Results
Tribunals and Commissions(2025) 09 ITAT CK 2825

Vasudev Garg Vs DCIT

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 22 Sept 2025 · Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member · S. Rifaur Rahman, Accountant Member

Open full page

Judgment

85 paragraphs · 5,885 words

Per Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member:

The assessee’s eight appeals ITA Nos. 3169 to 3176/Del/2025; for asse ssment years 2012-13 to 2019-20, arise against the CIT(A)-3, Gurgaon’s common order dated 25.03.2025 passed in case No. 10210, 10377, 10688, 11299, 11627, 10608, 10860/CIT(A) GG N-3/2011-12, 20 12-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, in proceedings u/s 153A/143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in shor t “the Act”), respectively.

2.

Heard both the p arties at length. Case files peruse d.

3.

It emerges at the outset that there arises the first and foremost issue of validity of all the impugned assessments framed u/s 153A of the Act by the learned Assessing Officer, in furtherance to the search in q uestion herein dated 30.07.2018 for want of a valid section 153D approval. T his is for the precise re ason that learned counsel representing the assessee has filed before us a copy of the prescribed authority followed by the latter’s approval dated 16.06.2021, a common one rig ht from assessment years 2012-13 to 2019-20, as the case may be. This being the clinching fact, we note that the tribunal’s recent co-ordinate bench order dated 24.02.2025 in DCIT Vs. Empire Realtech Pvt. Ltd., ITA No . 4288/Del/2017 as held such an assessment itse lf has no t sustainab le in law for want of valid section 153D approval as under:

“5 . It is in t his factual backdr op that the learned CIT-DR co ul d hardly dispute the clinc hi ng fact t hat the assessee’s cross obje ction r aises the foregoi ng legal issue o f validi ty of the impugned assessment framed by t he Assessi ng O ffi cer dat ed 18.02.2015 itself; for want of a valid secti on 153D approval in further ance t o the search i n question carried out by t he de partmental authorities on 23.11.2012. We make it clear that the learned As sessi ng Officer’s s ection 1 53D approv al s ought dated 12.02.2015 forms pa rt of t he records before us whic h is found t o be a c ommon one for assess ment years 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2012-13, which stood granted on 16.02.2015.

6.

Fa ced wit h this situati on, we invited R evenue’s attenti on to vario us recent decis ions t hat s uch an assessment based on a co mmon section 153D approval is not s ustai nable i n law i n light of learned c o-ordinate bench’s order i n Aditya S harma Vs. ACIT, ITA Nos. 36 16 to 3621/D el/2019 vide order dated 15.01.2025 holdi ng as unde r:

“3 . We next note that ther e arises the firs t and foremost iss ue of validity of all the impugned assessments framed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A o f the A ct ; dat ed 02.03.2017, in conse quence to the searc h action herei n dat ed 15.0 2.2014, on the ground that the learned prescribed authority had not accor ded a valid approv al thereto u/s 153D of the Act. T he R ev enue could hardly dispute that the i nstant legal ground sought to be rai sed at t he assess ee’s behest goes to the root o f the matter and there for e, we quote National Thermal Power Co . L td. vs. CIT (1998) 2 29 ITR 383 (S C); as considered in Allcargo Global L ogistics Ltd. vs. DCIT (2012) 137 ITD 287 (SB ) (Mum), that such an addi tional gro und c ould ve ry well be allowe d to be raised in sectio n 254(1) proc eedi ngs, i n order t o det ermi ne the corr ect tax liability of an assess ee pr ovided all t he relevant fac ts form part of the r eco rds.

4.

It is i n t his fac tual bac kdrop that we admit t he assessee’s insta nt legal gr ound and note with t he able assista nce coming from both the parties that the learned Assessi ng Officer had sought the prescri bed authority’s appr oval on 27.02.2017 which sto od gra nted on 02.03.2017. The cl inchi ng fact whic h fr om page 10 in t he assessee’s paper book is that the le arned Assessing Officer her ei n had infact sought a c ommon appr oval for all thes e assess ment years fro m 2008-09 to 2013-14 whic h stood gra nted, and the refore, we quote PC IT Vs. Shiv K umar Nayyar (2024) 163 taxmann.c om 9 (D el.), PCIT Vs. MDLR Hotels (P) Ltd. (2024) 166 taxmann.co m 327 (Del.) and ACIT vs. Seraj uddi n and Co . (2024) 1 63 taxmann.com 118 (SC), to conclude t hat such a combi ned section 153D appr oval indeed viti ates t he entire assessment itself. We draw str ong t her efrom to quash all the imp ugned assess ments framed herei n in assessee’s cas e i n ass essme nt years 2008-09 to 2013-14 in ver y terms.”

