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T. Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.—In Writ Petition No. 3624 of 1973 the Petitioner is A. Veerayya Vandiyar Memorial Sri Pushpam College,
Poondi. On 19th January, 1966, a deed of declaration was executed by the founders of this College presided over by Sri Veerayya Vandiayar. In
and by that document, a permanent endowment for the establishment and maintenance of the college, for the construction of buildings and for
equipments and furniture, was created. The deed of trust contains three schedules. The A schedule relates to an extent of 46 acres 32 cents of
buildings sites in which the college is located. The B schedule consists of an extent of 399.95 acres of land, dry, wet, house sites, topes, etc., in
various villages in the district of West Thanjavur. The B schedule properties were intended to provide funds for the establishment and maintenance
of the college. Even the C Schedule properties of an extent of 168.80 acres were set apart by the fore fathers of the donors under the declaration
of trust for various charities referred to in an agreement, dated 9th September, 1964 and for the setting up of an institution for the advancement of
education. With the help of such munificent donations made by the donors under the agreement, dated 9th September, 1964 and under the deed of
trust, dated 19th January, 1956 the Petitioner college was started which was later on affiliated to the University of Madras. Due to the untiring and
self-less devotion and service of Sri Veerayya Vandiyar, the Petitioner has grown into a First Grade Post Graduate affiliated college of the
University of Madras. The Petitioner refers to the strength of the college, the various humanities and sciences taught in the college and in the main
refers to the substantial agricultural lands endowed for the benefit and maintenance of the college. The lands consisted of certain inam lands which
were taken over by the Government under the Inams Abolition Act. The other lands, which were ryotwari, came within the purview of the Tamil
Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (Tamil Nadu Act LVIII of 1961) (hereinafter called the Land Reforms Act), which came
into force on 6th April, 1960. Inter alia the Land Reforms Act provided that on and from the date of commencement of the Act, no person shall be
entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area as prescribed therein. The surplus lands have to be determined u/s 18 of the Act and a notification
has to be made to the effect that the surplus lands are required for public purpose and as soon as such surplus lands are taken over, compensation,
according to the graded slab, has to be paid to the owner from whom such lands are taken over. Until 1970, the lands belonging to the Petitioner
being, held by a charitable or educational institution, were not affected. Under the Tamil Nadu Act XXXVII of 1972, Section 73 of the Parent Act
was amended which said that nothing contained in this Act shall apply to any land held by any University constituted by any law. The result was
that the Act was made applicable to educational institutions of a public nature including the Petitioner college and the trust, Under the Tamil Nadu
Act XXXVII of 1972, lands belonging to religious institutions or any religious trust of a public nature, which were in existence at the
commencement of that Act was also excluded. The only salient feature was that as far as educational institutions were concerned, the ceiling area
was fixed under the table prescribed under the Act. According to the said table the ceiling area for any college affiliated to or recognised by any
University was fixed at 40 standard acres and for any hostel attached thereto 25 standard acres. This amending Act was assented to by the
President on 8th December, 1972. But a retrospective effect was given to it so as to make it effective from 1st March, 1972. This was again
followed by another Act called the Fourth Amendment Act of 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act XXXIX of 1972), in and by which the compensation
payable to such public institution was also reduced. The Petitioner was called upon to submit a return as to its holdings consequent upon the
passing of the amending Acts in 1972. The Petitioner objected and stated that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the Petitioner
institution. Finding, however, that the State of Tamil Nadu were taking steps to enforce the provisions of the Act, the Petitioner has come up to this
Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other writ or direction restraining the second and the third Respondents from applying the
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acts XXXVII and XXXIX of 1972. The grounds on which the petition has been laid are in the main that as certain
fundamental rights of the Petitioner arc involved and as the State laws in question have been reserved for the assent of the President, it is said that
the President would not have given his assent, if he had applied his mind over all the implications thereto and as President ordinarily acts on the
advice of the Union Cabinet it is said that such assent is as such an act of the Union Government and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be an act of
the President which is beyond judicial review. In any case, if the assent is deemed to have been given by the President, it is said that Courts have
the power to satisfy themselves that such assent was given properly by the President, even though under the advice of the Union Cabinet. As such
assents are equivalent to executive orders made by the Union Government, which is also made as the first Respondent to the writ petition, the bone
of contention is that certain irrelevant materials were taken into consideration by the President under the advice of the first Respondent when he
give the assent. Incidentally it is said that as in the text of Article 31(3) of the Constitution of India the main question which arise for consideration
are whether the State Government should be authorised to acquire properties at all and whether the compensation is adequate, and such matters
have not been fully gone into and in this respect, therefore, the assent of the President is challenged. Incidentally, one question was raised whether
the Petitioner''s objections were taken into consideration at all before the State passed the law and sought for the assent of the President. When the
State fixed the ceiling originally at 60 standard acres, though later it only fixed 40 standard acres, it did not correctly apply its mind. Therefore,
factually it is said that the materials which are required for the President to be considered were not placed before him and as a valid assent by the
President can only take away the fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 31. Article 31-A cannot be applied. In any event, it is said that it is
open to the Court to consider the reasonableness of the assent made by the President. On the merits it is said that as, to a great extent, the burden
of the citizens of the State, namely, the parents, is taken over by the institution by donating large extent of properties, there was no occasion or
necessity for the State of Tamil Nadu to apply the Act to the Petitioner institution in those circumstances, it is stated that the impugned enactments,
namely, Tamil Nadu Acts, XXXVII and XXXIX of 1972 are ultra vires and have to be struck down. The above contentions were raised in Writ
Petition Nos. 3624, 4815 and 4816 of 1973.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the Government of India, it is said that the President gave the assent to the Bill after due examination and
consideration of all relevant materials in accordance with the relevant rules of business and such an assent is beyond judicial review. It is asserted
that the assent given by the President is not one akin to any Government order of the Union Cabinet and it is not open to scrutiny in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the Bill had been validly assented to by the President.
