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Judgment
Dr. Satish Chandra, J.—We have heard learned Counsel for parties and gone through the material available on record. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 7th October, 1992 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 69 of 1983, where the award of Rs. 15,000/- was awarded in favour of the opposite party No. 2.
Earlier, this appeal was dismissed for non prosecution vide order dated 2nd September, 2003, but it was restored to its original number vide another order dated 22nd March, 2007. The appeal is filed for enhancement of the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act).
The brief facts of the case are that on 8th July, 1983, at about 1.00 p.m. deceased Rais Ahmad was going on a cycle on Lucknow-Raebareilly Road. When he reached near Mohalla Telibagh, a Jeep bearing number UPH-5338 hit the deceased. The driver of the Jeep was driving the vehicle negligently and rashly and crushed the deceased, who died on the spot. The deceased was aged about 13 years old and was a student of High School. It was claimed that he was working with one Ishtiaq Ali for welding work. So, the claim petition was filed for Rs. 1,50,000/-. However, the Tribunal after examining the entire evidence has awarded a compensation of Rs. 15,000/- under the then Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Not being satisfied, the claimant has filed the present appeal.
The accident and the death of son of claimants are not in dispute. The jeep in question was insured and the driver had a valid licence at the time of accident. However, a Case Crime No. 180/1983 was registered against the driver. Regarding the claim that the deceased was actually running his own shop of welding or has been employed by anyone was not proved before the Tribunal. Therefore, the relief was granted u/s 92-A (old Motor Vehicles Act) and a compensation of Rs. 15,000/- was awarded.
learned Counsel for the appellants relied on the ratio laid down in the following cases:
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda, ;
Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 2 S.C.C. (Cri.) 1002 : 2009 (2) T.A.C. 677 (S.C.);
Laxmi Devi & others v. Mohammad Tabbar & another, 2008 (3) A.L.J. 612 : 2008 (2) T.A.C. 394 (S.C.); and
Ram Ji Sahu and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others, 2009 (3) A.L.J. 276.
However, all the cases relied upon by the appellants'' case are related to the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the instant case is pertaining to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act), the ratio laid down in the above mentioned cases are not applicable in the instant case for the reason that the Tribunal has awarded compensation as per the then law i.e. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
It may be mentioned that in case of the death of a child, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during the child''s life time. But, this will not necessarily bar the parents'' claim and prospective loss will find a valid claim provided the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jenkins, (1993) A.C. 1, and Lord Atkinson said thus:
all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact-there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first that the deceased money in the past, and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them.
In the light of the above discussion and by considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the compensation was awarded by the Tribunal as per the then law. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The same is hereby sustained alongwith the reasons mentioned therein. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.