7.

Le arned CIT-DR has filed a copy of Revenue’s written submissions as under:

“S ub: Writt en S ubmission i n the above case on the legal ground of validity of S ec tion 153D approval granted by the JCIT/Addl. CIT - r eg. In the above cas e, it is humbly submitt ed t hat i n additi on t o t he oral arguments submitted by the undersigned, t he followi ng le gal issues/le gal submissi ons , r el evant to s ecti on 1 53D approval and two vital Judgments of the Hon. Supreme Cour t, on the l egality and le gal r equi rements of t he Admi nistrative Orders of gover nment or exec utive aut horities, may k indly be considered:-

1.

The w ord/phrase - “written approval ” is no t menti oned i n the sec tion 153D of t he Income tax Act, 1961. The o nl y phrase used is “the pri or approval ”. Ther efore, t he co ntents of the wri tten order of the JC IT/Addl. CIT are le gally not r equir ed t o be exami ned or c onsidered, for meeting the legal or fact ual r equireme nts of t he a pproval under section 153D.

2.

The or der by the Addl . CIT/JCIT under section 153D i s an A dministrative Or der, by the hi ghe r aut hority i.e. JCIT/Addl. CIT to t he lowe r authority, i.e. AO. Such an ord er is not a quasi -j udicial o r judicial orde r. Ther efor e, the l egal requirements and benchmarks r egardi ng the principl es of “the applicatio n of mi nd" and “t he speaking order” are not as strict or hi gh, as they are i n t he c as e of quasi -judicial or j udicial order.

3.

In respect of t he l egal requirem ents and the benchmarks regar ding the administr ative orders, the Ho n. S uprem e Court has given many comprehe nsive judgements, w hich are encl osed and t he r elevant porti ons /parts are quoted as under:-

(i)

Decision o f Hon’ble S upr eme Court i n t he case of Municipal C ouncil Neemuch vs Mahadeo R eal Estate, dat ed 17 Sep tember, 2019, AIR 2019 SC 4517, 2019 (10) SCC 738.

“. .... 14. In the pr esent c as e, t he l ear ned Judges of the Division B ench have arrived at a fi nding tha t such a sanction was, i n fac t, granted. We will exami ne the c or rectness of the said fi nding of fac t at a subsequent stage. Howe ver, bef ore d oi ng that, we prop ose to e xamine the s cope of t he powers of the High Cour t of judicial review of an a dmi nist rative action. Though, the re ar e a catena of judgments of this Cour t on the said issue, the law laid down by this Court in the case of Tata Cellul ar Vs. Union of I ndia reported i n (1994) 6 SCC 651 lays down the basic pri nciples whi ch still hold t he fi eld. Par agraph 77 of the said judgment reads thus:

“77.

The duty of the c ourt is to c onfi ne its elf to the questi on of legality. Its conc ern should be:-

1.

Whe t h e r a de c is io n - mak i ng aut ho ri t y e xce ed ed it s po w e rs ?

2.

C om m it t e d a n e r r or of l aw ,

3.

com m it t e d a b r e ach of t h e ru les o f na t u ra l j us t ic e ,

4.

r eac hed a d ec is ion w hic h no r ea s o nab l e tr ib u nal w o u ld ha v e r eac h ed o r ,

5.

ab us ed it s p ow er s .

Ther efore, it is not for the court to det ermi ne whether a par ticular policy or partic ul ar deci sion taken in the fulfillme nt of that policy is fair. It is only concer ned with the manne r i n whic h those dec isi ons have been ta ken. The ext ent of the duty to act fairly wi ll var y from cas e to cas e. Shortly put, the grounds upon whic h an adminis trative action i s subjec t to control by judicial revi ew can be classifie d as under:-

(i)

I l le gal it y: T h is m e ans t he d ec is io n - mak e r m us t und e rs t a nd c o r r ec t ly t he law t ha t re gula t e s h is dec is ion -m ak ing p o w er a nd m us t g ive eff ec t t o it .

