Case at a Glance
A mother-in-law convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC for setting her nine-months-pregnant daughter-in-law on fire in May 2015 appealed against her life sentence, arguing that the death was an accidental cooking fire. The Tripura High Court found that “the victim was not cooking in any kerosene oven”, since the site sketch showed only a gas stove, and relied on the dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, corroborated by oral statements to the victim’s father and others. It held that relative witnesses cannot be discarded merely as interested witnesses in crimes committed inside the matrimonial home, and that under Section 106 of the Evidence Act the accused, present in the house, had to explain the fire. The appeal was dismissed.
The deceased married into the appellant’s family in 2011 (her father placed the marriage on 13 August 2011). The prosecution alleged that the in-laws demanded Rs 20,000 shortly before the incident, and that on 21 May 2015 the appellant gagged her with a gamchha, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. She was about nine months pregnant, with delivery scheduled for 25 May 2015. The post-mortem recorded burns over 97% of the total body surface area as the cause of death.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Sepahijala (Bishalgarh), in ST (T-I) 07 of 2018, convicted the mother-in-law on 7 September 2024 and sentenced her to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs 50,000 (one more year in default). The deceased’s husband had been charged under Section 498A IPC; this appeal concerned only the mother-in-law. She argued that the death was accidental, that she had been cooking on a kerosene oven, that the dying declaration was unreliable and that only interested relatives had deposed.
The Key Question Before the Court
Could the murder conviction rest on the victim’s written and oral dying declarations and the evidence of her relatives, and was the defence of an accidental kerosene-oven fire credible?
Why the High Court Rejected the Accident Theory
The Bench first tested the defence story against the investigation record. Relying on the Investigating Officer’s testimony and the hand sketch map, which showed only a gas stove, it concluded: “So there is no doubt in holding that the victim was not cooking in any kerosene oven.” It then examined the written dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate at the hospital after a fitness certificate from the surgery department, in which the victim said her mother-in-law tied her mouth with a gamchha, poured kerosene and set her ablaze. Applying Purshottam Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 01 SC CK 0011, and noting that the fitness certificate was exhibited without objection, the Court found it voluntary and reliable; the oral dying declarations to her father and five other witnesses matched it, leaving “no hesitation in the mind of this Court in relying upon the oral as well as written dying declaration.”
On the witnesses, the Court observed that bride-burning happens within the matrimonial home and “there is no scope to have any independent witness of such cases”, so “the evidence of the relative witnesses must not be discarded only on the ground that they are the interested witnesses.” Since it was undisputed that the accused was in the house when the fire broke out, Section 106 of the Evidence Act placed on her the burden of explaining it, which she failed to discharge; a neighbour also reportedly saw a half-burnt gamchha tied from behind. Finding the authorities cited by the defence inapplicable to the facts, the Court held the crime “proved beyond shadow of doubt” and dismissed the appeal.
What the Court Actually Held
- The defence of an accidental fire from a kerosene oven was false; the site sketch showed only a gas stove.
- The written dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate after a fitness certificate, corroborated by consistent oral dying declarations, was reliable and could found the conviction.
- Relative witnesses in crimes committed inside the matrimonial home cannot be discarded merely because they are interested witnesses.
- As the accused was in the house when the fire occurred, Section 106 of the Evidence Act required her to explain it; the conviction under Section 302 IPC and life sentence were upheld and the appeal dismissed.
Why This Judgment Matters
- It reaffirms that a properly recorded dying declaration, with a fitness certificate, can by itself sustain a murder conviction.
- It recognises the reality of domestic crimes — relatives are often the only witnesses, and their evidence must be judged on merit.
- It shows how Section 106 of the Evidence Act shifts the burden onto family members present when a death occurs inside the home.
What Should Advocates Take Away From the Judgment?
For Families of Victims
- Statements made by the victim before death, to a magistrate or to family, can be decisive evidence.
- Courts will not reject your testimony simply because you are related to the victim.
- Report dowry demands and harassment early; they form part of the prosecution story.
For Counsel
- Test a dying declaration on fitness certification, the recording officer and consistency with oral statements.
- An accident defence must match the physical evidence — site plans and seizure lists can demolish it.
- In deaths inside the home, prepare to meet the Section 106 burden with a credible explanation.
Key Takeaways
- Mother-in-law’s murder conviction and life sentence affirmed.
- Dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate with a fitness certificate was held reliable.
- Relative witnesses are not to be rejected only as ‘interested’.
- Section 106 Evidence Act burden applied to the accused present in the house.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a conviction rest only on a dying declaration?
Yes, if it is voluntary, reliable and made in a fit state of mind. Here the written declaration, recorded by an Executive Magistrate after a fitness certificate and corroborated by oral statements, was accepted.
Are statements of the victim’s relatives enough in a bride-burning case?
The Court said relatives’ evidence cannot be discarded merely because they are interested witnesses, since such crimes happen inside the home where independent witnesses are rarely available.
What does Section 106 of the Evidence Act mean in such cases?
When facts are especially within the accused’s knowledge — such as how a fire started inside a house where she was present — the burden is on her to explain them.
Conclusion
Parul Barman v. State of Tripura is a firm affirmation of a murder conviction built on a careful dying declaration and consistent family testimony, and a reminder that an accident defence must fit the physical evidence.
Practical takeaway: In bride-burning prosecutions, the quality of the dying declaration — fitness certificate, recording magistrate and consistency — usually decides the case; defence counsel must confront it on those points, not just on the relationship of witnesses.
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