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High Courts(2026) 11 AHC CK 3201

Promod Chandra Gupta Vs State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Allahabad High Court · 19 Nov 2026 · Chandra Dhari Singh, J · Tarun Saxena, J

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Judgment

307 paragraphs · 18,968 words

(Per: Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J.)

Factual Matrix

I. Particulars of the case

1.

The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The case pertains to District Gautam Budh Nagar. The petition seeks, inter alia, quashing of the sanction order dated 21 August 2025 and the report dated 15 March 2019, which formed the basis of FIR No. 209 of 2019, registered at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.

2.

The petitioner is Promod Chandra Gupta, a former Indian Administrative Service officer who served as Chief Executive Officer of the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA). The respondents are the State of Uttar Pradesh, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Appointment and Personnel, Lucknow; the Commissioner of Police, Gautam Budh Nagar; Gajendra Singh, Police Inspector, Police Station Kasna; and the Chief Executive Officer of YEIDA, whose head office is situated at Commercial Complex, P-2, Sector Omega-I, Greater Noida, District Gautam Budh Nagar.

II. Background of the dispute and origin of the criminal proceedings

3.

The dispute arises out of the acquisition of land by YEIDA in village Midahwali, District Hathras, Uttar Pradesh, for the development of a 7% residential plot scheme. The petitioner states that the land in question formed part of a larger acquisition undertaken by YEIDA and that the acquisition and subsequent transactions were processed under the applicable policies and decisions of the Authority. The principal controversy concerns the purchase of approximately 14.4896 hectares of land from the original cultivators and the subsequent purchase of portions of that land by YEIDA at a price alleged to be higher than the price originally paid by certain intervening purchasers.

4.

The petitioner was posted as Chief Executive Officer of YEIDA during the period from 16 April 2013 to 10 June 2015. According to the petition, the relevant land acquisition and development decisions were taken in the context of the Authority’s policy for allotment of developed residential plots to farmers and landowners whose land had been acquired. The petitioner relies on the decisions taken at the 46th and 49th meetings of the Board of YEIDA, particularly the decisions concerning the acquisition of land for the 7% residential plot scheme and the rehabilitation of farmers. He contends that these were decisions of the collective body of the Authority and that the actions taken by him in his official capacity could not be examined in isolation from those decisions.

5.

The petition further refers to the acquisition of land in District Mathura under a similar process. According to the petitioner, a report concerning the Mathura land acquisition was prepared by the same General Manager and subsequently led to the registration of a separate FIR, being FIR No. 421 of 2018, dated 3 June 2018, at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The said FIR was subsequently transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the proceedings arising from it were stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 16 January 2023 in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 390 of 2023. The petitioner relies on these circumstances to contend that the report concerning the Hathras land acquisition must be examined in the light of the earlier proceedings and the decisions of the Board of YEIDA.

III. The report dated 15 march 2019 and registration of the FIR

6.

The immediate origin of the present criminal proceedings is a report dated 15 March 2019, prepared in relation to the purchase and subsequent acquisition of land by YEIDA in the village Midahwali, District Hathras. The petition states that the process originated from a report dated 28 January 2019, submitted by the then General Manager, Planning, YEIDA, to the then Chief Executive Officer. The report was thereafter placed before the Chairman of YEIDA on 18 February 2019. According to the petitioner, the Chairman subsequently prepared a report and issued directions, resulting in the report dated 15 March 2019 and registration of the FIR on the same date.

7.

FIR No. 209 of 2019 was registered on 15 March 2019 at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar, under Sections 218, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The FIR was registered on the basis of the report concerning the alleged irregularities in the purchase of land for the 7% residential plot scheme.

8.

The allegation, as it emerges from the pleadings, is that certain portions of the land were initially purchased by private persons from the original landowners and were thereafter sold to YEIDA at a higher rate. It was alleged that the transactions resulted in wrongful loss to the Authority and corresponding wrongful gain to the intervening purchasers. The report also questioned the manner in which the land was selected and acquired, including the fact that the land was stated to be scattered rather than forming a compact block.

9.

The petitioner disputes this allegation. He contends that the land was purchased by YEIDA through registered sale deeds, that the title of the acquired land stands recorded in favour of YEIDA in the revenue records, and that the land is available at the site. According to him, the mere fact that the intervening purchasers acquired the land at one price and subsequently sold it to YEIDA at a higher price does not, by itself, establish a criminal offence. He further contends that the acquisition was connected with the implementation of the Authority’s residential scheme and that the report fails to account for the applicable policy and the decisions of the Board.

10.

The petitioner also questions the allegation that the land was unsuitable for the intended development merely because it was not compact. He relies upon the acquisition and development policy of YEIDA and the fact that the land was acquired for the residential scheme. These assertions are disputed matters arising from the pleadings and require consideration in the context of the material relied upon by the parties.

IV. Investigation and proceedings before the criminal court

11.

Following registration of FIR No. 209 of 2019, investigation was undertaken by the police. The petitioner states that the investigation continued for several years before the filing of the charge-sheet. He relies on this delay as one of the circumstances relevant to the challenge to the subsequent sanction order.

12.

The petition records that a charge-sheet was filed on 2 July 2024 before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption-II, Meerut. The charge-sheet was stated to have been filed against ten persons. The petitioner asserts that his name did not figure as an accused in the said charge-sheet. He further refers to cognizance having been taken by the Special Judge on 4 October 2024.

13.

The petitioner states that supplementary charge-sheets were subsequently filed on 4 January 2025, 17 February 2025 and 12 April 2025. According to him, he was not arrayed as an accused in the original charge-sheet or the supplementary charge-sheets filed before the sanction order dated 21 August 2025. The precise effect of these filings is a matter raised by the petitioner in support of his challenge.

14.

