Abu @ Syed Abuthagir & Ors. vs Union Of India

Per Dr.ANITA SUMANTH,J and SUNDER MOHAN,J.

In Crl.O.P.No.4906 of 2025, A1, A2, A3 and A5 in Crime No.735 of 2016 challenge order dated 17.12.2025 passed in Crl.M.P.No.322 of 2025 in Spl.S.C.No.17 of 2022, where the prayer was for recall P.Ws. 40, 52, 62, 63, 64 and 65 for the purpose of cross examination by the Special Court under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (Special Court).

The challenge in Crl.O.P.No.4909 of 2026 is to order dated 24.12.2025, allowing Crl.M.P.No.318 of 2025 in Spl.S.C.No.17 of 2022, and granting protection to LWs.10, 11, 12 and 15 and treat documents connected with them, being D25, D26, D28, D50, D74, D89, D102, D119, D120, D121, D130, D131, D194 and D215 as protected documents along with threat assessment reports and enquiry statements.

The brief facts are this. On 22.09.2016 at about 23.15 hours, the then spokesperson of Hindu Munnani (Front), Coimbatore was attacked indiscriminately by a group of persons. As a result, he had sustained grievous injuries to which he later succumbed. Investigation in FIR No.735 of 2016 under Section 302 IPC was taken over by the Special Investigation Division of the CBCID, Coimbatore. It is alleged that the four petitioners along with other accused who were all members of the Popular Front of India (PFI) were conspiring to strike terror within a section of people in the Country by various means including by brutally murdering the deceased.

A1 was arrested on 22.03.2017, A2 on 01.08.2017, A3 on 11.10.2017 and A4 on 25.12.2017. A1 and A2 were enlarged on statutory bail on 19.06.2017 and 01.11.2017 respectively, and A4 and A3 were enlarged on bail on 19.09.2018 and 17.10.2018 respectively.

The investigation was entrusted to the National Investigation Agency under the applicable provisions of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (in short ‘NIA Act’) and the original case was re-registered under Sections 120B, 153A and 302 of IPC along with Sections 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (in short ‘UAPA’) on 29.01.2018.

Charge sheet was filed as against A2 and A3 for the commission of offences under Sections 302 read with 120B, 302 read with 34 and 153A(1)(b) of IPC along with Sections 16(1)(a), 18 and 20 of the UAPA on 07.04.2018. Supplementary charge sheet has been filed as against A1 for the offence under Section 18 of the UAPA on 21.06.2018. Second supplementary charge sheet has been filed as against A5 for offences under Section 34, 120B, 153A(1)(b) and 302 IPC and Section 16(1)(a), 18 and 20 of the UAPA on 06.08.2021. Trial is on-going.

While so, a Miscellaneous Petition in Crl.M.P.No.154 of 2018 was filed by the NIA seeking to treat certain witnesses as protected. By order dated 26.04.2018, after recording satisfaction under Section 44 of the UAPA, the Court held as under:

Crl.M.P.No.283 of 2021 had been filed by the Respondents seeking to declare the witnesses listed in Schedule – 1 as protected witnesses and to direct not to supply copies of statement recorded in respect of the protected witnesses. The Petition was ordered on 19.08.2021 in the following terms:

On 25.06.2025 Crl.M.P.No.233 of 2025 was filed by the petitioners inspired by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Asarudeen v. Union of India & Ors^{11.SLP (Crl.)No.18155 of 2024 dated 06.05.2024} objecting to the protection accorded and pointing out that the respondent must satisfy the Court with the reasons set out as per section 44(2) of the UAPA for the grant of protection. That Miscellaneous Petition was allowed on 21.08.2025 on an endorsement made by the Special Public Prosecutor.

The Union then approached the Special Court once again in Crl.M.P.No.318 of 2025 seeking to treat LWs 10 to 25, 222 to 225 as protected witnesses and all documents connected to those witnesses as protected documents. The petitioners, arrayed as respondents before the Special Court, filed a counter objecting to the protection accorded to the witnesses and insisting on their right of cross examination as being a fundamental component of free trial, relying on the judgment in Kartar Singh V. State of Punjab^{22.(1994) 3 SCC 569} rendered in the context of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and Chandrasekhar Patel V. Suresh &Ors.³.

