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Judgment
Sanjay Yadav, J.—The question which falls for determination is whether Collector, Respondent No. 2, was justified in allowing the claim of respondent No. 1 for relief under Public Liability Insurance Act (No. 6 of 1991) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1991), in lieu of death of Ox, who died due to electrocution. Uncontroverted facts are that Tehsildar, Mohangarh through Sub-Divisional Officer, Jatara District Tikamgarh furnished a report that respondent No. 1 lost his Ox having come in contact with live 11 KV wire which fell on it. This fact was ascertained by lineman. Collector, Tikamgarh on receiving such report drew a proceedings under 1991 Act, wherein, despite of notice, the petitioner herein remained absent. The Collector on a finding that the death of Ox was due to fall of 11 KV live line, awarded compensation of Rs. 6,000/- by impugned order dated 23.05.2013.
Assailing the order, it is urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that, the electricity being not a hazardous substance and the death being due to electrocution, the Collector was not justified in allowing the claim. It is urged that the liability to give relief under the Act of 1991 being on the principle of no fault as is contemplated vide section 3 of the Act of 1991 and the electricity being not a hazardous substance it was beyond the jurisdiction of Collector to have awarded the compensation. It is urged that the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
Considered the submissions.
Electricity is a hazardous substance is no more res-integra and has been held to be in M.P. State Electricity Board Vs. The Collector and Another, wherein it was observed by His Lordship:-
The next question for consideration is whether a notification is required to be made by the Central Government quantifying the electricity by notification as mentioned in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The definition of "hazardous substance" has been given in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 which is as under:-
2 (d)-"hazardous substance" means any substance or preparation which is defined as hazardous substance under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and exceeding such quantity as may be specified, by notification, by the Central Government.
The definition of "hazardous substance" has been borrowed from Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. As per Section 2(e) of the said Act, definition of "hazardous substance" reads as under:-"2(e)-''hazardous substance'' means any substance or preparation which, by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organism, property or the environment.
"Hazardous Substance" has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, according to which it means any substance or preparation which, by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling, is liable to cause harm to human beings. Physico-chemical properties of electricity are definitely liable to cause harm to human beings and other living creatures, plants, micro-organism etc. Thus, it has to be regarded as "hazardous substance" within the meaning given in Section 2(e) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and once when something is hazardous irrespective of quantity, In my opinion it is not necessary for the Central Govt. to issue a notification as it is not necessary to notify electricity as required in Section 2(d) of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 as it is hazardous irrespective of its quantity. A thing which is known as intensely hazardous has to be treated as hazardous substance so as to effectuate the purposes for the enactment of the Act of 1991. Whatever irrespective of proportion is hazardous has to be treated as hazardous one. Some article may not be hazardous in small quantity but electricity is not one of such article. Only these hazardous substances have to be notified which may be dangerous on exceeding such quantity then it becomes necessary to specify the quantity. In my opinion it is not necessary for the electricity to be notified u/s 2(d) of the Act of 1991 as in any quantity electricity is hazardous. It has to be taken as hazardous substance within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991. Section 2(d) of the Act of 1991 does not have effect narrowing down the meaning of "hazardous substance" as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1986. Similar question was answered in U.P. State Electricity Board and Another Vs. District Magistrate and Others, and in M.P. State Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. Collector, Mandla in W.P. No. 2165/2001 decided on 15-4-2002. In U.P. State Electricity Board (supra), it was held in Para 42 as under:-
Hence in my opinion ''hazardous substance'' as defined in Section 2(d) of the 1991 Act is not to be confined to a substance specified in the notification issued by the Central Government, but it includes all substances which come under the definition of ''hazardous substance'' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, with this exception that if any such substance is also notified by the Central Government u/s 2(d) of the 1991 Act then it will be a ''hazardous substance'' only if it exceeds the quantity specified in the said notification. Thus the notification issued by the Central Government u/s 2 of the 1991 Act can only narrow down the scope of ''hazardous substance'' as defined under the Environment (Protection Act, 1986, but substances which are not specified in the said notification will nevertheless be regarded as ''hazardous substances'' under the 1991 Act if they come within the definition of ''hazardous substances'' under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986." In the case of M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur (supra) it was held as follows:-
On a reading of aforesaid two definitions it cannot be construed that the substance which is not notified by the Central Government cannot be regarded as a ''hazardous substance''. The terms used u/s 2(d) of the Act are of wide amplitude and of immense magnitude. They are not to be understood in a narrow, restricted or confined manner. On the contrary, it covers a large canvas. The dictionary clause does not lay down a postulate that unless a substance is notified it cannot be regarded as a hazardous substance. The definition in the Act refers to Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. I have reproduced the aforesaid definitions hereinabove. The said definition is in a broad spectrum. It cannot be encompassed in a small region. If both the definitions are read together it is quite pronounced that the electricity should come within the ambit and sweep of the definition, and certain substances may become hazardous if they are notified as required under the provisions. Thus, notification by the Central Government is not the sine qua non to make a substance hazardous.
The question is whether the petitioner can be absolved from the liability on the ground that the falling of live 11 KV wire/line was accidental and not due to the petitioner''s negligence.
Act of 1991 was enacted to provide for public liability insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons effected by accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance. The expression "handling" is defined u/s 2(c) to mean:
(c)"handling" in relation to any hazardous substance, means the manufacture, processing, treatment, package, storage, transportation by vehicle, use, collection, destruction, conversion, offering for sale, transfer or the like of such hazardous substance;
The use of electricity thus tantamounts to handling the same. The expanse of its applicability cannot be curtailed as the respondent No. 1 wants that the accident occurred beyond the precincts of the respondents. In the considered opinion of this Court since the death was due to ''handling'' of hazardous substance being the proximate cause for death, sufficient it is for the person who claims through such deceased to maintain the claim for relief under the Act of 1991. This aspect is further strengthened when section 3 is taken into consideration which stipulates:-
Liability to give relief in certain cases on principle of no fault.-(1) Where death or injury to any person other than a workman or damage to any property has resulted from an accident, the owner shall be liable to give such relief as is specified in the Schedule for such death, injury or damage. (2) In any claim for relief under sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to in this Act as claim for relief), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death, injury or damage in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of any person.
In Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India, it was observed by their lordships:
91... According to this Court, an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such activity resulting, for instance, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who were affected by the accident as part of the social cost for carrying on such activity, regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or no (Such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-�-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous or dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. The enterprise alone has the resources to discover and guard against hazards and to provide warning against potential hazards. This Court reiterated that the measure of compensation in these kinds of cases must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and, more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise. The determination of actual damages payable would depend upon various facts and circumstances of the particular case.
In Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari and Others, , it was held:
Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability:. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.
This being the law regarding no fault liability, the Collector, i.e. respondent No. 2, in the considered opinion of this Court is justified in allowing the claim on the strength of the reasons therein. In the result, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.