The petition also refers to proceedings initiated by other persons accused in the same FIR. In particular, it refers to Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 18350 of 2024, filed by one of the farmers, in which an interim order was passed on 16 December 2024. The petitioner relies on the observations recorded in those proceedings concerning the progress of the investigation and the absence of a report in relation to the investigation during the preceding years.

15.

The petitioner further relies on proceedings arising from FIR No. 421 of 2018, relating to the acquisition of land in District Mathura. He contends that the circumstances surrounding the two acquisitions were similar and that the action taken in the present matter should be examined in the light of the proceedings and orders passed in relation to the Mathura acquisition. The respondents, however, maintain that the investigation in the present case disclosed material warranting further proceedings against the petitioner.

V. Grant of sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC

16.

The petitioner challenges the sanction order dated 21 August 2025, which was passed by the competent authority of the State of Uttar Pradesh. The order is challenged on the ground that the sanctioning authority did not have the complete and relevant material before it and that the sanction was granted without proper application of mind.

17.

The petitioner contends that the sanction was granted more than six years after registration of the FIR dated 15 March 2019. According to him, the sanctioning authority was required to consider the relevant records, including the decisions of the Board of YEIDA, the circumstances in which the report dated 15 March 2019 was prepared, and the judicial orders passed in connected proceedings. He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal1, to contend that the material facts and documents must be placed before the competent authority and that the sanction order must reflect due consideration of the relevant material.

18.

The petitioner also refers to the guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission, including Circular No. 08/05/2015 dated 25 May 2015 and Circular No. 07/03/12 dated 28 March 2012, concerning the grant of sanction for prosecution. He contends that the sanction was granted contrary to the applicable guidelines and without proper consideration of the relevant material.

VI. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner

19.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the impugned report-cum-order dated 15.03.2019, which forms the basis of FIR No. 209 of 2019, is contrary to the decisions of the YEIDA Board. The petitioner’s case is that the then Chairman proceeded on his own assessment and directed criminal action without first dealing with the decisions already taken collectively by the Board. Those decisions, according to the petitioner, continued to remain in force and had not been reviewed or set aside by the Board.

20.

The petitioner submits that the allegations arise from land transactions undertaken in connection with the development activities of YEIDA. The dispute regarding the purchase price or the subsequent transfer of land cannot, by itself, establish cheating, forgery, criminal conspiracy or an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The prosecution must identify material showing the petitioner’s role in the commission of the alleged offences. The petitioner contends that the impugned report does not provide a proper basis for fastening criminal liability upon him.

21.

The petitioner further submits that YEIDA continues to retain the title to the land in question while, on the other hand, the land transactions have been described as causing loss to the Authority on the ground that the land was allegedly unsuitable or purchased at an excessive price. According to the petitioner, these positions are inconsistent and the respondents cannot disregard the operative decisions of YEIDA while relying upon the same transactions to initiate criminal proceedings. In this regard, the petitioner relies upon the principle that the State cannot adopt inconsistent positions, as discussed in Central Warehousing Corporation v. Adani Ports Special Economic Zone Ltd.2.

22.

The petitioner submits that the allegations must be examined in the context of the decisions and records of YEIDA, rather than on the basis of the report dated 15.03.2019 alone. He contends that the report was prepared without proper consideration of the collective decisions of the Authority and that the criminal proceedings founded upon it are therefore unsustainable.

23.

The petitioner also relies upon the proceedings concerning the land transactions at Mathura. He refers to FIR No. 42 of 2018 and the subsequent communication dated 04.06.2018 concerning Satish Kumar, who was then serving as ACEO, YEIDA. The petitioner’s contention is that the treatment of the Mathura transactions and the later action concerning the Hathras transactions demonstrate inconsistency in the manner in which the authorities examined similar matters. He submits that the respondents ought to explain this difference before relying upon the later report to justify criminal prosecution.

24.

The petitioner further submits that the proceedings are substantially founded upon allegations concerning land transactions and the decisions taken by the development authority. He contends that a dispute concerning the legality, propriety or financial consequences of such transactions cannot be converted into a criminal prosecution unless the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are disclosed. In support, he relies upon Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand3; Randheer Singh v. State of U.P.4; and Usha Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal5. The petitioner submits that the impugned proceedings amount to an abuse of the criminal process in the circumstances of the case.

25.

The petitioner specifically challenges the sanction order dated 21.08.2025. He submits that the competent authority did not consider the relevant material before granting sanction. According to the petitioner, the decision was taken mechanically under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, without obtaining sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He contends that the nature of the allegations and the statutory provisions invoked required the respondents to follow the applicable statutory procedure. The petitioner relies upon Yashwant Sinha v. Central Bureau of Investigation6, in support of his objections concerning the procedure followed by the investigating agency.

26.

The petitioner further submits that prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was obtained only on 27.12.2019, whereas he had been taken into judicial custody on 25.03.2019 and his statement had been recorded on 26.03.2019. He contends that the investigation had thus proceeded before the requisite approval was obtained. He submits that the respondents must explain how the investigation initiated and conducted before such approval can be sustained in law.

27.

The petitioner also contends that the sanctioning authority was not supplied with all relevant material, including the decision taken in the 49th meeting of the YEIDA Board and other documents material to the petitioner’s defence. He relies upon the principles governing the grant of sanction and submits that the authority was required to apply its mind to the relevant record rather than act on a selective account of the allegations. The petitioner accordingly challenges the validity of the sanction on the ground of non-application of mind.

28.

The petitioner further relies upon the charge-sheet dated 02.07.2024, which, according to him, was filed against other accused persons without naming him. He submits that the subsequent decision to proceed against him required independent consideration of the material and a legally valid sanction. The petitioner contends that the respondents have not adequately explained the basis on which the sanction was sought and granted against him despite the earlier course of investigation.

29.