(ii ) Ir r a t io na lit y , na m el y, u nr ea s o na b le n es s.

(ii i) P roc ed u r al imp r op r i et y.

The above are o nl y the broad grounds but it does no t rule out additi on of fur ther grounds in c ours e of time. As a matt er of fac t, i n R. V. S ecretary o f State for the Ho me D epartment, ex B ri nd, (1991) 1 AC 696, Lord Diplock refers s peci fically to one devel opment, namely, t he possible r eco gni tion of the pri nciple of prop orti onality. In all thes e case s t he test to be adopted is that the court shoul d, ‘conside r whether somet hi ng has gone wr ong of a nat ure and degree whic h requires its inter vention”.

15.

It c ould t hus be seen t hat the scope of judicial revi ew of an admi nistr ative action is ver y limited. Unl ess the Court comes to a concl usion, that the decision maker has not unde rstood the law correctly that r egulates his decision-maki ng power or when it i s found that the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irratio nality and t hat too on the pri nciple of “Wednesbury Unreasonableness” or unl ess it is found that there has bee n a procedural impropriety in the decision-ma ki ng pr ocess, it would not be permissible for t he Hi gh Court to i nt erfere i n the decisi on maki ng pr ocess. It is also equally wel l settled, tha t it is not permissible for t he C ourt t o exami ne the validity of the decision but this C ourt can exami ne only the correctness of the deci sion maki ng proc ess .

16.

This C ourt recentl y in the case of West Be ngal Central Sc hool Service Commissio n Vs. Abdul Halim reported i n 2019 SCC O nLi ne SC 902 had agai n an occasion to consider t he scope of inte rferenc e under Article 226 i n an admi nistrative action. ”

31.

In exercise of its po wer of judicial revi ew, the Court is to see whether the d ecision impugned is vitiated by an appar ent error of law. The test t o det ermi ne whether a decision is vitiat ed by error apparent on the fac e of the r ecor d is whether t he err or is self-evident on t he face of the rec ord or whether t he error requires ex ami natio n or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a proc ess of reasoni ng, on poi nts where t here may reasonably be t wo opini ons, it cannot be said to be an err or on t he face o f t he rec ord, as held by t his Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarj una reported i n AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provi sion of a stat utory r ul e is reasonably capable of t wo or more constructi ons and one constr uction has been adopte d, t he decision woul d not be open to i nterfere nce by the writ C ourt. It is only an obvious misi nterpretation of a r elevant stat utory provision, or i gnora nce or disregard there of, or a decision f ounded on re as ons whi ch ar e clearly wrong in la w, which can be cor rected by t he writ Court by iss uance of writ of Certiorari.

32.

The swe ep of power under Arti cle 2 26 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decisi on is so arbitrary and capricious t hat no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liabl e to be struck do wn by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be support ed by the mat erials on rec ord, the s ame may be regarded as perverse. Municipal Council Neemuch vs Ma hadeo Real Estat e on 17 Sept ember, 2019 Indian Kano on -htt p://indianka noon.or g/doc/83894917/ 6.

33.

Ho wever , the power of the Court to exami ne the reasonabl eness of an order of t he authoriti es does not enabl e t he Court to look i nto the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to exami ne the merits of the deci sion, sitti ng as if i n appeal over the decisi on. The tes t is not what t he C ourt considers reasonable or unr eas onable but a deci sion whic h the Court thi nks that no re asonable pers on could have ta ken, which has led t o manifest injustice. The writ Court do es not Int erf ere, because a deci sion is no t perfec t.

17.

It coul d thus be seen that an int erfer ence by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law, i .e., when the error is appare nt on the face of the r eco rd and is self evi dent . The Hi gh Court would be empowered t o exercise the powe rs when it fi nds that the decisi on impugned is so arbi trary and capricious tha t no reasonabl e person would have ever ar rived at. It has bee n reiterated t hat the test is not what the court considers reas onable or unreasona ble but a decisi on whic h the c ourt thi nks that no reasonabl e person c oul d have taken. Not only this but suc h a decisi on must have led to manifest i nj ustice ...

25.

