2026 INSC 853
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 1 of 16
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA EXTRA-ORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.17699 OF 2026
NAZIM SHAIKH HASAN …. PETITIONER
VERSUS
NASIR MUSHTAQ SHAIKH AND OTHERS
…. RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
1) The present Special Leave Petition calls in question the judgment
dated 01.04.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in
Civil Revision Application No.280/2024, whereby the High Court dismissed
the revision application of the petitioner and upheld the judgment and order
of the First Appellate Court which affirmed the order of the Small Causes
Court whereby the petitioner was directed to vacate and handover the suit
premises to the respondents’ predecessor – Jainbi Mushtaq Shaikh.
2) For the proper disposal of the Special Leave Petition, the parties are
being referred by their position in Civil Suit No.384/2010.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3) Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts lay thus: the respondents’
predecessor - Jainbi Mushtaq Shaikh owned a shop on the ground floor of
the building admeasuring 200 sq.ft bearing House No.3031, S.No.51, Mitha
Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.08.13 15:19:07 IST Reason:
Signature Not Verified
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 2 of 16
Nagar, in front of Vishwakarma Building, Kondhwa Khurd, Pune1.
Admittedly, the suit premises was let to the petitioner/defendant at a
monthly rent of Rs.1500/-. While the tenancy was subsisting, the original
plaintiff agreed to sell the suit premises to the petitioner/defendant,
consequently, this culminated into an agreement to sell dated 21.09.2004.
Pursuant to the stipulations laid in the agreement to sell, the
petitioner/defendant paid Rs.40,000/- out of the total consideration of
Rs.1,90,000/- and the residual consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- was to be
paid within three months.
4) As per the original plaintiff’s assertion, the petitioner/defendant failed
to comply with the stipulations inhering from the agreement to sell, leading
to non-fruition of the sale. As a corollary, the petitioner/defendant
continued as a tenant in the suit premises.
5) Subsequently, the original plaintiff alleging default of rent by the
petitioner/defendant, change in the use of the suit premises, coupled with
an express bona fide need, filed a civil suit being Civil Suit No.384/2010
seeking possession of the suit premises. The petitioner/defendant resisted
the suit inter alia on the ground that the landlord-tenant relationship ended
upon the execution of the agreement to sell. Further, it was pled by the
petitioner/defendant that he paid Rs.90,000/- out of the total consideration
and was ready to pay the balance consideration to the original plaintiff.
1 Hereinafter referred to as the “Suit premises”
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6) The Small Causes Court after examination of oral and documentary
evidence, vide judgment dated 19.09.2015, upheld the bona fide
requirement of the original plaintiff and held that the landlord and tenant
relation subsisted even after the execution of the agreement to sell.
Predicating upon the aforesaid reasoning, the suit was decreed in favour of
the original plaintiff, and the petitioner/defendant was directed to handover
the possession of the suit premises. The petitioner/defendant’s appeal
challenging the Small Causes Court’s decision was also dismissed by the
First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 24.11.2023.
7) Being aggrieved, the petitioner/defendant filed Civil Revision
Application No.280/2024 challenging the decisions of the Small Causes
Court and the First Appellate Court. The High Court vide the impugned
judgement and order dated 01.04.2026 dismissed the revision application
preferred by the petitioner/defendant.
8) Taking exception to the judgement passed by the High Court, the
petitioner/defendant is now seeking refuge of this Court in reversing the
concurrent findings rendered.
ANALYSIS
9) Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant and perused
the material on record.
10) The question inhering from the present lis is whether on the execution
of the agreement to sell by the landlord in favour of the tenant, upon
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 4 of 16
receiving part consideration, the inter se relationship of landlord-tenant
ceases and fresh rights and obligations flow from the agreement to sell.
