Shilpa T. Sunny & Anr. Vs K.N. Prasad & Anr.
High Court Of Kerala · Ernakulam · 13 Nov 2026 · Mohammed Nias C.P., J
Judgment
The plaintiffs who lost before both the Courts have filed the Second Appeal.
O.S.No.195/2023 was filed before the Munsiff Court, Devikulam, contending that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to the late father of the plaintiffs and, following his demise, the plaintiffs inherited the absolute title, ownership, and possession over the said property by way of intestate succession. On 3.1.2006, an agreement for sale was entered into, after which a sale deed was executed as Sale Deed No. 58/2006 at SRO, Devikulam, between the mother of the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 concerning the plaint schedule properties.
In the said document, the plaintiffs were represented by their mother as their natural guardian, as they were minors at the relevant time. Alleging that the mother of the plaintiffs did not receive the entire sale consideration stipulated under the said agreement and that, no portion of the consideration was paid, deposited or utilized for the welfare, benefit, or maintenance of the minors/plaintiffs and that they became aware of the transaction only on 15.1.2022, the suit was filed challenging the alienation as per Sale Deed No. 58/2006 and the subsequent transactions and prayed for cancelling the same and declaring them not binding on the plaintiffs and also, for recovering possession of their respective shares in the property.
The first defendant filed a written statement stating that the suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and the same is hopelessly barred by the law of limitation. It was contended that the first plaintiff attained majority in the year 2011 and the second plaintiff in the year 2015, and since the suit was instituted long after the expiry of the statutory period, the claim is time-barred. It is also argued that the plaintiffs had previously instituted another suit, O.S.No.130/2021, on the same cause of action and therefore, the present suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also urged that the mother of the plaintiffs, who executed the document, was not made a party and, therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of a necessary party. It is argued that the sale transaction was bona fide, valid and executed for valuable consideration reflecting the market value of the property and that the entire sale consideration was duly paid by the first defendant.
The respective share amounts due to the minor plaintiffs were safely deposited in Fixed Deposits at the Federal Bank, Munnar Branch, on 29.12.2005. The fact of the deposit of funds for the benefit of the minors was explicitly recited in registered Sale Deed No.58/2006 and that the plaintiffs, upon attaining majority, had withdrawn the full maturity amounts. The sale was executed by the mother of the plaintiffs acting for herself and as the natural guardian for the welfare and legal necessity of the minors. The entire estate of late Mr Sunny T. Jacob, the father of the plaintiffs, was burdened with heavy debts and liabilities owed to various banks and financial institutions. The sale of the property was imperative to discharge those pressing liabilities and save the family estate.
The Trial Court framed five issues as follows:
“1.Is the suit barred by Order II Rule 2 of CPC?
2.Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary party?
3.Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree of cancellation of Sale deed No. 58/2006 of SRO Devikulam?
4.Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the shares of plaint scheduled properties?
5.Orders as to reliefs and costs.”
On the side of the plaintiffs, PW1 and 2 were examined. Exhibits A1, C1 and C1(a) were marked. On the side of the defendants, the first defendant was examined as DW1 and Exhibit B1 was marked.
The Trial Court had found that there was no necessity in taking prior permission before the alienation, that the consideration mentioned in the document was paid and that the shares of the minors were deposited as a fixed deposit. The Appellate Court concurred with the findings and rendered an additional finding on the question of limitation, finding that the suit was clearly time-barred. It is against the same that this Second Appeal is filed.
The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the judgment of the Court below was clearly wrong as the question of permission for alienation was not considered and that the guardian was not appointed before alienating the property of the minor. It is also argued that the finding of the Court below, that the mother of a minor can dispose of the property of the minor without the permission of the Court, is wrong and unsustainable. It is argued that the minor is incompetent to contract and such a statutory restriction created to protect the interest of the minor cannot be defeated by enabling the natural guardian to step into the shoes of the minor and to enter into any contract on behalf of the minor.
It is also argued that the sale deed ought to have been found void and the right of the minor to avoid the document under Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, applied to the facts and those facts were not noted by both the Courts. The judgments relied on by both the Courts were inapplicable to the facts of the case.
Heard the learned counsel for the appellants. Perused the available records.
The facts of the case would show that Exhibit A1, the deed sought to be cancelled, was executed on 3.1.2006 by Smt. Deepthi Sunny, acting for herself and as the natural guardian on behalf of her two minor children, the present plaintiffs, who have since attained majority and instituted the suit. The recitals in Exhibit A1 disclose that the property conveyed originally belonged to Late Sunny T.Jacob, the father of the plaintiffs, by virtue of Document No. 1579/2001 of SRO, Devikulam, and upon his demise, the property devolved intestate upon his widow, Smt.Deepthi Sunny, and their two minor children.
The document records that the total sale consideration was fixed at Rs.1,50,000/- which was paid by defendant No.1. Exhibit A1 also states the legal necessity for the alienation. It stated that the usufructs and income derived from the schedule property were insufficient for the maintenance, betterment and education of the minor plaintiffs and, upon the advice of well-wishers and legal counsel, the property was sold with the intention of acquiring more profitable alternative assets for the welfare of the minors. Thus, the recitals in Exhibit A1 belie the contention of the plaintiffs that no consideration was paid. The deed also records that the respective shares of the minor plaintiffs were deposited in Fixed Deposits at the Federal Bank, Munnar Branch, on 29.12.2005. Thus, the very foundation of the suit that the plaintiffs received no consideration and that no financial provision was made for their benefit was found to be wrong, going by Exhibit A1 itself.