The State of Tamil Nadu, in its counter-affidavit, while sustaining the ceiling limits fixed for educational institutions, such as the Petitioner
institution, states that the Petitioner was asked to submit its returns in accordance with Tamil Nadu Act XXXVII of 1972 and that as no such
return was filed, the ceiling was fixed on the basis of the report of the field staff attached to the third Respondent and a notice was issued to the
Petitioner declaring the surplus and fixing the ceiling. It is, therefore, expressly denied that the Petitioner or its corRespondent was not aware of the
provisions of law and that they were not given notice of the manner and method under which the ceiling was to be fixed in accordance with Tamil
Nadu Act XXXVII of 1972. Originally, a surplus after allowing 40 standard acres, was fixed and after notice to the Petitioner''s corRespondent
and those in charge of the institution, the ceiling: had to be fixed in accordance with law. The Respondents denied that the President did not give his
proper assent to the Acts in question. They would state that the writ petitions are not maintainable, as the President has taken into consideration,
the relevant matters and given his assent after observing the necessary formalities. They denied that any rights of the Petitioner under Articles 14,
19 or 31 of the Constitution are affected. In fact, the representations of the Petitioner were taken into consideration and ultimately the ceiling area
has been fixed at 40 standard acres and the Petitioner cannot have any grievance at all. As the impugned Acts XXXVII of 1972 and XXXIX of
1972 are only amendments to the principal Act LVIII of 1961, they are not independent enactments transgressing the limitations imposed by the
Constitution upon the legislative powers of the State. It is also contended that the compensation awarded is fair and in accordance with the
provisions of law. In those circumstances the writ petitions are resisted.
In Writ Petition No. 5929 of 1973, the Petitioner is Ukkadai Appavoo Thevar High School, Ammapet. Similar objections as, those raised by
the writ Petitioners in the other cases are repeated. In particular, it is said that Tamil Nadu Acts XXXVII and XXXIX of 1972 were not properly
assented to by the President and that in the absence of such proper assent, the jurisdiction of the Courts are not taken away to examine whether
there has been such an assent at all. Here again, on the merits it is stated that the Petitioner was not consulted and its representations were not
taker into account at all. It is repeated that the educational and charitable institutions and trusts have to be treated on a different footing and as their
fundamental rights to hold property is affected, the impugned Acts have to be struck down. Above all, it is said that there is no public purpose
involved in the impugned enactments. Since the objects of the trusts themselves are of a public nature and on this ground also it is said that the
provisions of Tamil Nadu Acts XXXVII and XXXIX of 1972 are beyond the competence of the State Legislature.
The Parent Act, namely, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act, 1961, expatiates the prevailing economic philosophy in our Country. In order to
achieve the objective for which our Republic stands and whereas it was felt that the area of agricultural land available for cultivation in the State is
limited, the Parent Act LVIII of 1961 was thought of to provide for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural land-holdings by certain people including
institutions, so that there could be a fair distribution of land amongst the proper sections of the community. This legislation reflects the national
intention, which is to provide land to all sections of the community equitably, so that there may not be centrifuging of such estates or properties in
the hands of a few. In order to achieve this object, the Parent Act was passed in 1961. On the concept of right to own properties, no doubt,
Article 31 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, and it also provides that fair
compensation should be paid to the land owners of properties so compulserily acquired for a public purpose. As this general provision
safeguarding the interests of proletariats might not serve the ends, meanings and the purpose of the Constitution, Article 31-A was introduced so as
to provide for an exception to the generality of the intention, as provided in Article 31. Article 31-A(1) says that notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 13, now providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein at the extinguishment or modification of
any such rights or the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to
secure the proper management of the property, etc., shall be deemed to be void on the ground that, it is inconsistent with, or takes away or
abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31. The two provisions to Article 31-A(1) are important. The first one is
that any such law made by the Legislature of a State should be reserved for the consideration of the President and it should receive his assent. The
second proviso says that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is
held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit
applicable to him under any law for the time being in force. Compensation also has to be paid to the land owner from whom such lands are
acquired. Article 31-A(2) reads as follows:
2 In this article:
(a) the expression ''estate'' shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law
relating to land tenure in force in that area and shall also include--
(i) any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, any janmam right:
(ii) any land held under ryotwari settlement and
(iii) any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites or
buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators land, agricultural labourers and village artisans;
(b) the expression ''rights'' in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder
(raiyat, under-raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights or privilages in respect of land revenue.