11) Contending in affirmative to the question posed, the learned counsel
for the petitioner/defendant placed reliance on a judgment rendered by this
Court in R. Kanthimathi and Another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs.)2, wherein
this Court was dealing with a similar question concerning the inter se rights
and jural relationship between the landlord and the tenant after an
agreement to sell has been executed and a substantial amount of
consideration was paid by the tenant. The germane observations elucidated
therein read thus:
“4. As aforesaid, the question for consideration is, whether the status of tenant as such changes on the execution of an agreement of sale with the landlord. It is relevant at this junction first to examine the terms of the agreement of sale. The relevant portions of the agreement of sale record the following:
“I, the aforesaid, Mrs Beatrice Xavier hereby agree out of my own free will, to sell, convey and transfer the property to you Mrs R. Kanthimathi, wife of Mr S. Ramaswami, 435 Trichy Road, Coimbatore for a mutually agreed sale consideration of Rs. 25,000. I shall be proceeding to Coimbatore and shall execute the sale deed and present the same for admission and registration before the registration authority, accepting and acknowledge payment of the balance of consideration of Rs. 5000 (Rupees five thousand only) at the time of registration and shall complete the transaction of sale and conveyance as the property demised has already been surrendered to your possession.” 5. Submission for the tenant is after entering into the agreement, the landlady accepted Rs. 20,000 confirming delivery of possession in this context which already constitutes the clear intent of the landlady of entering into a new relationship with the tenant under it. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the words “already been surrendered” therein, only refer to the existing possession of the tenant and nothing more. So far as this submission for the respondent is concerned we have no
2 (2000) 9 SCC 339
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 5 of 16
hesitation to reject the same. The reference of the words “already been surrendered” has been incorporated with consciousness. This is to be construed in the background of the landlady having received a major amount of sale consideration and as normally, if a substantial sum is received by the seller, the purchaser is put in possession of the property hence to fall in the same lines the said words were used to confirm this possession in this context. There could be no other reason to record therein as such. Even if it be said to refer to the possession as a tenant the reassertion in the agreement of sale is only for the purpose of denoting possession given in pursuance of this agreement of sale. 6. Any jural relationship between two persons could be created through agreement and similarly could be changed through agreement subject to the limitations under the law. Earlier when the appellants were inducted into tenancy it only means both agreed that their relationship was to be that of landlord and tenant. Later when the landlord decided to sell this property to the tenant and the tenant agreed by entering into agreement, they by their positive act changed their relationship as purchaser and seller. When the seller-landlord accepts the sum he actually acts under this agreement. This acceptance preceded by agreement of sale changes their relationship. This is how they intended. Once accepting such a change, their relationship of landlord-tenant ceases.”
(emphasis supplied)
12) On a careful perusal of the above adjudication, it is evident that the
agreement to sell executed therein contained an express stipulation that the
demised property had already been surrendered to the possession of the
tenant, which was consciously incorporated to indicate the willingness of the
landlord to effect a change in the jural relationship. The intention of the
parties was clearly discernible from the terms of the agreement to sell itself.
It is equally significant that such willingness flowed from the fact that a
substantial part of the consideration Rs.20,000/- out of Rs.25,000/- had
already been paid by the tenant, leaving only a balance of Rs.5,000/- to be
paid at the time of registration. The decision in R. Kanthimathi (supra) was
thus one rendered entirely on its own peculiar facts, turning on the specific
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 6 of 16
language employed in the agreement to sell and the near-complete payment
of consideration thereunder.
13) However, the instant lis presents us with a materially different stand
with respect to the agreement to sell executed herein. The relevant recitals of
the agreement to sell read thus :
“1. The Seller has agreed to sale the above Shop to the Purchasers for the price of Rs.1,90,000/- (Rupees One Lakh and Ninety Thousand only) and today the Purchasers paid an amount of Rs.40,000/- in cash to the Seller and the Seller hereby acknowledges the receipt thereof. 2. The Purchasers promised that the balance amounts of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one Lakh and Fifty Thousand only) will be paid within the period of three months from today. 3. The Purchasers has agreed to give the balance Loan amount as soon as the loan will be sanctioned by his Banks. 4. The Purchasers hereby confirms that if the said loan will not be sanctioned within the above period then this agreement stands cancelled and the Seller will refund Rs.40,000/- to the Purchasers and the Purchasers will have to handover the possession of the Shop back to the Purchasers as it was in the previous condition.”
14) A plain reading of the aforesaid recitals makes it evident that the
agreement to sell executed in the present case contains no stipulation
indicating that the possession of the petitioner/defendant thereafter would
be referable to the agreement to sell, nor does it provide for cessation of the
obligation to pay rent or otherwise evince an intention to alter the subsisting
landlord-tenant relationship. The marked distinction between the terms of
the present agreement to sell and those considered in R. Kanthimathi
(supra) necessitates an examination of whether the tenancy stood
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determined in law by way of either express or implied surrender under
Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18823.