In the present case, we find t hat the Commissi o ner had acte d ri ghtly as a c ustodian of t he public pr opert y by poi nti ng o ut the anomalies in the prop osal of the Municipal C ouncil to the Stat e Gov ernment and the State G overnm ent has also res ponded i n the right perspective by authorizi ng the Commissi o ner t o ta ke an appr opriate deci sion. We ar e of t he considered view t hat, bot h, the Commissioner as well as the State G overnme nt, have acted i n the lar ger public inter est , We are unabl e to appr eciate as to how the Hi gh Court, i n t he pres ent matt er, coul d hav e come to a concl usi on that it was empowered t o exerci se the power of judicial r eview to prevent arbit rariness or favoritism o n the part of the S tat e aut horities, as has been obs erv ed by it i n paragraph 13. We are als o una ble t o appreci at e t he fi ndi ng of the Hi gh Court i n par a 17 wherei n it has obs erv ed tha t the impugned decision of the authoriti es ar e found not to be i n the public i nterest . We ask t he questi on to us, as to whet her directing re -tendering by i nviti ng fresh tenders aft er givi ng wide publ icity at the Na tional level so as t o o btai n the best price for the public property, would be i n the public interest or as to whether a wardi ng c ontract to a bidder i n the te nder process where it is found that there was no adequate i nt erest or as to whether publi city and al so a possibility o f there bei ng a car tel of bidders, would be In the public int erest. We a re of the consider ed view that t he decision o f the Co mmissioner whic h i s set aside by t he High Court is undoubte dly i n larger public Int eres t, whic h wo ul d ens ur e that the Munici pal Council ear ns a hi gher r evenue by enlar ging the scope of the c ompetition. By no stretch of imagi nation, t he decisi on of the S tat e Government or t he Commissi o ner co uld be termed as ille gal, impr oper, unreasonable or irrati onal, whic h parameters o nly could have permitted t he Hi gh Court to i nt er fere. Int erferenc e by the High Court when none of suc h parameters exist, in our vie w, was tot ally improper. On t he co ntrar y, we fi nd that it is the Hi gh Court, whic h has failed to take int o co nsiderati on r elevant mat erial.

26.

In the r esult, the impugned Orders are no t sustai nabl e in law. The appeals are, accordi ngl y, allowed and the Impugned or ders dated 31.08.2017 and 05.07.2018 are quas hed and set aside. The petition of r esponde nt No. 1 stands di smissed ………..”

(ii)

Decision of Hon’ble S upreme Co urt i n the case of West Be ngal C entr al School S ervice ... vs A bdul H alim dat ed 24 July, 2019, AIR 2019 SC 4504, AIRONLIN E 2019 SC 2188 AIR 2020 SC (C IV) 82.

“…………… …..31. The swe ep of power under A rticle 226 may be wide enough t o quash unreasona ble orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious tha t no rea sonable pers on c ould have ever arrived at it, the same is liabl e to be s truc k down by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be s upport ed by the materials on rec ord, t he same may be regarded as per verse.

32.

Ho wever , the power of the Court to exami ne the reasonabl eness of an order of t he authoriti es does not enabl e t he Court to look i nto the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to exami ne the merits of the deci sion, sitti ng as if i n appeal over the decisi on. The tes t is not what t he C ourt considers reasonable or unr eas onable but a deci sion whic h the Court thi nks that no re asonable pers on could have ta ken, which has led t o manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, becaus e a decision is not perfec t.

33.

In entertai ning a nd allowi ng the wri t pe tition, the Hi gh Cour t has lost sight of the limits of i ts extraor di nar y power of j udicial review and has in fac t sat i n appeal over the decision of the respondent No. 2…………….”

8.

We have given our thoughtful conside ration t o the assessee’s pl eadings and R evenue’s vehement contentions as well as it’s written submissi on. We find no r eason to uphold the validity of the impugned assessment as it has come on recor d that the same has bee n framed in furthe ranc e t o a co mmon secti on 15 3D appr oval already held as not s ust ainabl e in law. We order acc ordi ngly.”

4.

The lear ned CIT- DR at this stage seeks to distinguish the above preposition by filing the Revenue’s written submissions as fo llows:

“A. Con ten tions of the De pa rtme nta l R eprese nta tive o n Issue o f Appro val under Sectio n 153D

1. Jurisdictio n a nd Ro le of Appro vin g Author ity

It is respectfu lly submitted th at the Additional C om missi oner o f Incom e Tax (A dd l. CIT) ex erc ises concurrent ju risdictio n over assessment proceed ings in search and s eiz ure cases. Th e assessment is a cont inuou s a nd comp osite process, wherein t he Addl. C IT assum es both adm inistrative and statu tory functions.

