Abraham Nadar and Others vs The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Harbour Project and Others

K. Veeraswami, C.J.—This batch of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ appeals are directed against the

notifications u/s 4(1) as well as the declarations u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the first made in 1962 and the second in 1968 and January,

1969. The public purpose mentioned in Section 4 (1) notifications was the development of Tuticorin Port or Tuticorin Harbour, establishment of

industries, industrial estates, training centre and construction of residential quarters. But in the declarations u/s 6 the purpose described was

industrial development of Tuticorin area connected with Tuticorin Harbour Project. The land sought to be acquired extended to several thousands

of acres. The short grounds on which the validity of the notifications as well as the declarations are challenged, are that the public purpose

mentioned in the notifications u/s 4 (1) was vague and lacked in particulars so as to enable the owners of lands to effectively file their objections to

the purpose of acquisition u/s 5-A, and that there was a change in the purpose of acquisition as mentioned in the declarations u/s 6.

Munshi Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), , held that the whole object of Section 5-A would be defeated, if the public purpose was

stated vaguely and without any indication of the nature of the purpose for which the land was being or was intended to be acquired. In that case, all

that was mentioned as public purpose in the notification u/s 4 (1) was "" for planned development of the area"". The Supreme Court by an

unanimous verdict held that the notification u/s 4 (1) was vitiated on account of vagueness. The judgment was noticed by a larger Bench in

Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, . The view in the earlier judgment was quoted apparently with approval, but with the

observation that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification u/s 4 was sufficient to enable an objection to be filed u/s 5-A, would

depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Actually, however, the second decision was rested not on the view to Munshi Singh and

Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), but on the ground of delay and laches or want of a plea at the earliest possible time. The Court pointed out that

the plea as to the vagueness of public purpose in the notification u/s 4(1) was not raised in the writ petition, and that the writ petitions themselves

were filed after a long delay. So, on the basis that the appellants before the Supreme Court were not vigilant and had failed to take the precise plea

at the earlier stage, the appeals were dismissed.

In our opinion, the basis of Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, will apply to the present cases. The notification u/s 4 (1)

in the matters before us was made in 1962. In answer thereto, objections were relied u/s 5-A : but no plea of vagueness of the public purpose was

taken. The declaration u/s 6 followed in 1968 and in January, 1969 : but the challenge to the validity of the notifications and the declarations was

made in the objections filed only in 19735 after a long lapse of time. In justification of the delay, we are informed that, unlike in Aflatoon and

Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, in the instant cases there was an alteration of the public purpose in the declaration which was

different from the one in the notifications u/s 4 (1). This is hardly an explanation, because even after the declaration u/s 6 there was a delay of more

than 3 1/2 years. Also, the ground of the State that no plea was taken as to the vagueness of the public purpose in Section 5-A objections stands

unchallenged.

Applying Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, , the petitions as well as the appeals are dismissed. No costs. For the

purpose of assessing the fee as between counsel and party, we fix fee Rs. 200 in each case.

W.P. No. 2346 of 1973.

This too is like the other petitions and appeals which we have dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and for want of taking the precise

plea. Nevertheless it is said that the extent of 39 acres 24 cents covered by the notification in this petition could not serve any purpose indicated in

the Section 4 (1) notification unless the immediately neighbouring lands of an extent of 440 acres belonging to the Central Government are also

acquired. Counsel, for the purpose of meeting the objection on the ground of delay and want of a plea, is willing to accept the validity of the

notification u/s 4 (1) and the declaration u/s 6. Even so, he says that, since the purpose mentioned in the notification u/s 4 (1) and in the declaration

u/s 6 could not be implemented unless the neighbouring hands are acquired which apparently has not been done so far, there is no longer any need

for proceeding with the acquisition. The answer, in our opinion, is that, once the validity of the notification u/s 4 (1) and also the declaration u/s 6

remains unchallenged on any ground whatever, the rest of the matter is procedural under the Land Acquisition Act. If ultimately Government find

that the land in question is not required for the public purpose it is always open to them at the appropriate stage to give up the acquisition u/s 48

and, for that purpose, it is also open to the petitioner to apply to Government. But what is urged cannot furnish a ground for our interference,

notwithstanding the objection based on the delay and laches on which we have held Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others,

was disposed of.

The writ petition too is dismissed. No costs. For the purpose of assessing the fee is between Counsel and party, we fix Rs. 200.