15) It is relevant to note that Section 111 of the TP Act contemplates
different modes by which a lease may be determined. Section 111(e) deals
with express surrender, whereas Section 111(f) deals with implied
surrender.
16) The concept of surrender, as contemplated under Sections 111(e) and
111(f) of the TP Act was succinctly explained by this Court in Shah
Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage and
Others4, wherein it was observed that surrender involves yielding up of the
lessee’s interest to the lessor by mutual agreement. In case of implied
surrender, the intention of the parties has to be gathered from the
circumstances and conduct which demonstrate that the earlier relationship
could no longer subsist. The relevant observation reads as follows:
“19. A surrender under clauses (e) and (f) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is an yielding up of the term of the lessee's interest to him who has the immediate reversion or the lessor's interest. It takes effect like a contract by mutual consent on the lessor's acceptance of the act of the lessee. The lessee cannot, therefore, surrender unless the term is vested in him; and the surrender must be to a person in whom the immediate reversion expectant on the term is vested. Implied surrender by operation of law occurs by the creation of a new relationship, or by relinquishment of possession. If the lessee accepts a new lease that in itself is a surrender. Surrender can also be implied from the consent of the parties or from such facts as the relinquishment of possession by the lessee and taking over possession by the lessor. Relinquishment of possession operates as an implied surrender. There must be a taking of possession, not necessarily a physical taking, but something amounting to a virtual taking of possession. Whether this has occurred is a question of fact. In the present case if the mortgagor was not able to redeem the appellant
3 For short, ‘TP Act’ 4 (1976) 3 SCC 660
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 8 of 16
mortgagee was to enjoy the property in accordance with the terms of the mortgage and also to sell the property for recovery of debts. This feature shows that the appellant surrendered the tenancy from November 7, 1953.”
17) A similar view on the enunciation of law on surrender as crystallised
in Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. (supra) was elaborated by this
Court in Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi5, wherein, while
considering an analogous question concerning an agreement to sell executed
between a landlord and tenant, this Court undertook a comprehensive
examination of the concepts of express surrender, implied surrender and the
consequences flowing therefrom under Section 111 of the TP Act. The
relevant observations read thus:
“5.3. The expression “express surrender” means the lessee yields his interest under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. In other words, express surrender means giving up of the interest in the premises under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between the lessor and the lessee. Express surrender necessitates that the lessee has given up possession of the holding. Surrender need not be in writing nor by a registered deed. However, if there is an abatement of rent, it should be only by a registered instrument for it effects a variation in the contract of tenancy. The effect of surrender under clause (e) of Section 111 of the Act is the determination of the lease. 5.4. Clause (f) of Section 111 of the Act deals with the rule of implied surrender. Implied surrender is by operation of law and it can occur by - i) the creation of a new relationship of lease, or ii) relinquishment of possession i.e., there is yielding of possession by the lessee and taking over of possession by the lessor. It is created by the acceptance of, and not by the mere agreement for a new relation which, in effect, estops the lessee from setting up the old one. Implied surrender of tenancy can be established by the conduct of the parties and from attending circumstances. Implied surrender is by the operation of law and takes place in spite of the intention of the parties. It may come into being in a number of ways, e.g., by acceptance of a new lease, or by unequivocal giving up of possession by the lessee as a lessee, or by re-letting to another person by the landlord, or by accepting of a sub-tenant as his tenant by the landlord. 5.5. Where the agreement to sell entered into by the parties clearly states that from the date mentioned in the
5 2026 SCC OnLine SC 84
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 9 of 16
agreement, the tenant in possession of the property intended to be sold under the agreement shall not be liable to pay any rent and shall alone be in charge of any damage caused to the property in question, it would imply a surrender of rights as a tenant vide B. Paramashivaiah v. M.K. Shankar Prasad, AIR 2009 Kar 88. 5.6. A surrender by operation of law determines the lease and extinguishes the rights of the lessee in respect of the property surrendered, from the date of the surrender and the estate vests immediately in the lessor. The term “surrender by operation of law” is used to describe all those cases where the law implies a surrender from unequivocal conduct of both the parties which is inconsistent with the continuance of the existing tenancy. 5.7. There is a distinction between an express and implied surrender inasmuch as while express surrender is a matter of intention of the parties, implied surrender is by implication of the law. An implied surrender is the act of the law and takes place independently of and in some cases even in spite of the intention of the parties.”