The petitioner raises a further objection concerning the role of Smt. Meena Bhargav, who, according to the petitioner, was part of the committee involved in the acquisition of land in Mathura through the same process. He submits that her role in the earlier land-acquisition process and the report subsequently associated with the present proceedings ought to have been disclosed and examined. The petitioner contends that the failure to consider this circumstance raises a question regarding the fairness and impartiality of the inquiry. In support, he relies upon the principle nemo judex in causa sua and the judgment in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School7.

30.

The petitioner also relies upon the order passed by this Court in the bail application of co-accused Vivek Kumar Jain, being Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 3711 of 2025. He submits that the documentary material and the circumstances discussed in that order support his contention that the allegations require close scrutiny.

31.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the report/order dated 15.03.2019, passed by the then Chairman of YEIDA, is the very foundation upon which FIR No. 209 of 2019 came to be registered against the petitioner. It is contended that the impugned report/order records adverse conclusions concerning the land transactions in question without demonstrating proper consideration of the relevant contemporaneous documents, the decisions taken by the competent bodies of YEIDA, and the circumstances in which the transactions were undertaken. According to the petitioner, the report/order proceeds on allegations and inferences without adequately explaining how the material on record supports the conclusions drawn against him. The petitioner accordingly submits that the impugned decision suffers from non-application of mind and cannot be sustained merely because a criminal investigation was subsequently undertaken on its basis.

32.

Learned counsel further submits that the impugned report/order was passed without affording the petitioner an effective opportunity to explain the relevant documents or to controvert the material relied upon against him. It is contended that no adequate opportunity was afforded to place his version before the authority before the adverse conclusions were recorded, and that the report/order does not disclose any meaningful consideration of the petitioner’s position or the material supporting it. The petitioner, therefore, seeks setting aside of the report/order dated 15.03.2019.

33.

The petitioner submits that the respondents have failed to satisfactorily answer the specific objections raised in the writ petition and reiterated in the rejoinder affidavit. According to him, the impugned report, the subsequent FIR and the sanction order cannot be sustained merely by repeating the allegations, particularly when the petitioner disputes the factual basis of the report and challenges the procedure followed in initiating prosecution against him.

34.

The petitioner accordingly prays that this Court quash the sanction order dated 21.08.2025, the report-cum-order dated 15.03.2019 and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including FIR No. 209 of 2019, insofar as they concern the petitioner.

VII. Submissions on behalf of the respondents

35.

The respondents’ case is that the writ petition raises disputed questions concerning the land transactions, the circumstances in which the land was purchased by YEIDA, and the alleged financial loss to the Authority. These issues cannot be decided merely on the basis of the petitioner’s interpretation of the Board’s decisions or the documents relied upon by him. The petitioner’s challenge requires consideration of the material collected during the investigation and cannot be accepted solely because he disputes the conclusions drawn by the investigating agency.

36.

It is submitted by the respondents that the challenge raised by the petitioner must be examined in the light of the material collected during investigation and the specific allegations concerning the acquisition and transfer of land to the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA). The proceedings arise from the report dated 15.03.2019 and the subsequent criminal investigation into the alleged irregularities relating to the purchase of 14.4896 hectares of land situated in Village Midhawali, District Hathras, purportedly for the development of a 7% residential area. The allegations are not confined to the price at which the land was purchased, but also concern the circumstances of its acquisition, the involvement of intermediaries, the identity and location of the parcels, and the absence of possession and development alleged by the investigating agency.

37.

It is submitted that the investigation has brought to light circumstances which, according to the prosecution, require examination in criminal proceedings. The investigating agency has alleged that land originally belonging to cultivators of Village Midhawali was purchased through persons connected with the concerned government officials and was thereafter acquired by YEIDA at a rate higher than the rate at which it had originally been purchased. The investigation further concerns the allegation that the persons involved in these transactions included relatives, associates or intermediaries of the officials concerned. The respondents submit that these allegations must be considered cumulatively and in the context of the documentary and testimonial material collected during investigation.

38.

It is submitted that the question involved is not merely whether the land was ultimately registered in the name of YEIDA. The material relied upon by the investigating agency raises questions concerning the manner in which the transactions were undertaken, the persons through whom the land was acquired, the rates at which the successive transactions took place, and whether the land acquired was identifiable, available and suitable for the stated purpose. Registration of the land in the name of the Authority, by itself, does not answer every allegation concerning the circumstances in which the acquisition was effected.

39.

It is further submitted that the location, extent and suitability of the land formed material aspects of the investigation. The report records that the land in question was not contiguous and was scattered across different locations. It was also alleged that the Authority had not obtained possession of the land and that the land had not been developed for the intended purpose. The investigation further considered the allegation that, although the land was stated to have been acquired for the development of a 7% residential area, the parcels acquired did not correspond with the requirements and planning considerations relevant to that purpose. These matters are relied upon by the respondents as part of the circumstances requiring investigation, rather than as isolated administrative irregularities.

40.

It is submitted that the investigation also examined the question of the quantity of land acquired vis-à-vis the requirement for the proposed residential area. The material refers to the acquisition of approximately 22.42924 hectares of land in the area for the development of the residential component and raises the question whether the acquisition of the particular 14.4896 hectares was justified by the actual requirement. The investigating agency has also referred to the fact that the land in question was not included in the Master Plan at the relevant stage and that, by communication dated 21.12.2015, the land was stated to be proposed for agricultural use. These circumstances formed part of the material considered in examining the rationale and circumstances of the acquisition.

41.

It is submitted that the investigation has also examined the circumstances in which the original landowners were allegedly dealt with and the transactions through which the land reached YEIDA. The report refers to allegations that the consent letters submitted by the concerned persons recorded that compensation would be paid in instalments or through split payments, including payments of less than Rs.30 lakhs. The investigating agency has questioned the circumstances in which such arrangements were made and whether they were intended to avoid the applicable requirements. The respondents submit that the significance of these transactions has to be assessed with reference to the relevant documents, statements and other material collected during investigation.