It is, therefore, seen that the Parent Act, namely, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act, 1961 was passed under this provision of the Constitution. By
the First Amendment of the Constitution in 1951, Article 31-B was introduced. It reads as follows:
31-B. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-B, none of the Acts and regulations specified in the Ninth
Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or
provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any
competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.
By inclusion of any Act in the Ninth Schedule, such an Act is beyond judicial review and shall not be called in question in any Court of law. Article
201 of the Constitution provides for the assent of the President, when he is called upon to give his assent to the Bills passed by the State. It runs as
follows:
When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or
that he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as the case may be, the
Houses of the Legislature of the Stale together with such a message as is mentioned in the first proviso to Article 200 and, when a Bill is so
returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is
again passed by the House or Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his consideration.
It is conceded that the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Third Amendment Act, (1972) Tamil Nadu Act XXXVII of
1972) as well as the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Fourth Amendment Act (1972) (Tamil Nadu Act XXXIX of 1972)
have been included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The first question that was mooted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is
whether the President''s assent under Article 31-A of the Constitution has been validly given or not. It is unnecessary for us to consider this
question in detail, in view of the definite pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Khajamian Wakf Estates etc. Vs. State of Madras and Another, .
In that decision the Supreme Court said:
In order to avoid the bar of Article 31-A a curious plea was put forward. It was urged that when the concerned bills were submitted to the
President for his assent as required by the first proviso to Article 3-A, the President was not made aware of the implications of the bills. This
contention is a wholly untenable one. There is no material before us from which we could conclude that the President or his advisers were unaware
of the implications of those bills. We must proceed on the basis that the President had given his assent to those bills after duly considering the
implication of the provisions contained therein.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Petitioners were given every opportunity to place their objections to the Acts in question, and it was only
after due consideration that the Acts were passed and it can, therefore, fairly be presumed that every material that was necessary to be placed
before the President for his assent under Article 31-A was placed before him. We are unable, therefore, to accept this first contention that the
assent to those two Acts in question, which are impugned in these writ petitions was not given properly by the President.
In another case reported in Jagannath Vs. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms and Ors, the Supreme Court said:
Apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the amendatory process of Article
368 it must now be held that Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said schedule
as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Article 31-B such curing
of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statute book. These Acts even, if void or
inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Article 13(2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from
the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Article 31-B of the Constitution. The States could not,
at any time, cure any defect arising from the violation of the provisions of part III of the Constitution and therefore, the objection that the Madras
Ceilings Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force cannot be
accepted.
The second contention that is raised in these writ petitions is whether, even after the inclusion of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule to the
Constitution, still judicial review is possible by civil Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept
this contention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Venkata Rao Esajirao Limbekar and Others Vs. The State of Bombay and Others,
in which the Supreme Court has said.
The provisions of the Maharashtra Act as also of the Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950 together with the amending Act are immune from any challenge
on the ground of contravention of Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. By the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964, after entry 20,
entries 21 to 66 were inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the constitution. Entries 35 and 36 relate to the Maharashtra Act and Hyderabad Act XXI
of 1950 respectively. Article 31-B gives full protection to an Act and its provisions in the schedule against any challenge on the ground of
inconsistency, with or abridging of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. This would be so notwithstanding any judgment,
decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary. The amending laws and, in particular, Hyderabad Act III of 1954 which inserted Section
38E would also be covered by the same protection because the Parent Act, namely, the Hyderabad Act XXI of 1950 included in the Ninth
Schedule in the year 1964 which was long after the enactment of the amending Act.
These are the main contentions which were argued before us as regards the constitutional validity of the enactments in question. As they are
covered by pronouncements of our highest Court. We hold that Tamil Nadu Acts XXXVII and XXXIX of 1972 having received the assent of the
President should he deemed to have been accepted by the President after he fully applied his mind to them and that these Acts having been
included in the Ninth Schedule, it is beyond judicial review.
On the merits we are not satisfied that the Petitioners have got any case at all. They have been given opportunity to submit their returns and usual
objections and they were considered if they did object by the statutory functionaries from time to time. It was only thereafter the State Legislature
passed the enactments in question and forwarded them to the President for has assent. The complaint of the Petitioners that they were not
consulted is without any substance. We, therefore, hold that no public duty having been violated by any of the Respondents in these cases no writ
of mandamus, as prayed for can be issued and these writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.