On 24.12.2025, the Special Court allowed the petition in part, holding LWs.10, 11, 12 and 15 as protected witnesses and the documents connected with them, being D25, D26, D28, D50, D74, D89, D102, D119, D120, D121, D130, D131, D194 and D215 as protected documents along with the threat assessment reports and enquiry statements.

The protection was made effective for the life of the witnesses. It is as against this order that Crl.O.P.No.4909 of 2026 has been instituted. Both parties would concur on the position that despite orders dated 26.04.2018 and 19.08.2021, there was really no secrecy maintained in the identity of the witnesses in the course of trial.

That apart, Crl.M.P.No.322 of 2025 was filed by the four petitioners seeking the following prayers:

³2023 Supreme (SC) 1261

That Miscellaneous Petition came to be substantially dismissed on 17.12.2025 and their request to recall the witnesses, save P.W.40, rejected. The Court notes that as far as P.Ws.52 and 62 to 65 were concerned, they had already been cross examined by the defence counsel in extenso. As far as P.W.52 is concerned, he had been examined in chief on 31.05.2024 and was present on 12.08.2024 for cross examination when the counsel for the accused had declined cross examination.

All exhibits marked through P.W.52 had been furnished to the accused on the date of chief examination and it was only after perusal of those documents, that the defence had chosen not to cross examine him. The learned Judge thus proceeds to reject the request for cross examination of all witnesses, save P.W.40, who had not been cross examined earlier. It is as against order dated 17.12.2025 that Crl.O.P.No.4906 of 2026 has been filed.

Mr.Basith, learned counsel, appears for the petitioners in both matters. He would submit that there is no justification in treating certain witnesses as protected witnesses. Moreover, the learned Judge ought to have permitted recall of the protected witnesses as the petitioners had been denied the right to cross examine them at the first instance.

Taking us through various judgments of the Supreme Court, he would submit that the selection of witnesses as protected witnesses had been arbitrary and without any application of mind, and such protection greatly prejudiced the accused as they were unable to put forth a proper case to defend themselves.

Section 44(1) of the UAPA states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, proceedings under UAPA may be held in-camera if the Court records reasons in writing. Section 44(2) states that if an application is made by a witness or by the Public Prosecutor apprehending danger or threat to the life of witnesses, the Court may impose such measures as are appropriate for keeping the identity and address of the witness secret after recording reasons in writing.

Section 44(3) mentions some of the measures that the Court may resort to, such as holding of proceedings at a particular place, effacing the name and address of the witness in Court records, issuance of directions for securing the identity and other details of the witnesses or direction not to publish the proceedings of the Court in public interest. Mr.Basith submits that Courts rarely, if at all, apply their mind to an application filed under Section 17 of the NIA Act seeking protection of witnesses, and the applications are allowed for the mere asking. According to learned counsel, this is one such instance.

Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Mr.Karthikeyan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for NIA cases, would submit that it is necessary in such cases to accord protection to a witness based on the threat perception and the other materials produced before the learned Judge. The Special Court bestows attention to the request for protection of witnesses and, based on the gravity of the case, orders such pleas. The present matter is no exception, and no case has been made out to intervene in the impugned order.

Heard both learned counsel. As far as Crl.O.P.No.4906 of 2026 is concerned, the challenge is to the order of the learned Judge permitting recall only in the case of P.W.40, and rejecting the plea for recall of other witnesses on the ground that sufficient opportunity has been granted to the defence to cross-examine them. The defence had either availed the opportunity given or, in one case, chosen not to. In the case of one witness where no opportunity had been granted at the first instance, the petitioners have been granted the right now.

Charge sheets in this matter have been filed on 07.04.2018 as against A2 and A3, on 21.06.2018 as against A1 and on 06.08.2021 as against A5 and trial is proceeding from that date onwards. We are given to understand that the authorities had approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court is monitoring the trial to ensure that there are no further delays in the matter. Thus, as far as Cr.O.P.No.4906 of 2026 is concerned, we agree that sufficient opportunity had been granted at the initial stage and had been availed by the defence. The learned Judge has found one instance where the defence had not cross-examined the witness, and has put the record straight, by granting such opportunity.