The stat utory approva l envisaged under sect ion 153 D is not a m ere e mpty form ality, b ut a substantive safegu ard requiri n g t he approvin g authority t o j udiciously an d ind ependently examine th e assessment record s, seiz ed d ocum ent s, a nd issues arisi ng theref rom.

In t he present case, the assessee ha s failed t o demon strat e that such approval wa s granted mechanicall y or with out applicat ion of mind. The burden of proof lie s on th e assessee t o posit ive ly establish non-a pplicat ion of m ind, whi ch has not been discharged.

2. Findings Re corded in Approva l Orde r

The ap proval gran ted by the Addl. CIT, Central R ange, Gurugram dated 16.06.2021 sp ecifically records in Paragra ph 2 that :

a)

The assessee was afford ed p rop er op portunity of bein g heard durin g assessment proceed ings;

b)

The issues arising from material on rec ord wer e duly examined by th e A ssessing Officer and considered at the ti me of approva l; and

c)

The relevan t seiz ed do cumen ts were duly verified before the p assing o f t he dra ft a ssess ment order.

These categorical fi ndings recorded in th e approval order itself di spel t he a llegation of non-application of min d. They dem onst rate that the A ddl. CIT not only exam ined t he draf t order but also s atisfied himself wit h respect to t he seiz ed m at eria l a nd procedural safegu ards.

3. Seize d Material Form s Inte gr al Pa rt o f Assessme nt Records

It is a set tle d pr op osit ion that seized d ocuments form pa rt of the assessment records an d are con tinuously referred to b y the A O during proceedings. S uch do cu ment s are neit her segre gat ed nor exc luded bu t are inc orpora ted i nto t he ma terial on rec ord relied upon while f raming the assessm ent.

Therefore, wh en the AO forwa rded the draft o rde r and records for statut ory ap proval, t he e ntire b ody of records including seiz ed docume nts st ood bef ore t he ap proving authori ty. Hen ce, t he allegation that ap proval wa s g ran ted without con sidera tion of seized material is devo id of m erit.

4. No Infer ence of M echa nic al Approval

The ap proval letter its elf makes it evident that t he A ddl. C IT had perused t he assessment record s and seiz ed material. A ccordingly, it can n ot be inf erred th at t he approva l was accord ed in a mech anical o r perfunctory man ner.

5. Prio r Kno wledge of Issues by Appro ving Autho rity

In search cases, the A ddl. C IT remain s apprised of th e facts, seiz ed m aterial, an d devel opments of assessment procee dings. This is fu rth er fo rtifi ed b y C BDT In struction F. No. 286/16 1/2006- IT(Inv.II) da ted 22.12.2006, which mand ates that t he appraisal repo rt is shar ed with both the Assessin g Officer a nd supervisory aut horit ies.

Therefore, m uch prio r to the fo rwarding of the draft assessment orde r, th e A dd l. C IT was well- info rmed ab out t he fact s and issues. The fact th at app roval was gr anted on the sa m e day as rec eip t of th e p roposal do es n ot imp ly mechanical app roval.

6. Approval - A Question of Fa ct

The Hon ’ble Ju risd ictional High C ourt has repeat edly held th at validity of approval under sect ion 153D is essentially a question of fact , to be dete rmin ed ba sed on the factu al matri x of each case. The cases rel ied upon by t he asses see are cl earl y disting uishable, as ev ident b elow:

Ca s e & Ci ta ti o n Fa c ts Co n s i d e r e d b y D i s ti n g u i s h in g Fe a tu r e s Co u r t i n P re s e n t C a s e

P C I T v s . A n u j No a s se s s m e n t I n p r e se n t c a s e , s e i z e d B a n s a l , I T A r e co r ds s e n t ; m a t e ri a l a n d a ss e s s m e n t 36 8/ 2 0 2 3 ( D e l H C) in f i r m it ie s i n f ig u r e s r e c o r d s w e re f o r w a r de d ; n o o v e r lo o k e d i n f i r m it ie s s h o w n

Se h R e a l t o rs P v t. Ap p r o v a l in 2 3 2 ca se s P r e se n t c a s e co n c er n s o n ly L t d . v . A C I T , I T A in o n e d a y ; h u m a n 8 c a s e s o f s a m e gr o up w it h 25 0 3/ D e l /2 01 7 l im i t a t io n s qu e st io n e d i d e n t i ca l m o d u s o p e ra n di ( I T A T D el h i)

A ccordin gly, relia nce placed by th e assessee is who lly mispl aced.

