A.D. Amin vs Union of India, New Delhi and Another

Gokulakrishnan, C.J.—This Letters Patent Appeal is against the order passed by the learned single Judge summarily rejecting the Special Civil Application filed by the appellant herein. The appellant was granted recognition as Travel Agent for Regional Passport Office, Bombay. By the letter dated 31st December, 1964, the appellant was informed by the Regional Passport Officer, Bombay that the recognition already accorded to him for dealing with the Regional Passport Office Bombay in matters relating to passport facilities of the appellants clients has been extended by the Government of India until further orders. In 1979, the appellant was called upon to renew his recognition. Since he has not put in any application for renewal, his agency was terminated on 27-7-1979. A Special Civil Application came to be filed and subsequently, on 27-7-1979, the order of termination of the agency was cancelled by the authorities concerned. On 1-10-1986, a new policy was enunciated by the Government of India with regard to the travel agents, who deal with passport facilities, Annexure ''F'' to the Special Civil Application is the letter received by the appellant from the Regional Passport Officer, Ahmedabad, requesting, him to send his fresh application for registration/recognition to the Joint Secretary (CPV) and the Chief Passport Officer, or the Under Secretary (PVS), Ministry of external Affairs, Government of India, Patiala House, Tilak Marg, New Delhi, directly with two copies of it to the Regional Passport Officer, Ahmedabad. This letter is dated 17-2-1988,while, according to the learned counsel, the policy enunciated for such renewal is dated I -10-1986. Subsequently, the appellant filed Special Civil Application No. 1212 of 1988 for issue of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the directions contained in letter dated 17-2-1988, which is Annexure ''F'', and letter dated 5-1-1988, which is Annexure ''G'', with a further prayer to direct the respondent to entertain and deal with the passport and other allied matters of the appellant''s clients. The learned single Judge of our High Court, after adverting to the facts of the case, dealing with each of the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner there n, observed that by the earlier recognition the appellant got a right to deal with the Bombay Office only, that it cannot be said that the appellant had acquired any vested right so as to deprive the 2nd respondent of his power to call upon the appellant to obtain fresh recognition under the new rules and that there is absolutely no unreasonable restriction in the new criterion so as to offend Art, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution an accordingly dismissed the Special Civil Application. The learned Judge has also dealt with the question as to the violation of principles of natural justice as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner therein and came to the conclusion that there is no such violation of the principles of natural justice in this case. Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant has come forward with the present Letters Patent Appeal.

Mr. A. J. Shastri, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the policy dated 1-10- 1986 is not applicable to the case of the appellant, that the Government is bound on the principles of estoppel to continue to recognise the appellant to deal with the Passport Office in matters relating to passport facilities, that the policy cannot have a retrospective operation, that the termination, of the right of a person, who enjoyed the benefit for 30 years, just as the appellant herein, without any notice, is against the principles of natural justice, that notice is a must before termination even under the Contract Act, that persons, who have some adverse records and criminal prosecution against them, are given the facility to deal with the Passport Office while the appellant is denied this facility and this attitude spells out arbitrariness on the part of authorities concerned offends Art. 14 of the Constitution, that the grant of recognition can be done only by the Central Government and the refusal to give recognition by the Regional Passport Office at, Ahmedabad is contrary to the procedure and the rules and as such, the action of the officer has to be quashed and that the work of the appellant is unblemished for a period of 30 years as on date and as such, cancellation of the recognition is against all canons of the principles of natural justice and offends Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

We have carefully considered all these averments made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein. In Special Civil Application No. 2403 of 1979, a single Judge of this High Court, as early as on 10-9-1979, passed the following order:

"Mr. D. D. Vyas, for the petitioner states that his client is given to understand that he would be allowed to work and so at that stage the petition is withdrawn by him though Mr. Vakil has no instructions either way."

Pressing this order into service and also the averments in the affidavit-in-reply filed by Shri C. H. Vasudevah, Regional Personal Officer, Ahmedabad, to the effect that the earlier order dated 27-7-1979 passed by the Regional Officer is cancelled, the learned counsel submitted that a clear case of promissory estoppel has been made out and as such, the facility enjoyed by the appellant cannot be curtailed without properly discharging the obligations on the part of the respondent concerned. The learned counsel reiterates that the original order, which we have extracted in paragraph supra, which is Annexure ''A'' to the Special Civil Application, is the extension of the recognition already accorded until further orders. Unless a valid order is passed by the Central Government requiring the appellant to renew the recognition, the facilities -accorded to the appellant cannot be curtailed. As regards the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the learned counsel cited the following decisions:

Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, ;

Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., ;

Kothari Oil Products Company Vs. Government of Gujarat, and

The Gujarat State Financial Corporation, Ahmedabad Vs. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., .

We have absolutely no difficulty in accepting the principles laid down in these decisions as regards the principles of promissory estoppel. The question is as to whether there is any case made out for invoking this doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Court order in Special Civil Application No. 2403 of 1979, which we have extracted above, nowhere spells out that the respondents held out that the recognition granted to the appellant will not be disturbed even if a new policy is evolved by the Government of India. Even the withdrawal of the Special Civil Application is not on any promise held out by the respondents, but it is on instruction given to the appellant''s counsel by his client. Further, the order states that the appellant was given to understand that he would be allowed to work. This itself, in our opinion, cannot make out a case of promissory estoppel against the respondents herein. The withdrawal of the cancellation order dated 10-9-1979 cannot also be construed as a promise given by the respondents to the effect that the appellant will be allowed to continue indefinitely irrespectively of any policy decision or direction may be given by the authorities concerned. In the absence of establishing the actual promise held out by the respondents, we do not think that the decisions cited by learned counsel appearing for the appellant, which are referred above, will have any hearing on the facts of this case.