(emphasis supplied) 18) This Court in Vayyaeti Srinivasarao (supra) further considered the
interplay between Section 53A of the TP Act and the continuance of tenancy
subsequent to the agreement to sell. It was observed that Section 53A
operates as a shield for a transferee who has taken possession pursuant to a
contract of transfer, or who continues in possession in part performance
thereof and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, thereby
debarring the transferor from enforcing any right in respect of such
property. Significantly, this Court categorically held that the continuous
possession of a tenant in the suit property even after entering into an
agreement to sell would not by itself amount to part performance so as to
put the tenant in possession pursuant to the agreement to sell. It is only
where the tenant is inducted into possession for the first time subsequent to
the contract that it would constitute strong evidence of possession changing
hands pursuant to the contract.
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 10 of 16
19) It is also trite law that an agreement to sell, by itself, does not confer
any title or interest in the property in favour of the purchaser, and a
beneficial reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this
Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) Through
Director v. State of Haryana and Another6 wherein this Court held as
follows :
“16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam [(1977) 3 SCC 247] observed: (SCC pp. 254-55, paras 32-33 & 37)
“32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [AIR 1967 SC 744 : (1967) 1 SCR 293] .) The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein. 33. In India, the word ‘transfer’ is defined with reference to the word ‘convey’. … The word ‘conveys’ in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership. 37. … that only on execution of conveyance, ownership passes from one party to another….” 17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [(2004) 8 SCC 614] this Court held: (SCC p. 619, para 10)
“10. Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a
6 (2012) 1 SCC 656
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 11 of 16
right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed into service against a third party.” 18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred. 19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the TP Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
20) The ratio flowing from the aforesaid pronouncements, read conjointly,
can be distilled to the following propositions:
(i) the mere execution of an agreement to sell between a landlord and
tenant does not ipso facto bring about a determination of the
subsisting tenancy;
(ii) it is only when the terms of the agreement or the unequivocal
conduct of the parties, inconsistent with the continuance of the
existing tenancy, disclose either an express or implied surrender
within the meaning of Section 111(e) or (f) of the TP Act, that the
lease can be said to have been determined;
(iii) the continuous possession of a tenant even after the execution of
an agreement to sell does not amount to part performance under
Section 53A of the TP Act unless such possession is shown to be
directly relatable to and flowing from the agreement to sell; and
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 12 of 16
(iv) any agreement to sell, not being a registered deed of conveyance,
does not by itself confer any title or interest in the property.
21) Applying the aforesaid principles to the lis at hand, neither the terms
of the agreement to sell nor the conduct of the parties disclose any express
or implied surrender within the meaning of Section 111(e) or (f) of the TP
Act. The mere execution of the agreement to sell coupled with payment of
Rs.40,000/- out of the agreed consideration of Rs.1,90,000/-, cannot be
treated as determining the tenancy.
22) The terms of the agreement to sell itself lend further reinforcement to
this conclusion. Clause 4 of the agreement to sell expressly stipulates that
in the event the loan of the petitioner/defendant is not sanctioned within the
stipulated period, the agreement would stand cancelled and the
petitioner/defendant would be required to hand over possession of the shop
back "as it was in the previous condition." This recital is wholly consistent
with the continuance of the tenancy and, in fact, proceeds on the clear
premise that the existing possession of the petitioner/defendant was
referable to the tenancy and not to the agreement to sell. Far from
evidencing a change in the jural relationship, this demonstrates that the
parties themselves contemplated a reversion to the status quo ante upon the
failure of the sale.
23) Also, the reliance placed by the petitioner/defendant on Arjunlal
Bhatt Mall Gothani and Others v. Girish Chandra Dutta and Another7
7 (1973) 2 SCC 197
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 13 of 16
is equally misplaced. In that case, upon execution of the agreement to sell,
the earlier eviction proceedings were withdrawn and the agreement itself
exclusively governed the parties’ rights and obligations, there being no
stipulation for payment of rent or interest during the subsistence of the
agreement. The present agreement to sell contains no comparable indication
that the tenancy stood substituted by a new jural relationship. On the
contrary, Clause 4 of the agreement to sell provides for cancellation of the
agreement and restoration of possession in accordance with the existing
arrangement.
24) At this juncture, it is also apposite to turn to the contention of the
petitioner/defendant, that his possession subsequent to the agreement to
sell was that of a prospective purchaser under Section 53A of the TP Act.