As far as Crl.O.P.No.4909 of 2026 is concerned, while the petition prays for protection of 20 witnesses, the Special Court has treated four witnesses, viz., L.W.10, 11, 12 and 15 as protected witnesses and connected documents, threat assessment reports and enquiry statements, as protected documents. This is hence not a case where the officer has, en masse, proceeded to accept the case of the Prosecution.

Learned Judge has sifted through the contentions of both parties, the compelling requirement for a fair trial including the opportunity to cross examine and discussed applicable case law, proceeding to declare four individuals as protected witnesses and connected documents as protected documents. The protection has been extended for their lifetime as, in her view, the threat analysis report reveals that the threat as against their life was extreme.

To a specific question put by us as to how the chief examination of the protected witnesses was conducted, Mr.Sundaresan, on instructions, states that the chief examination was recorded in the presence of the accused and even redacted portions were elicited in the presence of the accused. Having acceded so, he would argue that cross examination in any event was not mandatory, relying on the judgments in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay and another⁴, Hira Nath Mishra and others v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and another ⁵ and Mahender Chawla and ors. v. Union of India and ors^{66.(2019) 14 SCC 615}.

As could be seen from the impugned order, the learned counsel for the defence, had in fact opposed the prayer for protection stating that the documents relatable to the witnesses that were supplied to the accused revealed the identity of the witnesses. Before us, the appellant does not dispute this factual position. Therefore, in this case, we do not see any reason to interfere in the impugned order, since the right of cross-examination has not been abridged or curtailed because of the order of the learned Judge declaring the witnesses as protected.

The challenge seems more cosmetic rather than substantive, as no prejudice has been caused to the Appellant. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no justification in intervening with the impugned orders dated 17.12.2025 and 24.12.2025. Accordingly, Crl.O.P.Nos.4906 and 4909 of 2026 and the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed.

However, we have to necessarily record our displeasure as regards the manner in which orders have been passed by the trial Court. Inspite of an earlier order dated 19.08.2021 to furnish the redacted statements after the examination

⁴1952 AIR SC 221

⁵1973 AIR (SC) 1260 in chief, copies were not furnished, citing the order passed by this Court in Mohammed Asarudeen’s ^{77.Foot Note Supra (1)} case, which ultimately was reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Often, we find that the Special Court grants protection of witness for the mere asking and there is little clarity in respect of the manner by which the protection is to be extended, period of protection, and reasons for such decision.

The larger question that was brought to light in this matter, related to the manner in which witnesses were accorded protection under Section 44 of the UAPA Act. In many of the orders that we have seen, the learned Special Judge has proceeded to pass orders mechanically either at the instance of the witness or prosecution, holding the witnesses to be protected. There was also no clarity or reasoning in regard to the extent of protection, the duration thereof, and the manner by which the protection was to be given.

We thus sought the assistance of Mr.Sharath Chandran on the aspect of the matter relating to witness protection, and have heard learned Amicus Curiae in detail. We record our deep appreciation for the efforts of learned Amicus to assist us in the matter, and draw from his oral and written arguments in tracing the background to Section 44 as we know it today, and our understanding as to how the provision must be understood and applied.

Protection of witnesses is provided for under Section 17 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA) which states that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, proceedings conducted in regard to the NIA Act may be held in-camera, if the Special Court if so desires, carving out an exception from Section 327 of the Code which requires Court hearings to be open in nature.

Section 17(2) says that such protection may be accorded either on an application made by the witness in a proceeding or by the Public Prosecutor in relation to a witness or suo motu by the Court, if the Special Court is satisfied that the life of the witness was in danger. The measures to be adopted for grant of such protection by keeping the identity of such witness secret are left to the discretion of the Court with suggestions made in Section17(3), being (a) holding of proceedings in a location alternate to the regular Court hall, (b) avoiding of the names and addresses of the witnesses in orders/judgments/case records, (c) issuing of directions that the identity and witness of the witness not be disclosed and (d) directions that the proceedings before the Court not be published in any manner.

In a case where the Special Judge passes orders under Section 17(1)/(2)/(3), any contravention was held to be punishable with imprisonment that may extend to three years and fine. This is provided for under Section 17 (4). Section 44 of the UAPA mirrors Section 17 of the NIA Act.

The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance was introduced on 15.07.1984 to provide for speedy trial of matters in terrorist affected areas by setting up Special Courts. The ordinance was replaced by the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts)Act, 1984, with effect from 31.08.1984, that dealt with protection of witnesses under Section 12 thereof.

