High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 07 MAD CK 0126

A. Munusamy and Others vs The Labour Inspector, The Commissioner and The Chief Engineer

Madras High Court · Decided on 18 July 2013 · Citation: (2013) 3 LLJ 571

HON’BLE JUDGES
D. Hariparanthaman, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 19389 of 2013

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Judgment

50 paragraphs · 917 words

D. Hariparanthaman, J.—The petitioners are all working in the lorries carrying Garbage for disposal by the Corporation of Chennai.

According to the petitioners, they are working from 2008 onwards. They are not regularized in service. They moved the Inspector of Labour, the

first respondent, under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981, claiming permanency.

The first respondent dismissed the application in Na.Ka. No. 1982/2011, seeking permanency by an order dated 27.7.2012 on the ground that he

is not the competent authority and on the other hand, the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories is the competent authority under the aforesaid Act to

adjudicate the matter relating to permanency.

2.

In view of the aforesaid order of the first respondent, the petitioners approached the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories by their application,

dated 13.8.2012. The Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories rejected their application by his order, dated 11.10.2012 on the ground that he is not

the competent authority to enquire into the matter. It is stated that the petitioners are not employees covered under the Factories Act.

3.

In the circumstances, the petitioners once again approached the first respondent on 30.4.2013. The first respondent passed the impugned order

in Na.Ka. No. 240/13, dated 5.7.2013 rejecting the application stating that already he rejected the application on an earlier occasion by order

dated 27.7.2012 and therefore, this application cannot be entertained.

4.

This writ petition is filed against the aforesaid order, dated 5.7.2013 of the first respondent.

5.

Heard both sides.

6.

Section 2(3) of the Act defines ""industrial establishment"". As per Section 2(3)(c), a motor transport undertaking as defined in clause (g) of

section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act is an industrial establishment. The establishment, wherein the petitioners are working, is a motor

transport undertaking as per Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act.

7.

The notification issued by the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 134, Labour and Employment, dated 16.8.1999 u/s 4(1) of the Act is produced. As

per the notification, the first respondent is the Inspector to enquire into the matter of permanency for the Chennai area.

8.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in The Municipal Council, Raipur and Another Vs. The State

of Madhya Pradesh, . Hence it is submitted that the impugned order is bad and the matter has to be remitted back to the first respondent to

entertain the application of the petitioners on merits and in accordance with law and to pass orders thereon.

9.

The learned Special Government Pleader has no objection for sending the matter to the first respondent to decide in accordance with law.

10.

Though the learned counsel for the Corporation has initially opposed, later he also has no objection for remitting the matter back to the first

respondent to decide the matter in accordance with law.

11.

I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

12.

Section 2(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, is extracted hereunder:

2(3)(c) a motor transport undertaking as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (Central Act 27 of 1961);

or

13.

Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, is also extracted hereunder:

2(g) ""motor transport undertaking"" means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or

reward, and includes a private carrier;

14.

As per Section 2(3)(c) of the Act, the establishment wherein the petitioners are working is covered u/s 2(3)(c) of the Act.

15.

The G.O.Ms. No. 134, Labour and Employment, dated 16.8.1999 is produced before me. As per the Government Order, the first

respondent is the Inspector appointed u/s 4(1) of the Act to enquire into the matter of permanency as far as Chennai area is concerned.

16.

As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court has held that the vehicle owned by the Municipal Council

for transporting sick or injured persons and for carrying night-soil and distributing water is governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport

Workers Act.

17.

The following passage relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in The Municipal Council, Raipur and Another Vs. The State of

Madhya Pradesh, is extracted hereunder:

Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as

defined in the Act. It is necessary to set out the relevant definitions in Section 2 of the Act:

2(g) ""motor transport undertaking"" means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or

reward, and includes a private ""carrier"";

18.

Hence the respondent establishment is covered u/s 2(3)(c) of the Act.

19.

For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the first respondent is the competent authority to decide the permanency issue as far as the

petitioners herein are concerned. Hence I have no hesitation to quash the impugned orders dated 27.7.2012 and 5.7.2013 of the first respondent.

Accordingly, they are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the first respondent to decide the matter in accordance with law. The first

respondent is directed to pass orders thereon within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Accordingly, this writ

petition is allowed. No costs.