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Judgment
We are unable to accept the finding of the District Judge that the 1st plaintiff is the only person interested in the contract. The agreement to sell,
Ex. A, expressly states that the contract is in favour of the 1st plaintiff and others. The case for the 1st. plaintiff is that the ''others'' referred to in the
document, are the 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs. The case for the contesting defendant is that by ''others'' were intended the other plaintiffs, the 6th
defendant and 20 other villagers. The only evidence is that of 1st plaintiff and 1st defendant. The 1st plaintiff says that the ''others'' means 2 and 3
plaintiffs, and the 1st defendant in his evidence says that ''others'' means 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs, 6th defendant and 20 others. The 6th defendant in
his written statement also says so. Haying regard to the terms of the document, the written statement, and the evidence in this case, we find it
difficult to see how the court can find that the 1st plaintiff was solely interested in the contract or how a decree can be passed in favour of the 1st
plaintiff alone.
It is argued by the appellant''s Vakil that evidence is not admissible to show who are meant by the term ""others"" and that the contract is
therefore unenforceable. Where a vendor agrees to sell land to several named persons and in drawing up the agreement of sale the name of one
person is mentioned and without naming the rest the word ""others"" is used, we can find nothing in the Evidence Act to prevent evidence from being
let in as to the persons in whose favour the conveyance is to be executed. We do not think that any of the provisions of Section 91 or 92 are
contravened nor does the case fall within Sections 93 to 97 of the Evidence Act.
As there is no dispute that the three plaintiffs are interested and as the only point in issue as regards parties is whether the 6th defendant and 20
others are also interested, the lower court was wrong in passing a decree in favour of the 1st plaintiff alone.
We reverse the decree and remand the appeal for disposal in the light of the above observations. Costs will abide the result. The Court fee will
be refunded.