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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No.28 of 2026 dated 24.02.2026 registered at Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police received secret information on 24.02.2026 at about 06:25 p.m. that Prince Rana and his foster brother Sudhanshu Soni were selling heroin in the house of Sonika Rana. The police completed the formalities and went to the house, where they recovered a transparent plastic pouch containing 32.56 grams of heroin. Sudhanshu Soni disclosed during the interrogation that Sonika Rana had purchased heroin from one person and handed it over to him with a direction to take it to Baijnath. Prince Rana had concealed the packet beneath sofa-cum-bed, which was recovered by the police. The police intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01DA-0548 at Palampur in which Rishav Kumar, Akash Rana (the present petitioners), Sonika Rana and Ashwani Rana were travelling. However, no recovery was effected from the vehicle or any of the occupants. The petitioners were implicated based on the statement made by the co-accused that they were involved in the purchase of the heroin on 23.02.2026. These allegations are false. No recovery was effected from the petitioners. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police is less than the commercial quantity and rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The police have completed the investigation, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody. The petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.
The petitions are opposed by filing status reports asserting that the police received secret information on 24.02.2026 at 06:25 p.m. that Prince Rana, Sonika Rana and Sudhanshu Soni were selling heroin in the house of Sonika Rana, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching the house. The information was credible, and any delay in procuring the search warrant would have led to the destruction of the heroin. Hence, the information was reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer. Anoop Kumar and Madan Lal were asked to join the investigation, but they expressed their inability. The police joined Sreshtha Devi as an independent witness and went to the house where Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni were found. The police searched the house in their presence and in the presence of the witnesses and recovered one polythene packet concealed in the sofa-cum-bed. The police opened the packet and found 32.56 grams of heroin in it. The police interrogated Sudhanshu Soni, who revealed that he had accompanied Sonika Rana and Aakash Rana to Ludhiana on 22.02.2026. Sonika Rana had purchased heroin and handed it over to Sudhanshu Soni with a direction to deliver it to Prince Rana. He had delivered the heroin to Prince Rana, who had concealed it beneath sofa-cum-bed, and it was recovered by the police. The police also interrogated Prince Rana. Subsequently, the police intercepted a vehicle bearing registration number HP-01DA-0548 and found Sonika Rana, Aakash Rana, Rishav Kumar and Ashwani Rana in it. The police searched the vehicle, but no recovery was effected. It was found during the interrogation that the petitioners were also present at the time of purchase of the heroin. The heroin was sent to the FSL and was confirmed to be diacetylmorphine. No FIR was registered against the petitioner. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court on 24.04.2026. The matter was listed for consideration of charge on 14.09.2026.
I have heard Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated based on a statement made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The police had searched the vehicle in which the petitioners were travelling, and no recovery was effected from them. The petitioners do not have any criminal antecedents. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners had accompanied the co-accused for the purchase of the heroin. They are also part of the conspiracy to purchase heroin and sell it to various people. The consumption of heroin is adversely affecting society and the petitioners should not be released on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56.In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7.It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.
8.Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9.Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57.In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8.The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58.This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3.Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59.In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60.In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9.… It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii)nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii)severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv)danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v)character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi)likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii)reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii)danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2.The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3.It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
The present petitions have to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The status report mentions that the police had intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01DA-0548 and found the petitioners present in it along with the co-accused. It was specifically mentioned in the status report that no recovery of any contraband was effected from the vehicle. Therefore, the petitioners’ presence in the vehicle does not show their involvement in the commission of the crime.
The police are relying upon the statement made by the co-accused to connect the petitioners to the commission of the crime. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by an accused during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. It was also held that the confession made by the co-accused is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 568: -
44.Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47] and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.”
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC 271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 (4) SCC 1, that a confession made to a police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the co-accused implicating the petitioner.
A similar situation arose before this Court in Dinesh Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, and it was held that a confession of the co-accused and the phone calls are not sufficient to deny bail to a person.
The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the matter was listed for consideration of charge on 14.09.2026. The status report does not disclose that the petitioners’ custodial interrogation is required in the present case. Therefore, there is force in the submission of Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioners, that no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioners in custody.
The petitioners asserted that they are permanent residents of District Kangra. This was not stated to be incorrect in the status report filed by the State. It means that the petitioners have roots in the society and there is no chance of their absconding.
In view of the above, the present petitions are allowed, and the petitioners are ordered to be released on bail subject to their furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/-each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioners will abide by the following conditions: -
The petitioners will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will they influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
The petitioners shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
The petitioners will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
The petitioners will surrender their passport, if any, to the Court; and
The petitioners will furnish their mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
The petitions stand accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai District and Open-Air Correctional Home Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of these petitions and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.