Administrator General vs V.T. Laxmamma and Another

Jagan Mohan Reddy, J.—This is an application by the Administrator-General, Hyderabad, praying for necessary orders to be given to him to administer the properties; and assets of one late T. Anjaiah under Sections 11 and 12; Administrator-General''s Act (3 of 1913) and for costs to be Incurred in the administration of the said properties. In the petition the Administrator-General stated that an application, was given to him by one T. Sudershan next friend and guardian of minor Kistiah alias Krishna Swamy who is said to be the adopted son of the late Anjaiah who died on 27-9-1954 leaving two widows, T. Laxmamma and T. Savitramma.

By Savitramma he has two daughters but as he had no male Issue, it is said that he adopted the aforesaid Kistaiah alias Krishna Swamy and a suit has been filed In the District and Sessions Court, Secunderabad on his behalf by T. Sudershan who is the nephew of late T. Anjaiah. It is further alleged that the two widows are in possession of the properties of late Anjaiah and if Kishtiah alias Krishna Swamy is declared to be the adopted son of Anjaiah there is little possibility for compensating the loss incurred by the minor on account of the misappropriation of the properties and assets by the two widows.

On a reading of Sections 11 and 12 we were doubtful whether we could exercise jurisdiction under these sections and whether we were entitled to appoint the Administrator-General because it seemed to us prima facie that we had neither ordinary original civil jurisdiction nor could it be said that there was no person immediately available who is legally entitled to the succession of such assets nor was any danger apprehended of misappropriation, deterioration or waste of such assets before it could be determined who may be entitled to the succession thereto.

These were some of the conditions precedent to the maintainability of the application by the Administrator-General and for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to grant any directions to; him to, take possession and administer the properties; consequently we issued notices to the two widows on 6-9-1955 and as a result of these notices, the widows have appeared and have filed a counter in which they have admitted the death of their husband late Anjaiah on 27-9-1953 and stated that a suit No. 13 of 1955 was pending in the District Court at Secunderabad against them.

They denied that the minor T. Kistiah alias Krishna Swamy was the adopted son and that they, as the late Anjaiah''s widows are sole heirs and are lawfully in possession of the properties and assets of the late Anjaiah. They further denied, that there was no one legally entitled to the succession of the properties and even assuming without admitting that the alleged adoption is true and valid that they, as widows of late Anjaiah were entitled to half share of the properties by reason of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 18 of 1937, which was applied to this State with effect from 22-1-1953 by the Hyderabad (Application of Central Acts) Act, 48 of 1952, and that the apprehension of danger of misappropriation apart from being untrue is vague and devoid of any particulars.

Further in para. 3 the Respondents denied the allegations of T. Sudershan and asserted that in the suit filed on behalf of T. Kistiah alias Krishna Swamy in the District Court of Secunderabad, an application for appointment of receiver was filed but it was rejected by the District Judge, who in order to safeguard the interests of the minor in the event of success, directed the Respondents to execute an undertaking not to alienate the properties of the estate and to furnish monthly accounts.

The undertaking was duly executed and the monthly statements of accounts are regularly filed. In para. 4 it was alleged that Sections 10 and 11, Administrator-General''s Act have no application to this Court as the High Court has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction and no properties are situated within this jurisdiction; and that the Administrator-General has not taken the necessary precautions u/s 30 of the Act. In the result the Respondents prayed that the application of the Administrator-General be dismissed with costs.

In order to determine the question whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s 10 or 11, Administrator-General''s Act which no doubt makes it a condition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction to direct the Administrator-General to apply for administration or to, direct him to collect and hold assets until the right of succession or administration is determined the deceased, must have left assets within the, local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of a presidency town.

In so far as Section 10 conferring power to direct the Administrator-General to apply administration is concerned the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court which is empowered to exercise jurisdiction under that section is the High Court of a presidency-town as defined in Clause (44) of Section 3, General Clauses Act of 1897 to mean

''the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay as the case may be.''

The power to direct the Administrator-General to collect and hold assets until rights, of succession of administration is determined u/s 11 of the Act can be exercised by such High Court if a person dies leaving his assets within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of that High Court.

Though a High Court has been defined by Clause (12) of Section 2, Administrator-General''s Act as meaning ''in relation to a Part A or B State, the High Court for that State'' and with respect to certain other High Courts it specifies the High Court at a particular place, it is not every High Court which exercises the ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

It cannot be denied that the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad at one time exercised original civil jurisdiction but this jurisdiction has been abolished by the Hyderabad High Court (Abolition of Original Side Jurisdiction) Act 12 of 1951, Section 3(1) whereof provides that the original civil and criminal jurisdiction of the High Court is abolished.

No doubt u/s 6 all High Courts irrespective of the fact that they possess ordinary original civil jurisdiction or not, are deemed competent for the purpose of granting probate or letters of administration to the Administrator-General under any law for the time being in force wheresoever within the State the estate to be administered is situate; and by Section 8, Administrator-General of the State shall be deemed by all the Courts in the State to have a right to letters of administration other than letters pendente lite in preference to that of:

(a) a creditor; or (b) a legatee other than an universal legatee; or (c) a friend of the deceased.

Under Section 9 of the said Act if any person, not being an exempted person, has died leaving within any State assets exceeding the value of two thousand rupees and if no person to whom any Court would have jurisdiction of such assets has within one month after his death applied in such State for probate of his will or letters of administration of his estate, the Administrator-General of the State in which such assets are, subject to any rule made by the Government, shall within a reasonable time after he had notice of the death of such person and of his having left such assets, take such proceedings as may be necessary to obtain from the High Court letters of administration of the estate of such person.

The learned Administrator-General relied upon the aforesaid provisions for the maintainability of his application. We are unable to accept this contention as sound for the reason that he has not applied for any probate or letters of administration u/s 6, Administrator-General''s Act nor in our view is it possible for him to apply for any such probate or letters of administration firstly because the late Anjaiah is not alleged to have executed any will and secondly the Administrator-General has no power to apply for a probate or letters of Administration for the assets of an exempted person.

No doubt the provisions relating to the intestate succession in Chapter I Part V, Indian Succession Act, 1925 are inapplicable to the property of any Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina in the event of any intestacy occurring but by virtue of Section 218 of the said Act, the application toy any such person as aforesaid or any other exempted person for the administration of the estate of the deceased who died intestate may be granted to any person who according to the rules for the distribution of the estate, applicable to the case of such deceased, would be applicable to the whole or any part of such deceased''s estate, or where several such persons apply for such administration, it shall be granted to any or more of them at the discretion of the Court or the creditor of the deceased.

The position u/s 8 is that the Administrator-General has a right to apply for letters of Administration in preference to creditors or friends or legatees but not against a universal legatee in any Court other than a High Court and u/s 6 High Court is comptent to grant letters of administration though by virtue of Section 7 the Administrator-General has a preference over everybody else except the next of kin. While this is so Section 9 prevents the Administrator-General from applying for letters of Administration or probate relating to the assets left in the State by an exempted person.

The result of the examination of the relevant provisions of the Administrator-General''s Act would show that while the High Court is competent to grant probate or letters of Administration on his application, it is not competent to do so in the case of an exempted person unless the High Court is one exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction at a Presidency-town. Be that as it may.

The parties are Hindus in this case and are exempted persons, as such; the Administrator-General is not entitled to administer the property of such a person u/s 9 of the Administrator-General''s Act, 3 of 1913. In these circumstances it appears to us for the aforesaid reasons that we have ho jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Administrator-General in this case; consequently we reject it. Inasmuch as this is the first case of this kind before this Court, we make no order as to costs.