7. No Presumptio n Aga inst Appro ving Autho rity

A N o ad verse p resump tio n can be drawn merely because m ultiple approvals w ere granted on a pa rticular dat e. T h e question of w hether ap pro vals were mechanical dep ends upon facts such as comm onality of iss ues, numb er of cases, and inter-relat ionship of fact s.

In th e i nst ant search g roup , the issues were based on identical accom mo dation entries and com mon modus op era ndi, en ablin g the Addl. C IT to efficiently app ly his mind a cross co nnected cases.

8. Judicial Support - P rocedural I rregularities No t Fatal

R elia nce is plac ed on Home Finders Housing L td. v. ITO [2018] 93 taxmann.com 3 71 ( Mad HC), wher ein it was held that non-comp liance of procedural requi rements d oes not vit iat e assessment proceed ings but is at best a curab le i r reg ularit y. The Hon ’ble S upreme Court also dismi ssed the SL P a gainst this decisio n.

S imila rly, in Impro vemen t Trust, Ludh iana v. U jagar S ingh (C A No. 2395/2008), the Hon’bl e S uprem e C ourt empha sized t hat ju stice must be rendered on merits an d n ot de feated on tech nicalities.

Thu s, even assumin g some proced ural ir regu la rity, it cannot invalidate t he substantive assessmen t framed on merit s.

In l ight of t he a bove subm issions, it is resp ect fully subm itted tha t:

1.

The Addl. CIT d uly disch arged h is statutory obligat ion und er section 153D;

2.

The approval orde r itsel f reco rds applica tio n of mind to seized docum ents and issues;

3.

The facts of the assessee ’s case are distin guishab le from cit ed p receden ts; and

4.

Proc edural o bjectio n s cannot viti ate val id assessmen t orders.

5.

A ccordin gly, the object ion raised by the assessee regard ing validit y of a ppr ova l under secti on 153 D deserves t o b e reje cted in toto.”

5.

We see no merit in the learned CIT-DR foregoing arguments. This is for the precise reason that there is no such procedure of getting the field authorities affidavit in support of the ir respective orders under the provisions of the Act that stated in the case records. Case law Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs. R.B. Wadkar (2004) 268 ITR 332 (Bom.) has already settled the issue; in section 148/147 jur isprudence , that even reasons recorded by the assessing authority co uld not be allowed to be improved of any latter stage which have to be read as standalone basis. The very legal proposition is applicable in administrative law as well as in hon’ble apex court’s landmark decisio n in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. CEC (1978) 1 SCC 405 (SC) wherein the ir held as under:

“Th e sec ond equall y re levant m att er i s that when a statut ory functionary makes an order based o n cert ain grou nds, i ts validity m ust be jud ged by the reas ons so m entioned and cannot be sup plement ed by fresh reason s in the sha pe of affidav it or o the rwise. Oth erwise, an order b ad in the beginnin g may, by the tim e it comes to court on account of a challenge, get vali dat ed by ad ditio nal grounds latter br ought o ut. We may here d raw attention t o the ob servations of B os e J. in Gordhandas B hanj i.

“Public ord ers, pub licly made, i n exe rcise of a statut ory au thority cann ot be construed in the light of explanations subseq uent ly given by the office making the ord er of what he m ean t, or of what was in his mind, or w hat he int ended to do. Public o rd ers m ade by public authorit ies are meant to h ave p ublic effect and are inten ded to effect th e act ings an d condu ct of th ose t o whom they are ad dressed an d must be const rued o bj ectiv ely wi th referen ce to the la nguage used in th e ord er itself. ”

Orders are not lik e old wine b ec omi ng better as they grow old er”.

6.

We thus conclud e in this factual backdrop that given the fact that the section 153D approval herein dated 16.06.2021 is a common one in all these assessme nt years, the impugned section 153A assessments herein are not non-est in t he eyes of law. The same are hereby quashed in very terms. Ordered according ly.

7.

All other plead ings on merits stand rendered academic.

8.

These assessee’ s eight appeals ITA Nos. 3169 to 3176/Del/2025 are allowed. A copy of this common order be placed in the respective case files.