42.

It is submitted that the petitioner’s reliance upon the decisions of the YEIDA Board does not, by itself, dispose of the allegations under investigation. The existence of an administrative decision authorising or approving a land transaction is a relevant circumstance, but it does not automatically determine whether the transaction was carried out in accordance with the applicable requirements or whether the conduct of the persons involved attracts criminal liability. The respondents submit that the allegations concerning the manner of acquisition, the role of intermediaries, the purchase price and the availability and suitability of the land must be considered on the basis of the complete material, and not solely on the basis of the petitioner’s reliance upon administrative approvals.

43.

It is submitted that the investigation was not confined to the petitioner alone, but extended to the other officials and persons allegedly connected with the transactions. The material records the involvement of several officials of YEIDA and persons associated with the land transactions. It also refers to statements recorded from the informant and other witnesses, including officials and persons connected with the transactions. The respondents submit that the investigation was undertaken to ascertain the role of the persons concerned and that the petitioner’s role was assessed in the light of the material collected during that process.

44.

It is submitted that the investigation proceeded after obtaining approval from the competent authority under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The material placed on record states that the competent authorities were approached for approval to investigate the public servants concerned and that, after obtaining such approval, their statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The respondents rely upon the steps recorded in the investigation in support of their submission that the investigation proceeded through the prescribed process.

45.

It is further submitted that the investigating agency has recorded statements of the informant and other witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and has considered the material collected during investigation. The respondents rely upon the statements and documentary material forming part of the investigation record, including the material concerning the land transactions and the role attributed to the petitioner. According to the investigating agency, the material collected disclosed sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioner for the offences specified in the charge-sheet. The petitioner’s disagreement with the conclusions drawn by the investigating agency does not, by itself, establish that the material collected is legally incapable of supporting further proceedings.

46.

It is submitted that the subsequent steps taken by the investigating agency must be considered in their proper sequence. The respondents state that, upon consideration of the statements and material collected, charge-sheet No. 07 dated 27.01.2026 was prepared against the petitioner for submission before the competent court. The respondents therefore rely upon the investigative material and the subsequent charge-sheet in opposing the petitioner’s challenge. The mere fact that the petitioner was not named in the earlier charge-sheet dated 02.07.2024 does not, by itself, resolve the legality of the subsequent proceedings against him.

47.

It is submitted that the sanction granted on 21.08.2025 and the proposal for sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are separate matters and must be considered accordingly. The material records that sanction was granted by the competent authority of the Government of Uttar Pradesh in respect of the offences under the Indian Penal Code specified therein.

48.

It is further submitted that the process for obtaining sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was being pursued through the competent authorities. The record states that the proposal was forwarded to the Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, and that, by communication dated 08.10.2025, certain deficiencies were pointed out, including the requirement of a comprehensive investigation report, the tabulated statement referred to in the proposal, authenticated English translations of the relevant documents and statements, and an analysis and rebuttal of the contentions of the public servant concerned. Thereafter, by communication dated 17.10.2025, the Joint Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, forwarded the deficiencies and discrepancies to the Commissioner of Police, Gautam Budh Nagar, for necessary compliance. The record further states that the proposal was revised and resubmitted, and that the relevant documents were forwarded to the concerned authorities. The respondents accordingly place the steps taken in the sanction process before this Court, without asserting that sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 had already been granted.

49.

It is submitted that the allegations concerning the fairness and impartiality of the investigation must be assessed with reference to the material on record. The respondents state that the investigating officer recorded the statements of the informant and other witnesses, considered the material collected during investigation, and proceeded on the basis of the evidence found relevant to the alleged offences. The respondents maintain that the petitioner’s objections do not, merely by being raised, displace the material collected during investigation or establish that the proceedings are liable to be terminated.

50.

It is submitted that the petitioner’s reliance upon proceedings concerning other persons or other land transactions cannot, by itself, determine the present challenge. The respondents rely upon the material collected in the present investigation and submit that the allegations against the petitioner must be assessed in the context of the transactions and evidence forming the subject matter of the present proceedings. The role attributed to the petitioner and the material relied upon against him must be considered on their own merits.

51.

It is submitted that the report dated 15.03.2019 and the subsequent investigative steps are founded upon allegations supported, according to the investigating agency, by statements and documentary material. The respondents submit that the petitioner’s challenge proceeds substantially on his own explanation of the transactions and the administrative decisions relied upon by him. Such explanation cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive of the issues arising from the investigation, particularly where the investigating agency relies upon material concerning the circumstances of acquisition, the persons involved, the rates of transfer and the location and possession of the land.

52.

The respondents accordingly submit that the petitioner has not established a sufficient ground for quashing the impugned report-cum-order, the sanction order or the consequential proceedings. The disputed questions concerning the land transactions, the role of the persons concerned and the material collected during the investigation cannot be resolved merely by accepting the petitioner’s version of the events.

53.

It is accordingly submitted that the petitioner has not made out a case for the relief sought in the writ petition. The respondents pray that the challenge to the impugned report and the sanction order be considered in the light of the material placed on record and that the writ petition be dismissed.

VIII. Principal factual issues emerging from the record

54.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

55.

The pleadings and documents disclose the following concerns for consideration:

55.1.

First, the criminal proceedings originate from the report dated 15 March 2019 concerning the acquisition of land by YEIDA in village Midahwali, District Hathras, for the 7% residential plot scheme. The allegation is that certain intervening purchasers acquired land from the original landowners and subsequently sold it to YEIDA at higher prices, thereby causing wrongful loss to the Authority. The petitioner disputes the allegation and maintains that the acquisition was undertaken in accordance with the applicable policy and decisions of the Board of YEIDA.

55.2.

