1. SMT. PUSPA SINGH (CWJC NO. 6427 OF 1991) 2. AJAY CONSTRUCTION (CWJC NO. 5971 OF 1993) 3. AMARNATH PANDEY (CWJC NO. 9713 OF 1993) vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.

These are connected cases. Common questions of law arise for consideration in this batch of cases. The petitioners assailed the order dated June 15, 1993 passed by the appropriate authority of the Income Tax Department under Chapter XXC, i.e., section 269UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The said order is the common order in all these cases. It has been assailed on many grounds but we take up one of the main points taken for assailing the order dated June 15, 1993, and that is that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further stated that the principles of natural justice have been violated at every stage and in every material particular.

For the purpose of disposal of these three cases, it is sufficient to state that it is agreed before us by counsel for the Revenue that the order dated June 15, 1993, was passed without hearing the petitioners. It cannot be doubted that the order dated June 15, 1993, visits the petitioners with civil consequences. Before rendering the order, the petitioners should have been heard. That is the minimal requirement. That is necessary to conform to "fairness in action". Since it is common ground before us that the petitioners were not heard by the appropriate authority before passing the order dated June 15, 1993, we are candidly of the view that the order in question is �infirm. We quash the said order in all the three cases. It is, however, open to the Revenue to proceed further in the matter, in accordance with law.

Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the entire proceeding on many other grounds, for example, it was argued that the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act are totally inapplicable, that no reasonable opportunity was afforded at any stage, that the materials used were not germane to the matter, that there was no application of mind, and that the materials gathered by the Department were never disclosed to the petitioners to have their say. We are not called upon to pronounce judgment on all these aspects, since it was agreed before us that the petitioners were not heard before rendering the order dated June 15, 1993, which we thought was a serious infirmity. These aspects are not adjudicated.

These cases are disposed of as above. There shall be no order as to costs.