This submission, however, is sans merit. This Court in D.S. Parvathamma
v. A. Srinivasan8 laid down the foundational principle governing such a
situation, holding that when a person already in possession of the property
in some other capacity enters into a contract to purchase the property, to
confer the benefit of protecting possession under the plea of part
performance, his act effective from that day must be consistent with the
contract alleged and cannot be referred to the preceding title, and that
having entered into possession as a tenant and having continued to remain
in possession in that capacity, a tenant cannot be heard to say that by
reason of the agreement to sell his possession was no longer that of a
tenant. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle, the
8 (2003) 4 SCC 705
SLP (C) No.17699/2026 Page 14 of 16
petitioner/defendant having been in possession as a tenant prior to the
execution of the agreement to sell and having neither alleged nor established
that his possession as lessee ceased, and commenced as that of a transferee
under the agreement to sell, his conduct throughout including continued
occupation without any disavowal of his character as a tenant is wholly
inconsistent with the plea of part performance.
25) Even assuming arguendo that the factual requirements for invoking
Section 53A stood satisfied, the petitioner/defendant's plea is independently
foreclosed by the statutory mandate contained in Section 17(1A) of the
Registration Act, 19089. Section 17 of the Registration Act was amended
with effect from 24.09.2001 by the introduction of sub-section (1A) therein,
which provides that documents containing contracts to transfer for
consideration any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53A of the
TP Act shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the
commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)
Act, 2001, and if such documents are not so registered, they shall have no
effect for the purposes of Section 53A. The agreement to sell in the present
case was executed on 21.09.2004, i.e., well after the coming into force of the
said amendment. The agreement to sell, being admittedly unregistered, can
have no effect for the purposes of Section 53A by virtue of the express
mandate of Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, as reaffirmed by this
Court in Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Others10.
The petitioner/defendant is, therefore, disentitled from claiming the
9 For short, ‘the Registration Act’ 10 (2018) 7 SCC 639.
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protection of Section 53A on this ground as well. The High Court was thus
entirely correct in holding that the benefit of Section 53A is unavailable to
the petitioner/defendant.
26) We also can’t be oblivious of the fact that the petitioner/defendant has
chosen not to institute a suit for specific performance. This conduct on the
part of the petitioner/defendant further militates against the plea that the
jural relationship between the parties had transformed from that of
landlord-tenant to vendor-vendee upon the execution of the agreement to
sell.
27) Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant advanced two
submissions before this Court. First, it was contended that upon execution
of the agreement to sell, the jural relationship between the parties stood
altered from that of landlord and tenant to that of vendor and vendee,
thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. Secondly, it
was urged that the agreement to sell ought to have been impounded on
account of insufficient stamp duty and non-registration before being
considered by the Court. In our opinion, neither submission merits
acceptance. The first contention proceeds on an erroneous assumption that
the mere execution of the agreement to sell determined the tenancy, a
contention which already stands negatived as discussed in the preceding
paragraphs hereinabove. Equally, the second contention is of no avail since
even assuming that the agreement to sell were to be impounded and
rendered admissible in evidence upon payment of the requisite duty and
penalty, such exercise would not cure the absence of registration nor enable
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the petitioner/defendant to invoke Section 53A of the TP Act in view of
Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act.
28) In view of the foregoing, we find no infirmity in the impugned
judgments of the Courts below warranting interference.
29) The present Special Leave Petition is sans merit and, accordingly, the
same stands dismissed.
…………………..........................J. (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
.………………............................J. (N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI; AUGUST 13, 2026.
ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.13 SECTION IX
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 17699/2026
NAZIM SHAIKH HASAN Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
NASIR MUSHTAQ SHAIKH & ORS. Respondent(s)
IA No. 152967/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 13-08-2026 This matter was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, Adv. Mr. Dhruv Tank, Adv. Mr. Sarthak Mehrotra, Adv. Ms. Surbhi Kapoor, AOR Mr. Uday Gautam, Adv. Ms. Aradhya Srivastava, Adv. Mr. Nakul Patwardhan, Adv. For Respondent(s)
O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra has pronounced
the reportable judgment of the Bench comprising his Lordship
and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria.
The Special Leave Petition is DISMISSED in terms of the
signed reportable judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(MINI) (AKSHAY KUMAR BHORIA) COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.08.13 15:18:32 IST Reason:
Signature Not Verified