Second, the petitioner relies on the decisions of the 46th and 49th Board meetings of YEIDA and contends that the report dated 15 March 2019 failed to account for the decisions of the collective governing body. The respondents, on the other hand, rely on the investigation and the material collected during it to oppose the challenge.

55.3.

Third, the petitioner contends that he was not arrayed as an accused in the charge-sheet dated 2 July 2024 or the supplementary charge-sheets dated 4 January 2025, 17 February 2025 and 12 April 2025. The counter affidavit, however, refers to a subsequent charge-sheet dated 27 January 2026 against the petitioner. The sequence and legal effect of these proceedings must be ascertained from the original charge-sheets and the orders passed by the competent criminal court.

55.4.

Fourth, the legality of the sanction order dated 21 August 2025 is a central issue. The petitioner alleges that the sanctioning authority did not have the complete material before it and that the sanction was granted without proper application of mind. The respondents rely on the steps taken by the authorities and the material collected during the investigation. The original sanction order, the proposal placed before the sanctioning authority, and the documents considered by that authority are therefore important to the determination of this issue.

55.5.

Fifth, the petitioner relies on the proceedings concerning FIR No. 421 of 2018 relating to land acquisition in District Mathura and on orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in those proceedings. The relevance of those proceedings to the present case must be assessed in the light of the facts and the relief sought in the present writ petition.

55.6.

Finally, the petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned sanction order and the report dated 15 March 2019, together with the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. The respondents oppose the relief and maintain that the prosecution should be permitted to proceed in accordance with law.

XI. Analysis and Findings

56.

Based on the foregoing paragraphs, the principal and initial question which arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the report/order dated 15.03.2019, passed by the then Chairman of the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “YEIDA”), which formed the immediate basis for registration of FIR No. 209 of 2019, can be sustained when the petitioner alleges that the same was prepared without affording him an effective opportunity to explain the relevant documents and without a reasoned consideration of the material bearing upon the decisions taken by YEIDA. The question, at this stage, is not whether the allegations made in the FIR are ultimately true or false. The question at this stage is whether the administrative decision which set the criminal law in motion satisfies the minimum requirements of fairness, consideration of relevant material and application of mind.

57.

Thereafter, the Court shall also decide if the sanction order, against which the petitioner has contended that the same has been passed without due application of mind and in terms of the settled law deserves interference of this Court under the writ jurisdiction?

XI.1 Validity of Sanction order dated 21.08.2025

58.

The question which arises for consideration is whether the sanction order dated 21.08.2025, passed by the competent authority of the Government of Uttar Pradesh in respect of the offences specified therein, can be sustained in law. While the report/order dated 15.03.2019 concerns the decision-making process adopted by YEIDA in examining the underlying land transactions, the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 concerns the independent statutory duty of the sanctioning authority to determine, upon consideration of the relevant material, whether the petitioner ought to be subjected to prosecution for the offences covered by the sanction. The validity of the sanction must, therefore, be examined on its own legal and factual footing and cannot be treated as automatically established merely because an investigation has been conducted or a report has been submitted by another authority. Each must independently satisfy the legal requirements governing the exercise of the power under which it was made.

59.

The petitioner’s challenge to the sanction order is founded, inter alia, on the contention that the sanctioning authority did not have the complete relevant material before it and failed to undertake an independent assessment of the circumstances in which the transactions were undertaken, including the relevant decisions of the YEIDA Board and the contemporaneous official record. The respondents dispute these allegations and maintain that sanction was granted by the competent authority after consideration of the material placed before it. The Court is, therefore, required to examine the legality of the decision-making process and not merely the conclusion recorded in the sanction order.

60.

The law relating to sanction for prosecution is well settled. In C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that the prosecution must place the entire relevant record before the sanctioning authority, including material which may have a bearing in favour of the public servant. The authority is required to scrutinise the material consciously and independently and to exercise its discretion to grant or withhold sanction in accordance with law. The grant of sanction is not a mechanical formality. The statutory responsibility rests upon the competent authority itself and cannot be discharged merely by adopting the conclusion of the investigating agency without the requisite independent consideration. The relevant paragraphs of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal are as under:

“13.

The prosecution has to satisfy the court that at the time of sending the matter for grant of sanction by the competent authority, adequate material for such grant was made available to the said authority. This may also be evident from the sanction order, in case it is extremely comprehensive, as all the facts and circumstances of the case may be spelt out in the sanction order. However, in every individual case, the court has to find out whether there has been an application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority concerned on the material placed before it. It is so necessary for the reason that there is an obligation on the sanctioning authority to discharge its duty to give or withhold sanction only after having full knowledge of the material facts of the case. Grant of sanction is not a mere formality. Therefore, the provisions in regard to the sanction must be observed with complete strictness keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.

14.

It is to be kept in mind that sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. Therefore, it is not an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to the government servant against frivolous prosecution. Further, it is a weapon to discourage vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent, though not a shield for the guilty.

16.

In view of the above, the legal propositions can be summarised as under:-

16.1

The prosecution must send the entire relevant record to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, disclosure statements, statements of witnesses, recovery memos, draft charge sheet and all other relevant material. The record so sent should also contain the material/document, if any, which may tilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the basis of which, the competent authority may refuse sanction.

16.2

The authority itself has to do complete and conscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced by the prosecution independently applying its mind and taking into consideration all the relevant facts before grant of sanction while discharging its duty to give or withhold the sanction.

16.3

The power to grant sanction is to be exercised strictly keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.

16.4

The order of sanction should make it evident that the authority had been aware of all relevant facts/materials and had applied its mind to all the relevant material.

16.5

In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence that the entire relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same and that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law.

17.

In view of the above, we do not find force in the submissions advanced by Shri Vishwanathan, learned ASG that the competent authority can delegate its power to some other officer or authority, or the Hon’ble Minister could grant sanction even on the basis of the report of the SP. The ratio of the judgment relied upon for this purpose, in A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1102, is not applicable as in the case of grant of sanction, the statutory authority has to apply its mind and take a decision whether to grant sanction or not.”

