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‘Benefit of Doubt Is Not an Empty Formality’: Supreme Court Refuses to Overturn Concurrent Acquittal in 1998 Murder Case

Updated 30 October 2026
‘Benefit of Doubt Is Not an Empty Formality’: Supreme Court Refuses to Overturn Concurrent Acquittal in 1998 Murder Case

Case at a Glance

The son of a man shot dead in 1998 appealed against the acquittal of one of the accused, which the trial court and the Patna High Court had concurrently recorded. The Supreme Court held that a concurrent acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence and can be disturbed under Article 136 only if the view taken is impossible, perverse or manifestly illegal. Since the eyewitnesses were related and required careful scrutiny, the medical evidence did not fully match the detailed attribution of shots, the only independent witnesses examined turned hostile, and the FIR was delayed, the acquittal was a possible view. The appeal was dismissed.

According to the prosecution, on 11.10.1998 at about 4 p.m. the deceased was returning from Yogipur market with the informant and others when four accused surrounded them near a paddy field at Soharpur village, and respondent No. 2 fired at him with a country-made rifle; he died on the spot. The fardbeyan was recorded at about 21:45 hours that day and the FIR was registered on 12.10.1998 at 09:30 hours as Hilsa P.S. Case No. 373 of 1998 under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The case against respondent No. 2 was split off as Sessions Trial No. 596 of 2003; charges were framed only on 13.06.2012. The prosecution examined the deceased’s son (PW-1) and two other eyewitnesses, the medical officer and the investigating officer; two independent witnesses turned hostile. The Additional Sessions Judge-III, Hilsa, Nalanda acquitted respondent No. 2 on 24.12.2024 and the Patna High Court affirmed the acquittal on 11.09.2025. The deceased’s son appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Key Question Before the Court

Did the concurrent acquittal suffer from perversity, manifest illegality or gross misappreciation of evidence warranting interference by the Supreme Court under Article 136?

The Double Presumption of Innocence and Careful Scrutiny of Evidence

The Court reiterated that after acquittal “the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced”. Relying on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 09 SC CK 0026, (1973) 2 SCC 808, it noted that where two views are possible, “the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted”, and, following Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 07 SC CK 0066, (2008) 10 SCC 450, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 02 SC CK 0129, (2007) 4 SCC 415 and Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura, (2011) 09 SC CK 0008, (2011) 9 SCC 479, that an acquittal should not be disturbed unless totally perverse or wholly unsustainable. On related witnesses, citing Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1953) 05 SC CK 0008, AIR 1953 SC 364, it held that relationship alone is no ground to reject testimony, but “the correct rule is one of careful scrutiny”, especially when independent witnesses do not support the prosecution or the medical evidence does not fit.

The Court accepted that the chin injury corresponded to the role attributed to respondent No. 2, but held that a conviction cannot rest on one matching circumstance in isolation: a “criminal court cannot pick one apparently corroborated portion while ignoring other material inconsistencies”. The FIR spoke of four shots causing four injuries, while the post-mortem showed three entry wounds with exit wounds, and other injuries did not fully match the ocular account. Of five independent witnesses named in the chargesheet, only two were examined and both turned hostile. The fardbeyan was delayed by over five hours and the FIR by over seventeen; only two empty shells were recovered. The Court added that alibi need not be proved where the prosecution evidence itself creates reasonable doubt, and that unrelated antecedents “cannot be used to fill gaps in the prosecution case”. “The benefit of doubt doctrine is not an empty formality.”

What the Court Actually Held

  • A concurrent acquittal can be interfered with under Article 136 only if the view taken is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable or manifestly illegal; the Court will not substitute its view merely because another view is possible.
  • Testimony of related witnesses is not rejected for relationship alone but requires careful scrutiny, particularly where independent witnesses are hostile and medical evidence does not fit the ocular account.
  • Where the prosecution evidence itself raises reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal even if his alibi is not strictly proved; criminal antecedents cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case.
  • The appeal was dismissed, the acquittal affirmed, and respondent No. 2 discharged of his bail bonds, subject to Section 437-A CrPC, if applicable.

Why This Judgment Matters

  • It is a comprehensive restatement of the law on appeals against acquittal, frequently cited by trial and High Courts.
  • It explains how inconsistencies between the FIR, the eyewitnesses and the post-mortem report can create reasonable doubt.
  • It clarifies that an accused does not have to prove the prosecution case false in every respect to keep an acquittal.

What Should Advocates Take Away From the Judgment?

For Victims and Families

  • An appeal against a concurrent acquittal faces a very high threshold; it must show the view taken was impossible or perverse, not merely that another view was possible.
  • Early, accurate FIRs and examination of independent witnesses greatly affect the outcome of murder trials.

For Counsel

  • Defending an acquittal, build a table comparing the FIR, eyewitness attribution and post-mortem findings, as the Court did.
  • Prosecutors should explain delays in the fardbeyan and FIR and why named independent witnesses were not examined.
  • Cite Ghurey Lal and Chandrappa for the double presumption of innocence.

Key Takeaways

  • Acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence.
  • Related witnesses require careful scrutiny, not automatic rejection.
  • A single corroborated detail cannot outweigh material inconsistencies.
  • Benefit of doubt is a substantive protection, not a formality.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can the Supreme Court overturn an acquittal upheld by the High Court?

Yes, but only where the view taken by the courts below is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable or manifestly illegal. A merely different possible view is not enough.

Is the evidence of a victim’s relatives unreliable?

Not by itself. The Court said relationship is no ground for rejection, but such evidence must be carefully scrutinised, especially when independent witnesses do not support it.

Did the failed alibi matter?

The Court held that an alibi must be strictly proved, but the acquittal did not rest on alibi alone; where the prosecution evidence itself creates reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal.

Conclusion

Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar underlines how high the bar is for reversing concurrent acquittals, and how inconsistencies between ocular, medical and documentary evidence can make an acquittal a legitimate view even in a grave case.

Practical takeaway: In appeals against acquittal, the question is not whether the accused could have been convicted, but whether acquitting him was a view no reasonable court could take.

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