It is seen from the letter Annexure ''A'', extending the recognition already accorded, that the Regional Passport Officer, Bombay, has permitted the appellant to deal with his office in matters relating to passport facilities of the appellant''s clients. Even that is restricted until further orders by the Government of India. As early as 1979 itself, the appellant was called upon to renew his recognition by the Ahmedabad Regional Passport Office. The letter, which is Annexure ''A'', clearly establishes that the facilities accorded to the appellant is only to deal with the Regional Passport Office, Bombay, and that too, until further orders by the Government of India. This letter is dated 3lst December 1964. Subsequent to 1971, due to the formation of a separate State, the Regional Passport Office, at Ahmedabad came to be established with independent powers to deal with the cases arising within the jurisdiction of the State of Gujarat. It is subsequent to that the appellant was called upon to renew his recognition. After the, appellant was called upon to renew his recognition, no doubt, a writ petition had been filed and the facts of the same have been extracted already in paragraph supra. Subsequent to the establishment of t e Regional Passport Office at Ahmedabad, this earlier recognition came to be cancelled in 1986. It is the say of Mr. Shastri, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that the recognition extended by the Bombay Regional Officer as early as on 31st December, 1964 will enure to his benefit in spite of the fact that a Regional Passport Office has been established independently at Ahmedabad, Considering the facts stated above, it is clear that the facility accorded to the appellant is only to deal with the Regional Passport Office at Bombay and the learned single Judge has also correctly adverted to this fact of the case and held that on the basis of such recognition the appellant cannot claim such right and that too indefinitely irrespective of the fact that a separate Regional Passport Office at Ahmedabad had been established subsequent to the bifurcation of Greater Bombay into two independent States.

The other contentions of the learned counsel, such as failure of natural justice and discrimination between the appellant and other similarly situated person, cannot, in our opinion, have any substance. Challenge to the policy as violative of Art. 19 of the Constitution has nowhere been raised in the Special Civil Application. Only the directions contained in letter dated 17-2-1988 were questioned. Nevertheless, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, states that the said letter, being in pursuance of the policy decided, it has to be construed that the appellant has taken the ground for the purpose of quashing the policy of the Central Government regarding the recognition for dealing with the Passport Office in matters relating to passport facilities. We are afraid, we are not able to appreciate this argument. There is absolutely nothing to show in Special Civil Application that the validity of the policy as offending the provisions of the Constitution is questioned. In as much as the Regional Passport Office, Ahmedabad, in whose jurisdiction the present appellant is situated, has clearly and categorically directed the appellant to renew his recognition, it is necessary for the appellant to put in necessary application for such renewal. The recognition of the travel agents for the purposes of dealing in matters relating to passport facilities, as observed by the learned single Judge of this High Court, is in the nature of privilege than a right. In our view, it is nothing but permission with a view to facilitate application for passports and not a right much less the vested right or enforceable right. The recognition, if any, which is not under statutory provision is subject to the policy decision by the Government or Competent Authority from time to time. Hence, the question of the new criteria, i.e. the policy now adopted, being violative of Art. 19(1)(c) cannot have any substance.

Inasmuch as the appellant has not put in any application for renewal, as directed by the Regional Passport Officer, Ahmedabad, it is too much on the part of the appellant to say that the recognition should not have been withheld without any notice. As we have observed already, it is not a lifetime grant for the appellant to deal in matters relating to passport facilities. Expression "until further orders" has been interpreted by the appellant to show that the Central Government has to issue necessary orders to cancel the facility and until then, the appellant is entitled to carry on his business without interruption and without even applying for renewal. Annexure ''A'', which is pressed into service, to support this contention, has not stated any where that the appellant can deal with in matters relating to passport facilities with any office until further orders. It is only with the Regional Passport Office, Bombay, that the appellant is directed to deal with until further orders. The facility is accorded to the appellant to renew his recognition, it is necessary for the appellant to have put in an application for renewal, instead of questioning the authority concerned as to under what authority they are asking for such an application for renewal. On these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that there was no notice before withdrawal of the recognition by the authorities concerned. Hence, the decision cited by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, namely: Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; Baldev Singh and Others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, ; and In Re: Om Prakash Pariwal and Another, , have absolutely no relevance on the facts and circumstances of the present case.

The contention to the effect that people who have dubious records, have been recognised and given the facilities, cannot give any advantage to the appellant to continue his business indefinitely. Individual cases, if they enjoy facilities illegally, can be considered as and when they are brought before the Court and the authorities concerned. If any illegal recognition has been granted, necessary action will be taken when it is brought before the authorities concerned. The appellant will have to stand or fall on his own, for the purpose of continuing his business indefinitely or until further orders. As we have discussed in paragraph supra, the appellant has not made out any such case and he has committed default in not putting in an application for recognition within the time stipulated nor has he put in an application even beyond that time.

For the reasons stated by the learned single Judge and also for the reasons we have stated in paragraphs supra, we do not find any merits in any of the submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant herein and accordingly this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.