61.

At the same time, the requirement of application of mind must not be confused with an obligation to write a judgment upon the merits of the proposed prosecution. In State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the principles governing judicial scrutiny of an order of sanction and cautioned against invalidating such an order on hypertechnical grounds. The Court exercising judicial review is not required to substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the sanctioning authority. The relevant inquiry is whether the authority was competent, whether the material legally relevant to the decision was placed before it, and whether the decision demonstrates the requisite application of mind. A sanction order cannot be set aside merely because it is concise; equally, the authority cannot be permitted to exercise its statutory discretion mechanically or on the basis of a materially incomplete record.

62.

The principles governing judicial review of administrative decisions also require the authority to take relevant considerations into account and to exclude considerations which are legally irrelevant as held in Kranti Associates (Supra)

63.

This Court is also of the considered view that the extent of reasons required depends upon the nature of the power exercised and the circumstances of the case. The principle does not require the sanctioning authority to determine disputed questions of fact as a trial court would; it does require the decision, read with the contemporaneous record, to disclose that the statutory discretion was exercised on relevant material and for legally permissible reasons.

64.

The Court has examined the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 along with the material shown to have been placed before the sanctioning authority. The question is not whether the authority ought to have accepted the petitioner’s explanation or whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion on the material. The question is whether the decision-making process satisfies the legal standard of independent application of mind. The relevant paragraphs of sanction order dated 21.08.2025 are as under:

“AND WHEREAS, the investigation of the case was conducted by the ACP-I. Noida and during the course of investigation it has been established that the accused/public servant P.C. Gupta, while holding the position of Chief Executive Officer, conspired with other appointed government officials. Through a planned criminal conspiracy, land in Village Midhavali, District Hathras, was purchased from the original landowners in the names of his close relatives. Thereafter, the same land was bought by the Authority at rates higher than the mutually agreed-upon rates. This caused a financial loss of Rs. 23,92,41,724.00 (including interest) to the Authority, from which the accused/public servant P.C. Gupta and his co-accused wrongfully gained financial benefit.”

65.

Upon examination of the material on record, this Court finds that the decision does not sufficiently demonstrate that the material issues bearing upon the petitioner’s explanation, including the relevant institutional decisions and contemporaneous official documents, were independently assessed in the context of the allegations for which sanction was sought. The deficiency is substantive insofar as it concerns the exercise of the statutory discretion itself and is not merely a complaint that the order lacks elaborate reasons. For these reasons, and subject to the contemporaneous sanction record supporting the foregoing finding, the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 cannot be sustained in its present form.

66.

The impugned order arises out of FIR No. 209 of 2019, registered on 15.03.2019 at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar, in relation to the purchase by the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority of approximately 14.4896 hectares of land situated at Village Midhawali, District Hathras. The petitioner had served as the Chief Executive Officer of YEIDA from 16.04.2013 to 10.06.2015. The prosecution case, as recorded in the sanction order, is that the land was purchased through intermediaries and was thereafter acquired by the Authority at a higher price, allegedly causing financial loss to the Authority.

67.

The sanction order quantifies the alleged loss at Rs.23,92,41,724/-, inclusive of interest, and attributes to the petitioner a role in the alleged conspiracy with other persons. It records that the petitioner’s acts are alleged to constitute offences punishable under Sections 218, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The order concludes that the petitioner ought to be prosecuted before the competent court and grants sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

68.

The Court is conscious that the sanctioning authority is not required to conduct a trial or to conclusively determine the innocence of the public servant before granting sanction. Nor is the authority bound to accept every explanation offered by the public servant. The obligation is to consider the relevant material fairly and independently and then to take a decision in accordance with the applicable statutory provision. The defect identified by this Court is confined to the manner in which that discretion was exercised. It does not amount to a finding that the allegations in the FIR or charge-sheet are false, that the evidence collected by the investigating agency is inadmissible, or that the petitioner cannot lawfully be prosecuted if the statutory requirements are subsequently satisfied.

69.

The order states that the material relating to the case was fully and carefully examined and that the authority had applied its mind. Such a recital is relevant, but it cannot conclude the judicial inquiry where a specific challenge is raised to the completeness of the material placed before the authority. The Court must examine whether the contemporaneous record supports the recital and whether the authority had before it the material necessary to understand the petitioner’s individual role in the alleged transactions.

70.

In the present case, the petitioner relies upon the decisions of the YEIDA Board, particularly those taken at its 46th and 49th meetings, and upon contemporaneous records concerning the land acquisition and the administrative process followed. The relevance of those materials is not that they necessarily exonerate the petitioner. Their relevance is that they may bear upon the circumstances in which the transactions were undertaken, the scope of the petitioner’s individual authority, the role of the institutional decision-making process and the basis on which the alleged loss has been attributed to him.

71.

The Court must therefore ascertain whether the sanctioning authority was supplied with the relevant Board proceedings, the reports preceding the impugned report dated 15.03.2019, the relevant land records and transaction documents, and the explanation or contentions of the petitioner to the extent that they formed part of the material available for consideration. If these documents were placed before the authority and were considered, their omission from the narrative of the sanction order would not, without more, invalidate the sanction. If material bearing directly upon the petitioner’s role was not placed before the authority or was excluded from its consideration, the defect would go to the substance of the statutory decision.

72.

The Court has also considered the chronology of the police reports. The charge-sheet dated 02.07.2024, as reproduced in the petition record, names ten persons as charge-sheeted accused. The petitioner is not identified among those ten persons. The petition further asserts that he was not arrayed as an accused in the supplementary charge-sheets dated 04.01.2025, 17.02.2025 and 12.04.2025. This chronology is a relevant circumstance for the purpose of examining the material on which the sanction proposal was founded and it is not, by itself, proof that the sanction was invalid or that the petitioner could not subsequently be made the subject of a prosecution.

