Case at a Glance
The Rajasthan Housing Board challenged orders of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (LARRA) through a petition under Article 227, instead of filing an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act. The High Court held the petition not maintainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the Board’s SLP, and in doing so said that the 120-day outer limit in Section 74 is “inflexible and rigid”, disagreeing with the two-Judge Bench view in S.V. Global Mill that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can apply. It declined to refer the issue to a larger Bench, and said pending time-barred appeals may be decided by High Courts in accordance with law.
The Rajasthan Housing Board, along with the State of Rajasthan and the Special Officer of the Urban Development and Housing Department, was aggrieved by two orders of the LARRA: an order dated 26 May 2025 allowing the first respondent’s reference under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and an order dated 12 September 2025 making a minor modification on review. Instead of filing an appeal under Section 74, the Board challenged these orders before the Rajasthan High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4122 of 2026).
By its judgment dated 6 July 2026, the High Court held the petition not maintainable because Section 74(1) provides an appellate remedy, and observed that even if treated as an appeal, it would be barred as belated under the proviso. Section 74(1), as the Supreme Court described it, allows an appeal to the High Court within 60 days of the award, with the proviso allowing a further 60 days — a total outer limit of 120 days. Earlier in 2026, a two-Judge Bench in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Limited, (2026) 02 SC CK 1762, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 171, had held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can apply to such appeals.
The Key Question Before the Court
Can a High Court condone delay beyond the 120 days permitted by Section 74 of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act, and should the contrary view in S.V. Global Mill be referred to a larger Bench?
A Rigid Outer Limit, and a Precedent That ‘Does Not Accord’
Justice Dipankar Datta, writing for the Bench, said that S.V. Global Mill “does not accord with the precedents” and effectively renders the proviso to Section 74(1) otiose. The Court treated Section 74(1) as in pari materia with limitation clauses in other statutes that larger Benches have held to be exhaustive, relying among others on Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 03 SC CK 0096, (2009) 5 SCC 791, Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, (2007) 12 SC CK 0053, (2008) 3 SCC 70, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 04 SC CK 0022, (2010) 5 SCC 23, Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 10 SC CK 0022, (2001) 8 SCC 470, and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd., (2017) 03 SC CK 0011, (2017) 5 SCC 42. It also said S.V. Global Mill had distinguished the three-Judge Bench decision in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1973) 12 SC CK 0041, (1974) 2 SCC 133, on a flawed basis, and that because Section 74 is unambiguous, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act does not bring in Section 5.
The Court held that the 120-day period “is inflexible and rigid” and cannot be read to allow an appeal barred “even by a single day’s delay”, adding that even the Supreme Court under Article 142 cannot condone such delay, though in a fit case a party may seek exemption from the laws of limitation. Yet it declined to refer S.V. Global Mill to a larger Bench: being bound by the doctrine of precedent laid down by larger Benches, it said a reference was “not an available option”. On the facts, even assuming S.V. Global Mill was correct, it would not help the Board, because the Board never filed a time-barred Section 74 appeal or sought condonation — it went under Article 227. The High Court was “perfectly justified” in rejecting the challenge.
What the Court Actually Held
- The 120-day period (60 days plus a further 60 under the proviso) in Section 74 of the 2013 Act is inflexible and rigid; an appeal barred even by a single day’s delay cannot be entertained.
- The two-Judge Bench in S.V. Global Mill ought not to have placed a discordant construction on Section 74(1); the Court found it did not accord with larger Bench precedents.
- The Court declined to refer S.V. Global Mill to a larger Bench, saying it was bound by larger Bench precedents, and clarified that pending time-barred appeals under Section 74 may be decided by High Courts in accordance with law.
- The Board’s Article 227 route was rejected; the High Court was perfectly justified, and the special leave petition was dismissed.
Why This Judgment Matters
- Land acquisition appeals are frequently filed late by acquiring bodies and landowners alike; this judgment signals a strict reading of Section 74.
- It openly disagrees with an earlier 2026 two-Judge Bench decision, which practitioners must factor into pending condonation applications.
- It confirms that the appellate remedy under Section 74 cannot be bypassed by an Article 227 petition.
What Should Advocates Take Away From the Judgment?
For Landowners and Acquiring Bodies
- Calculate the 60-day period from the award and treat 120 days as the absolute outer limit.
- Do not rely on a writ or Article 227 petition in place of a Section 74 appeal.
For Counsel
- In pending time-barred appeals, address both S.V. Global Mill and this judgment, since High Courts are to decide them in accordance with law.
- Note the precedents on exhaustive limitation clauses relied on, including Hongo India and Popular Construction.
- File within time and keep proof of the date the award was communicated.
Key Takeaways
- Section 74 gives 60 days, plus 60 more under the proviso, to appeal a LARRA award to the High Court.
- The Court said the 120-day outer limit cannot be extended even by a day.
- S.V. Global Mill was doubted but not referred to a larger Bench.
- The Board lost because it chose Article 227 instead of a Section 74 appeal.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the time limit to appeal a LARRA award under the 2013 Act?
Per the judgment, Section 74(1) allows 60 days from the award, and the proviso allows a further 60 days if sufficient cause is shown — 120 days in all.
Did the Supreme Court overrule S.V. Global Mill?
No. It said the two-Judge Bench ought not to have placed a discordant construction on Section 74(1), but declined to refer the issue to a larger Bench and assumed, for this case, that the earlier decision was correct.
What happens to time-barred appeals already pending?
The Court said pending time-barred appeals under Section 74 may be decided by the relevant High Courts in accordance with law.
Conclusion
The judgment draws a hard line around Section 74’s 120-day window and records serious disagreement with S.V. Global Mill, while leaving pending matters to the High Courts. For the Rajasthan Housing Board, the result turned on a simpler point: it chose the wrong remedy.
Practical takeaway: File Section 74 appeals within 60 days, and never later than 120 days; do not use Article 227 to bypass the statutory appeal.
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