“Cars, Trucks, Motorcycles, or Other Vehicles” — But Not a Bicycle?
How a list's own company decides what its catch-all phrase actually covers
A municipal by law banned parking “cars, trucks, motorcycles, or other vehicles” on a narrow market lane. A vendor parked his bicycle-cart there overnight and was fined under the bylaw's catch-all phrase, “other vehicles.” He argued the phrase couldn't possibly stretch to cover a hand-pushed bicycle-cart — and the court agreed.
Read in isolation, “other vehicles” looks broad enough to catch almost anything with wheels. But the phrase does not sit in isolation. It sits at the end of a list of motorised, engine-driven vehicles — cars, trucks, motorcycles. That company the phrase keeps is exactly what the doctrine of ejusdem generis uses to narrow it down.
What Does Ejusdem Generis Actually Mean?
Ejusdem generis is Latin for “of the same kind.” It is a rule of statutory interpretation applied when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific items belonging to a common category. The general phrase is read as limited to things of the same kind, class, or nature as the specific items listed before it — not as an unlimited catch-all.
For the doctrine to apply, courts typically look for a few conditions: the specific words must form a genuine, identifiable category or class; the general words must follow (not precede) the specific list; and there must be no clear indication in the statute that Parliament or the legislature intended the general words to have a wider, unrestricted meaning.
A Story That Brings It to Life
Back to the market lane bylaw. “Cars, trucks, motorcycles” are all self-propelled, engine-driven, road-registered vehicles — a coherent class. Applying ejusdem generis, “other vehicles” is read as confined to other things of that same kind: perhaps buses, vans, or three-wheelers, but not a hand-pushed bicycle-cart, which belongs to an entirely different category of conveyance.
Had the bylaw instead listed “cars, trucks, bicycles, or other vehicles,” the presence of a non-motorised item in the specific list would have signalled a broader intended class, and the outcome for the vendor might well have been different. This is precisely why the doctrine is so fact-sensitive — it depends entirely on what common thread genuinely runs through the specific words used.
Why This Interpretive Tool Matters
- It prevents catch-all phrases from being stretched to cover situations the legislature likely never contemplated when drafting a specific list.
- It gives drafters and readers of statutes, contracts, and rules a predictable way to read general language that follows a specific enumeration.
- It is not an absolute rule — it yields wherever the statute's language or purpose clearly shows an intention for the general words to sweep more broadly.
- It appears constantly outside pure statutory interpretation too, including in contracts, insurance policies, and regulatory notifications that use a list followed by a general phrase.
Key Takeaways
- Ejusdem generis limits a general word following a specific list to items of the same kind as that list.
- The doctrine requires the specific words to form a genuine, identifiable class or category.
- It applies only as a default interpretive aid — clear contrary intent in the text overrides it.
- The same catch-all phrase can mean different things depending on which specific words precede it.
Frequently Asked Questions
No. If the specific items listed do not form a coherent class — for instance, a list combining wholly unrelated things — courts generally find there is no common genus to which the general words can be confined, and the doctrine does not apply.
Yes. If the statute uses language clearly showing that the general words were meant to have a wide, independent meaning (for instance, phrases like “including but not limited to” combined with express wide definitions), courts will give effect to that clear intention over the default ejusdem generis reading.
Conclusion
The vendor kept his bicycle-cart, and his fine. Ejusdem generis is a reminder that words rarely mean everything they could possibly mean — they mean what the company they keep suggests they were meant to mean.