That apart, the first plaintiff, who was examined as PW1, stated that she came to know about the impugned transaction on 02.02.2023 while her sister was undergoing medical treatment. This testimony directly contradicts the pleading in the plaint, wherein the date of knowledge was stated as 15.01.2022. PW1 further deposed that her mother was subjected to severe physical and mental distress and that relatives of her late father had forcibly obtained signatures on various documents from her mother. However, when confronted during cross-examination, PW1 admitted that no such ground, allegation of coercion, or factual narrative was ever pleaded in the plaint or mentioned in her proof affidavit. She could not explain this significant omission.
PW1 was also unaware of whether any consideration was deposited or spent for their benefit. She admitted that she made no enquiries with the bank regarding the fixed deposits. PW1 also acknowledged that her late father had outstanding financial liabilities at the time of his death; she claimed ignorance regarding the extent or nature of those liabilities. PW1 admitted that she was not on good terms with her mother, whereas her sister (plaintiff No. 2) resided with their mother. PW1 testified that she enquired with her sister regarding the bank deposits, but received no response. PW1 also admitted to having previously instituted a suit, viz., O.S. No. 130/2021, which, of course, pertains to a different property.
The mother of the plaintiffs was examined as PW2. She also stated that she had seen the copy of the plaint provided to her by her younger daughter (plaintiff No. 2), but the plaintiffs never requested her to join as a co-plaintiff in the suit. It is also stated that she had executed the sale deed on 03.01.2006 at her official quarters in Marayoor and that, following the demise of her husband, his relatives had coerced and threatened her. PW2 admitted that she has never lodged any formal written complaint with the Police Station regarding the alleged coercion. She also admitted that her own brother-in-law had signed as one of the attesting witnesses to the impugned sale deed. Thus, the case set up in the plaint could not have been believed based on the evidence of PW1 and PW2.
PW2 further deposed that she or her children had not withdrawn the fixed deposit amounts mentioned in Exhibit A1 and, when asked as to why she did not challenge or seek cancellation of the sale deed, PW2 tried to explain that her occupational demands and responsibilities toward her children's education prevented her from initiating any legal proceeding. Thus, a reading of the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs clearly shows that no enquiry was made with regard to the bank deposits, and no steps were taken to summon the Branch Manager or call for the relevant records from the Bank. This shows that the contention taken in the plaint about the non-receipt of consideration cannot be believed at all. It is also relevant to note that there was no pleading at all regarding the alleged coercion or intimidation in the plaint, which again makes the plea completely unacceptable. So, the evidence adduced beyond the pleadings could not have been taken note of.
The Lower Appellate Court was also right in finding that the relevant provision applicable was Article 60(a) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which governs a suit to set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward and it prescribes a limitation period of three years commencing from the date the ward attains majority. Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act speaks about the legal disability suspending the time of running until the disability ceases. Thus, a reading of Article 60(a) and Section 6(1) would show that the suit which was instituted only on 25.7.2023 was clearly time-barred. Though this point was not considered by the Trial Court, the Lower Appellate Court had considered the same as is required under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
The contention raised that the mother was never appointed as the legal guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act and, consequently, the alienation of the minor plaintiffs’ undivided share under Exhibit A1 is illegal, is also without any merit. As rightly held by this Court in the decisions reported in Jince Mary Johns v. K.P.Johny and Another [2011 (4) KLT 533] as well as Deepthi v. Paulose @ Paul and Another [2014 (4) KHC 65], previous sanction of the Court is not necessary for the natural guardian to transfer the Christian minor’s share. Several judgments were noted in the above decisions. The Court Below has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Antony @ Jio v. Paul [2025 KHC OnLine 100] to hold that the term 'natural guardian' is not referred to in the Guardians and Wards Act; natural guardian is also included in the definition of guardian, and Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act does not apply to natural guardians.
The judgment relied on by the appellants, namely, Shivappa K. S. v. Neelamma [2025 KHC 6845], declared law under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and therefore did not apply to the facts. Thus, it was beyond any doubt that the biological parents are recognised as natural guardians of the minor child notwithstanding a specific definition of natural guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Such natural guardians fell under the definition of ‘guardian’ under Section 4(2) of the Act, and therefore, prior permission from the Court before alienating a minor’s immovable property was not mandatory. A natural guardian of a Christian minor is under no obligation to seek or obtain prior judicial permission before executing a conveyance on behalf of the minor.
In the instant case, the executant of Exhibit A1 is the mother of the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, the contention that prior permission was not taken and therefore the alienation is bad cannot be accepted. Both the Courts had analysed the evidence, both oral and documentary, in the correct perspective and in the light of the pleadings, and have come to the conclusion. No illegality can be found as regards the judgments of the courts below. There is no question of law, much less any substantial question of law arising in the facts of the case.
The Second Appeal lacks merit, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