Section 12 reads as follows:-

Section 12 as above, was mirrored in Section 13 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (TADA), application of which was extended from time to time till it lapsed on 23.05.1995. Section 13 in the 1985 TADA Act was carried forward as Section 16 in the subsequent editions of the TADA Act and the difference between Section 12 of the 1984 TADA Act and Section 16 of the 1987 TADA Act was that Section 16(3)(a) of the latter empowered the Special Court to hold proceedings at ‘a place’, as against ‘a protected place’, to be decided by the Special Court. The second difference was that Section 16(3) contained Clause (d) empowering the Court to order in public interest, that the proceedings not be published in any manner.

The 1985 and 1987 editions of the TADA were challenged before the Punjab and Haryana High Court and in Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of India^{88.AIR 1988 P&H 95}, the Full Bench was of the view that Section 16(1) of TADA, 1987 made serious inroads into the principle of open justice, as in-camera trials were declared to be the norm rather than the exception. Since the Full Bench also expressed the view that the decision as to whether open trial was to be conducted was at the discretion of the Public Prosecutor, Section 16 came to be substituted in 1993, clarifying that the decision for an in-camera hearing was to be by the Court.

Coming to the protection of witnesses, the Bench held that there has to be a fair balance between protection of the witness and the right of fair trial of an accused. To put it in their words, the Court must ‘ensure that a witness is able to depose (before) the Court free from all mental constraint and fear’ on the one hand and ‘at the same time ensure that the accused is put in a position to effectively cross examine the witness’.

Bearing in mind the necessity and importance of the right of cross examination, the Full Bench stated that where the trial was held in an open Court, the identity of the witness shall be left open, to be viewed by the accused, his counsel and the Court. Hence, the balance in Section 16 was sought to be achieved by stating that the name, identity and the address of the witness should be disclosed well before the start of the trial to ensure effective cross examination.

The constitutional validity of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984 and the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 and 1987, were challenged before the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh^{99.Foot Note Supra (2)}, and while upholding the validity of Section 16(2) and 16 (3) of the TADA, the Supreme Court held that there was no imposition of constitutional or statutory constraint against keeping the identity and address of a witness’s secret, if warranted by ‘extraordinary circumstances or imperative situations’.

In order to maintain the balance, the Supreme Court concluded stating that, while normally the identity and other details of the witnesses may be disclosed before trial commences, the Court has the discretion, for ‘weighty reasons’ that must be recorded, not to disclose the identity and details of the witnesses in order to protect their lives. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as follows:

emphasis supplied

This judgment was rendered by the three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court. The TADA lapsed on 23.05.1995 and the successor, Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000 came to be considered by the Law Commission in its 173^rd Report. The discussion on achieving a fine balance between a fair trial and witness protection continued, with the Law Commission expressing the view that, on recording of the reasons of the Court that the life of a witness was in danger, it may take such measures as necessary to balance the right of cross examination and the protection of the witness.

In their words, ‘we are also of the opinion that the power of the court to take appropriate measures to permit cross-examination even while protecting the identity of the witness must be deemed to be implicit in sub-cls. (2) and (3) as they are found in the Bill’

It was in this backdrop that the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) was enacted, where Section 30 provided for witness protection. Section 30 emphasized that the Court has to record satisfaction and the reasons indicating the basis of satisfaction that the life of a witness was in danger, prior to resorting to the measures set out in Section 16(3) for protecting the witness's life.

In PUCL v. Union of India^{1010.(2004) 9 SCC 580}, Section 16 came to be challenged and the challenge was repelled in the following terms, and we extract the following observations for better understanding:-

The repeal of the POTA by the Prevention of Terrorist (Repeal) Act, 2004, with effect from 21.09.2004 saw, on the same day, the promulgation of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ordinance. Many provisions of the POTA were telescoped under the UAPA, which has been in existence since 1967 and Section 30 of the POTA assumed the avatar of Section 44(1) to Section 44(4) of the UAPA Act, 1967.

The ingredients of Section 44 are as follows:

This provision has not been challenged. Similar provisions have been tested by the Supreme Court and held to be valid on certain conditions. Therefore, we intend to reiterate the said principles so as to balance the right of the accused and the protection that is required to be given to the witnesses. For this purpose, the Court must exercise discretion on an application filed by either witness or Public Prosecutor to decide whether the plea for protection is warranted or justified as it would certainly make some inroads into the rights of an accused.

