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High Courts(2026) 10 AHC CK 6442

Om Prakash Gupta & Anr. Vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. & Anr.

Allahabad High Court · Lucknow Bench · 28 Oct 2026 · Subhash Vidyarthi, J

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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 2,663 words

Hon'Ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.

1.

Heard Sri Prateek Tewari and Sri Prashant Shukla, learned counsels for the petitioner and Sri Yogesh Kumar Singh, the learned AGA-I, and perused the records.

2.

By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated 22.10.2026 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Court No. 25, Lucknow, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 4004 of 2026, whereby the Magistrate has allowed an application under Section 173(4) BNSS filed by the opposite party No. 2 and has directed registration of an FIR and conducting investigation in furtherance thereof.

3.

The learned AGA-I raised a preliminary objection that a mere direction to lodge an FIR does not give rise to a cause of action to challenge the order of the Magistrate before this Court, as an FIR is yet to be registered, an investigation is yet to be conducted and the court is yet to take cognizance of the offence. Unless the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences and summons the accused petitioners to face the trial, the petitioners do not have locus standi to challenge the order dated 22.10.2026 ordering registration of the FIR. In support of this contention, the learned AGA-I has placed reliance on a judgment rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Father Thomas v. State of UP: 2010 SCC OnLine All 2710, wherein the Full Bench held that an order passed by a Magistrate in exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the police to register an F.I.R. and investigate, is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process has been issued. The Full Bench held that an order made under Section 156(3) CrPC is an interlocutory order and the remedy of revision against such an order is barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 CrPC.

4.

Replying to the aforesaid preliminary objection raised by the learned AGA-I, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ranjeet Singh Bagh & Anr. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Another Criminal Appeal No. 4313 of 2024, decided on 06.02.2025 and Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2420.

5.

Regarding maintainability of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a judgment rendered by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P.: 2024 SCC OnLine All 7191, wherein the coordinate bench referred to numerous precedents, including Madhu Limaye versus State of Maharashtra: (1977) 4 SCC 551, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni: (1997) 4 SCC 241 and Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan: (2016) 16 SCC 30 and held that: -

"11.

So far as availability of filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the wordings of the aforesaid Article juxtaposed with the wordings of Section 482 Cr.P.C. clearly indicate that such jurisdiction is to be exercised by this Court as a supervisory jurisdiction in order to prevent abuse of process of law. Neither Article 227 of the Constitution of India nor Section 482 Cr.P.C. indicate any aspect ousting jurisdiction of the other. In such circumstances, it can only be held that provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 482 Cr.P.C. operate on a concurrent basis providing an option to an applicant to approach this Court under either provision."

6.

In Ranjeet Singh Bagh (supra) the Magistrate had passed an order allowing an application under Section 156(3) CrPC and directing the police to register the first information report. Quashing of the order was sought by filing a petition in the High Court, but the High Court dismissed the petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to and reproduced paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State of UP and Others: (2015) 6 SCC 287, which read as follows: -

"30.

In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.

31.

We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR."

7.

In Ranjeet Singh Bagh (supra), The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the Magistrate's order for the registration of FIR on the ground that before a complainant chooses to adopt the remedy under Section 156(3) CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 CrPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support, which was not done in that case. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered in the order in the order allowing the application under Section 156(3) CrPC and quashed the same.

8.

Om Prakash Ambadkar (supra) was an appeal against an order passed by the Bombay High Court rejecting an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. against an order allowing an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the Police to register an F.I.R. and the Hon'ble Supreme Court entertained and allowed the appeal for the following reasons: -

"24.

Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.

25.

In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Of course, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police."

9.

As the Hon'ble Supreme Court has entertained the challenge made to orders allowing application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and has set aside the orders passed by the High Courts refusing to entertain petitions challenging orders under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., I am of the view that in view of these subsequent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Father Thomas (Supra) that an order passed by a Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the police to register and investigate is not open to revision at the instance of a person against whom neither cognizance has been taken nor any process has been issued, stands diluted and the same is no more a good law. Therefore, I turn down the preliminary objection of the learned AGA-I and proceed to examine the merits of the case.