73.

The respondents’ subsequent reference to a charge-sheet dated 27.01.2026, stated to have been prepared against the petitioner for approval of higher authorities, requires particular care. The document is subsequent to the sanction order dated 21.08.2025. The sanctioning authority could not have considered the later charge-sheet as a completed document on the date of sanction. It could, however, have considered the evidence and investigative material which later formed the basis of that charge-sheet. The relevant inquiry is therefore whether the underlying material and the specific allegations against the petitioner were before the authority when it exercised its power.

74.

The subsequent preparation of a charge-sheet does not, in law, render a prior sanction invalid merely because the two documents bear different dates. Nor does the absence of the petitioner’s name from an earlier charge-sheet, by itself, prevent the competent authority from granting sanction on the basis of material subsequently collected or otherwise available to it. The legal difficulty would arise if the sanction was granted without the material necessary to assess the petitioner’s individual role, or if the prosecution now proposed rests on a materially different factual basis from that which was placed before and considered by the sanctioning authority.

75.

On the material presently identified, the Court does not rest its conclusion merely on the fact that the sanction order contains a concise statement of the allegations or does not separately discuss every document relied upon by the petitioner. The decisive question is whether the contemporaneous sanction file establishes that the competent authority had before it the relevant material concerning the land transactions, the institutional decisions and the petitioner’s individual role, and whether it independently considered that material before granting sanction.

76.

The sanction order dated 21.08.2025 is accordingly quashed and set aside with the direction to the competent sanctioning authority to reconsider the matter afresh in accordance with law. Such reconsideration must be an independent exercise of statutory discretion and not a post facto attempt to supplement or defend the reasoning of the order already set aside. The authority shall consider the relevant material lawfully available to it, including the material relied upon by the investigating agency and the relevant contemporaneous documents bearing upon the petitioner’s explanation. It shall determine whether the applicable statutory conditions for sanction are satisfied and record a decision accordingly. Nothing in this judgment shall be understood as directing the authority either to grant or to refuse sanction.

XI.2 Impugned report/order dated 15.03.2019

77.

Having considered the challenge to the impugned sanction order, the Court now turns to the independent challenge to the report/order dated 15.03.2019. The report/order cannot be sustained or invalidated merely by reference to the conclusion reached in respect of the farmer.

78.

The Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents, the pleadings on record, the impugned report/order dated 15.03.2019, the preceding report dated 18.02.2019, and the material placed before this Court in relation to the land transactions in question. The Court has also considered the subsequent developments referred to by the parties, including the registration of FIR No. 209 of 2019, the filing of charge-sheets and supplementary charge-sheets, and the sanction order dated 21.08.2025. These subsequent developments are relevant to understanding the consequences of the impugned report/order, but they do not dispense with the need to examine the legality of the decision dated 15.03.2019 on the basis of the reasons recorded in it and the material shown to have been considered at the relevant time.

79.

The chronology emerging from the record assumes importance. As set out in the petition, the matter originated from a report dated 28.01.2019 prepared by the General Manager, Planning, YEIDA, and submitted to the then Chief Executive Officer of YEIDA. The matter was thereafter placed before the then Chairman of YEIDA, who prepared the report/order dated 15.03.2019. The said report/order was followed by the registration, on the same date, of FIR No. 209 of 2019 at Police Station Kasna, District Gautam Budh Nagar, under Sections 218, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Thus, the report/order dated 15.03.2019 was not merely an internal communication without further consequence. It became the immediate basis for setting the criminal process in motion against the persons named in the allegations.

80.

The material placed before this Court further refers to a report dated 18.02.2019 prepared by the then Chief Executive Officer of YEIDA. The impugned report/order dated 15.03.2019 followed that report. The sequence of these documents is material because the Court must be able to discern what material was placed before the Chairman, what issues required determination, what relevant institutional decisions were considered, and how the conclusions recorded in the impugned report/order followed from that material. Merely identifying an earlier report or adopting the allegations contained in it does not, by itself, demonstrate that the authority independently examined the underlying documents and arrived at its own reasoned conclusion.

81.

The dispute concerns, amongst other matters, the purchase of approximately 14.4896 hectares of land in Village Midhawali, District Hathras, by YEIDA, in connection with the proposed development of a seven per cent residential area. The respondents’ case, as reflected in the material filed before this Court, is that the land was purchased from the original cultivators through persons or intermediaries and that the land was subsequently acquired by YEIDA at a rate higher than the rate at which it had been purchased by such persons. The respondents have also raised questions regarding the location and contiguity of the parcels, the alleged absence of possession or development, and the suitability of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired.

82.

The petitioner, on the other hand, disputes the conclusions drawn against him and relies upon the decisions taken by YEIDA in its institutional capacity, including the relevant Board decisions, and upon the documents concerning the acquisition and purchase of the land. The petitioner’s case is that the impugned report/order proceeds as though the transactions were inherently improper, without adequately examining the decisions of the competent bodies of YEIDA, the contemporaneous record and the circumstances in which the transactions took place. The petitioner also disputes the manner in which the relevant documents and statements have been relied upon to attribute criminality to him.

83.

It is not for this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to substitute its own assessment of the land transactions for that of the competent authority or to decide, in these proceedings, whether the transactions were commercially justified, whether the land was suitable for development, or whether any individual derived an unlawful benefit. Those questions must be examined by the authority or investigating agency competent to do so, in accordance with law. Nevertheless, when a report/order concerning such transactions is made the basis for registration of a criminal case, the decision must disclose a rational connection between the material considered, the issues examined and the conclusions reached. The seriousness of the allegations cannot be a substitute for such consideration.

84.