We observe that this provision is meant to be a protection / shield to the witnesses from threats and not a sword in the hands of the prosecution to curtail or abridge the valuable right of cross-examination. Therefore, whenever an application is made by the prosecution, or by any witness seeking protection, the Court would have to first examine the gravity of the threat, whether the life of the witness was in danger or whether the threat to the witness would only continue till he deposes before the Court. The measures to be taken would have to be commensurate to the decision in regard to the aforesaid parameters, in terms of the paragraphs to follow.

As and when the Court decides to keep the identity and address of witness secret, it is for the Court to decide as to which portion of the statement has to be redacted and it shall not be left to the discretion of the prosecution to decide that aspect. We find that in many cases, the Court accepts the redactions made by the investigating officer without examination. This is not only contrary to the purport and object of Section 44 of the UAPA Act, 1967, but would also pave way for affording undue advantage to the prosecution in the adversarial system that we follow.

The second grey area relates to the tenure of protection given to a protected witness. The measures taken for protection would normally relate to redaction of the name, address and other particulars in the statement that would point to the personal/identifying details of the deponent. If the right of the accused to cross examination is to be achieved, it is normally required for the Court to direct disclosure of the details, prior to cross examination. Such a right would depend on the subjective satisfaction of the Court as to the extent of protection to be afforded, having regard also, to the object of the UAPA.

We have noted that in some cases the Court directs furnishing of complete unredacted statements prior to commencement of trial, in order that the accused may equip himself in full for the trial. In some other cases, the unredacted version of the statements are supplied to the accused prior to cross examination and we have also seen in some cases the Court directing protection to be maintained for the lifetime of the witness, being of the view that the threat perception is so grave.

All three approaches would be perfectly within the domain of the Court as it is presumed that the decision is taken after assessing the plea for protection, the justification for the same and threat perception. It is only when the third option is exercised by the Court, that the right of cross-examination of the accused is abridged to a great extent and we must therefore, strike a balance.

Witness protection in India assumes a different form and substance than what it does in other Countries. While one might commonly understand witness protection as meaning protection of a witness for life by giving the witness a new identity and life in an altogether different place, in India, the concept of witness protection is restricted to the canvas of that particular trial alone.

In fact, a Witness Protection Scheme was prepared in 2018 providing for a comprehensive decision for deciding on protection of witnesses, the scope of the competent authorities in Districts to decide the extent of protection to be given, the means by which the decision of the competent authority should be taken and a review by the defence or police authorities of the decisions of the competent authority.

However the authority for consideration of the review has not been stipulated. It is also unclear as to whether at all, the Scheme has been notified and hence, it appears to us that the Scheme has been abandoned without Notification. Importantly, the aim and object of the Scheme indicates only protection of the witness sans balancing the rights of the defence. Moreover, a review has been provided only to the witness or police authority.

This indicates that the Scheme is solely witness centric and does not strike the necessary balance that we are urging now, by taking into account the interests of the defence, particularly in the context of cross examination.

While it may seem that stipulating measures for protection up to a particular stage only, might not serve the purpose of protection in the fullness of the term, we have noted that it is open to the Court to extend the protection for the life of the witness as well in deserving cases, if at the discretion of the Court, the threat perception qua that witness were to be so severe or grave.

It thus becomes all the more important that the decision in regard to measures for witness protection take into account the particular facts and circumstances of the case, its peculiarities, the perception of threat and all other available material, before the Special Court Judge addresses the question of witness protection and the extent of the same. There is thus no one size fits all formula as far as witness protection is concerned and the only rule that reigns is the one relating to application of mind by the Court on this aspect of the matter.

In Union of India v. Mohammed Asarudeen^{1111.Crl.O.P.No.2872 of 2024 dated 21.10.2024}, a Division Bench of this Court had taken the view that the protection accorded was for the lifetime of the witness and Section 161 statements could not be handed over to the defence at any time during the trial. The Division Bench had held that if a statement of a protected witness were to be handed over to an accused that would render the protection an empty formality.

Setting aside the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court, in Mohammed Asarudeen^{1212.Foot Note Supra (1)} expressly held that it is not in every case that the protection must be ad infinitum or over the lifetime of the accused. It is for the Court to apply its mind as to what the measures must be and record its reasons for directing those measures.