10.

In the application filed under Section 173(4) BNSS, the opposite party no.2 pleaded that he is an illiterate poor person, he came into contact with the petitioner no.2 through the latter's cousin Mukesh Gupta who resided in the neighborhood of the complainant and the opposite party no.2 often used to visit his cousin's place; that under allurement of getting benefit of government schemes and accommodation, the petitioner no.2 obtained thumb impressions of the complainant on some documents, but the complainant did not get benefit of any scheme; that subsequently, the complainant came to know about pendency of Regular Suit No.987 of 2021 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hawali, Lucknow, wherein he was a party, whereas he neither owns any property nor did he file any suit; that the complainant understood the facts of that suit, with the help of an Advocate and came to know that the suit was filed on the basis of forged and fictitious documents misusing the photograph of the complainant, which the petitioner no.2 had taken from him long ago. The complainant further stated that some of the documents filed in the suit appear to have been forged by the petitioner no.2.

11.

In paragraph 13 of the application, the complainant stated that he had given an information of the incident at the police station, but when the police did not take any action, he sent a complaint to the Commissioner of Police, Lucknow, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, North, Lucknow and to Police Station Wazirganj, Lucknow, through speed post on 31.03.2023 and when his report was not registered, he filed the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

12.

The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate noticed the contents of the application and the affidavit filed in support of the same. The Magistrate obtained a report from the concerned police station as per which no FIR has been lodged regarding the allegations leveled in the complaint and no investigation is pending. The Magistrate came to a conclusion that the averments made in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. prima facie make out commission of cognizable offences and the allegations required to be investigated. Accordingly, the Magistrate allowed the application under Section 173(4) BNS and directed registration of an FIR and conducting investigation in furtherance thereof.

13.

Assailing validity of the aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that prior to filing the application under Section 173(4) BNSS, the petitioner did not approach the concerned police station. He submitted that in the case of Ranjeet Singh Bagh (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has quashed the order of registration of the FIR on the ground that there was no averment that the complainant had approached the police prior to filing the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

14.

In the present case, the complainant had made a specific averment in paragraph 13 of the application under Section 173(4) BNSS that earlier he had given information to the police station, but when no action was taken thereon, he sent complaints to the police station, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, North, Lucknow and the Commissioner of Police, Lucknow on 31.03.2023. There cannot be any documentary evidence of approaching the police station with a request for lodging an FIR, when the police does not lodge an FIR. Therefore, the mere averment in the application under Section 173(4) that the complainant had approached the police station with the request for lodging an FIR, which averment is supported by an affidavit of the complainant, is sufficient to establish that prior to sending a complaint to the Commissioner of Police and other authorities through speed post, the complainant had approached the police station. The complainant approached the higher officials of Police by sending complaints through registered speed post and when no action was taken even thereafter, he approached the Magistrate with an application under Section 173(4) BNSS and it cannot be said that the complainant/ opposite party no.2 has approached the Magistrate directly without first approaching the police authorities. Therefore, I find no force in the first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

15.

The learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that there is an inordinate delay in filing the complaint, as the complaint has been filed on 03.04.2026, whereas the suit is pending since the year 2021. In this regard, it is to be noted that the complainant has alleged that he did not file the suit and the suit has been filed without his knowledge, using forged documents. Therefore, the date of filing of the suit is not relevant for ascertaining whether there is an unreasonable delay in lodging the complaint but the relevant date is when the complainant came to know about commission of the alleged offences.

16.

The learned counsel for the petitioner had advanced submissions on certain other grounds as well but while the court was dictating the order, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that they are confining their submission to the ground which has already been dealt with in the earlier part of the order and they are not pressing their other submissions.

17.

In view of the foregoing submissions, I am of the view that there is no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners nor there is any illegality in the impugned order dated 22.10.2026 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Court No. 25, Lucknow, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 4004 of 2026,. The petition lacks merit and dismissed accordingly.