Thus, in substance, it is the subjective satisfaction of the Court in imposing directions that is relevant, and more importantly, the reasons for the formation of that subjective satisfaction, that must be reflected in the order itself. The words of the Supreme Court are as follows:

From Section 44 of the UAPA and the observations made by the Supreme Court while upholding the constitutional validity of similar provisions, we summarise, at the risk of repetition, that the Court has three available approaches before it, if it comes to the conclusion that the protection of the witnesses is required.

If the Court exercises the first two options i.e., providing unredacted statements prior to the commencement of the trial or furnishing unredacted statements after the chief examination of the witnesses is complete and prior to cross-examination, the right of the accused to cross-examine the witness is neither abridged nor curtailed. These two options can be exercised by the Court if there is a reasonable apprehension of threat to the witness.

It is only in cases where the Court is of the view that the protection to the witness is for lifetime and the unredacted statements of witnesses, which purports to conceal the identity of the witnesses, are never furnished to the accused, that the right of cross-examination is abridged. This option cannot be exercised on mere asking and it should be exercised only in extraordinary or exceptional circumstances.

Needless to say, one of the important facets of cross-examination is to discover who the witness is and what is his position in life. It shall also be lawful in cross-examination to ask any question which tends to shake the credibility of the witness by injuring his character. Therefore, this important right of the defence would be denied if the anonymity of the witness is maintained.

That is exactly the reason why the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh^{1313.Foot Note Supra (2)} held that only in exceptional cases shall the anonymity of the witness continue for lifetime of the witness, mandating the trial Court to give weighty reasons if and when such a course is adopted. Mr.Sharath has also elaborated on what might constitute the residual category of cases where, for weighty reasons, the identity and other details of the witness may be withheld, referring to very many cases on that aspect, and making the following suggestions:

The last question would be in regard to the probative value of the evidence of such an anonymous witness, who could not be subject to full cross-examination. In PUCL^{1414.Foot Note Supra (10)}, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider this aspect as well, observing that in order to safeguard the right of the accused, the Special Court is obligated to satisfy itself about the truthfulness or reliability of the statement or deposition of the witness, whose identity is sought to be protected.

In fact, the Court had also observed that some jurisdictions also provide appointment of independent counsels to act as amicus curiae for going through the depositions of such witnesses and assist the Court in forming an opinion about the weight of the evidence of such witnesses.

In a recent decision, Bilal Mir v. National Investigation Agency^{1515.Crl.M.C.No.5129 of 2025 in Crl.M.A.No.22186 of 2026 dated 29.07.2026}, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court was pleased to consider the very same question and observed that while considering the evidence of such witnesses the Court must bear in mind that cross-examination was abridged and should appreciate the evidence with due caution and trepidation.

It is trite that any version untested by cross-examination would normally have no value. In the case of an anonymous witness, the cross-examination is abridged and therefore, his version is not fully tested. Hence, the probative value of such witness, would not be the same as that of the other witnesses, whose versions have been subjected to complete cross-examination, and the Court therefore, has to look for corroboration of such testimony.

The value to be attached to uncorroborated testimony of such witness would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the nature of evidence adduced through that witness and its relevance to the facts of the case.

Mr. Sharath has distilled the principles from the backgrounder to Section 44 and put forth several instructive suggestions. Endorsing the same, we issue the following directions:

We would conclude reminding ourselves that an order under Section 44 is not final in any respects, but is subject to revision by the Court, either suo motu or at the instance of the witness/Public Prosecutor based on the fluctuations in circumstances and in the gravity of threat and other parameters. It is interlocutory in character and maybe revisited any number of times.

Since we are given to understand that there is no specific procedure that is followed by the Court in deciding applications for witness protection, we request Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned Amicus to circulate an SOP in this regard.

List on 21.09.2026 to receive SOP.

Note: Registry is directed to return the files received from the Special Court in a sealed cover forthwith.

These matters are listed today for correction of three typographical errors in paragraph Nos.42, 44 and 45.

Paragraph Nos.42, 44 and 45 shall now read as follows:

Barring the aforesaid, the order remains the same.

Registry to carry out the necessary corrections and upload as well as issue order copy afresh, forthwith.