On examination of the impugned report/order dated 15.03.2019, this Court finds that the document raises serious allegations concerning the purchase of land, its location and suitability, the rates at which it was purchased and the alleged financial implications for YEIDA. However, the report/order does not adequately demonstrate how the relevant material was evaluated before the conclusions adverse to the petitioner were reached. The document refers to the subject transactions and records conclusions concerning the alleged irregularities, but the reasoning does not sufficiently explain how the competing material and the decisions of the Authority were examined and why they were considered inadequate or irrelevant to the conclusions drawn. The relevant paragraphs of order/report dated 15.03.2019 are as under:

"जनपद हाथरस के ग्राम मिथावली में यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा कय की गई कुल भूमि 14.4896 हेक्टेयर के सम्बन्ध में मेरे द्वारा श्रीमती मीना भार्गव, महा प्रबन्धक नियोजन एवं वास्तुकला की आख्या दिनांक 28.01.2019 तथा 06.03.2019 तथा श्री अरुण वीर सिंह, मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी की आख्या दिनांक 18.02.2019 तथा 06.03.2019 का गहन परीक्षण किया गया। यह प्रकरण भी जनपद मथुरा में पूर्व में षड्यंत्र कर अनाधिकृत रूप से कय की गई भूमि के समान ही है जिसमें पूर्व में ही प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट दर्ज कराई जा चुकी है एवं पुलिस द्वारा कार्यवाही की जा रही है।

इस सम्बन्ध में उपरोक्त आख्याओं के परीक्षण से एक बात स्पष्ट परिलक्षित होती है कि यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण के तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी तथा अन्य अधिकारियों द्वारा उनके जानकारी, रिश्तेदारों, मित्रों, दलालों इत्यादि के साथ मिलकर एक षड्यंत्र के तहत पूर्व नियोजित (Premeditated) तरीके से प्लान करके बिना किसी जरूरत/उपयोग के भूमि यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण (YEIDA) के लिए खरीदी गई तथा YEIDA को एक बड़ी वित्तीय हानि पहुँचायी गई। इस भूमि को कय करने पर YEIDA द्वारा रु० 16,15,28,032.00 का व्यय किया गया, जिसकी Net Present Value अब रु० 23,92,41,724.00 होती है (9.50 प्रतिशत ब्याज की दर से)।

उल्लेखनीय है कि प्रश्नगत भूमि पर आज तक न तो प्राधिकरण का कोई कब्जा है और न ही इसके लिए कोई योजना बनायी गयी है। तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी व अन्य अधिकारियों तथा बाहरी व्यक्तियों जिनके पते मुख्य रूप से दिल्ली, गाजियाबाद, बुलन्दशहर, आगरा इत्यादि हैं ने यह भूमि गाँव के मूल काश्तकारों से पूर्व नियोजित तरीके से अत्यन्त कम मूल्य पर कय की तथा फिर उस भूमि को YEIDA द्वारा पूर्व नियोजित षड्यंत्र कर निर्धारित दरों से अधिक दरों पर खरीद लिया गया तथा प्राधिकरण को रु० 23,92,41,724.00 की हानि पहुँचाई। स्पष्ट है कि इस धनराशि का इन सभी ने मिलकर misappropriation कर pecuniary gain किया गया

इस सम्बन्ध में मुख्य रूप से निम्नांकित अनियमिताएँ दृष्टिगोचर हों :-

1.

प्रश्नगत भूमि को खरीदने के लिए यह तर्क दिया गया कि इस भूमि का उपयोग 07 प्रतिशत आबादी विकसित करने के रूप से किया जायेगा। उल्लेखनीय है कि ग्राम मिथावली में यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे के आर०ओ०डब्ल्यू० के अन्तर्गत 42.2924 हेक्टेयर भूमि का अधिग्रहण किया गया, जिसके लिए यदि आबादी की भूमि विकसित करने के लिए भूमि ली भी जाती तो मात्र 5 हेक्टेयर भूमि जो एक ही जगह पर हो, की आवश्यकता होती। जबकि प्रश्नगत प्रकरण में 14.4896 हेक्टेयर भूमि कय की गयी। यह पूर्व नियोजित तरीके से किया गया जिसकी पुष्टि इस बात से हो जाती है कि आज तक इस भूमि पर कोई भी कब्जा प्राधिकरण का नहीं है, यहाँ तक कि स्थल पर यह भूमि चिन्हित भी नहीं है।

2.

जो भूमि कय की गई है उसमें कय किये गये खसरों का सम्पूर्ण क्षेत्रफल कय नहीं किया गया है तथा कय की गई भूमि contiguous नहीं है तथा कय की गई भूमि को नक्शा नजरी पर प्रदर्शित करने पर यह भूमि जगह-जगह छितराई हुई है। वर्ष 2014 में प्राधिकरण द्वारा भूमि अधिग्रहण करते समय यह भूमि महा योजना से आच्छादित नहीं थी। यहाँ तक कि प्राधिकरण द्वारा शासन को दिनांक 21.12.2015 को प्रेषित महा योजना फेज-2 में भी प्रश्नगत भूमि कृषि भू-उपयोग के लिए आच्छादित है। अतः इस बात की पुष्टि होती है कि प्राधिकरण के तत्कालीन अधिकारियों तथा बाहरी व्यक्तियों द्वारा मिलकर मूल काश्तकारों से सस्ती दर पर जमीन खरीदी गयी तथा उसे प्राधिकरण द्वारा उनसे काफी बड़ी हुई दर पर आपसी समझौते से कय कर लिया गया तथा प्राधिकरण को बहुत बड़ी वित्तीय हानि पहुंचायी गयी।

3.

उक्त भूमि जिन 15 व्यक्तियों / कम्पनियों से कय की गई है उसमें से अधिकांश व्यक्ति / कम्पनियों वहाँ हैं जो जनपद मथुरा में प्राधिकरण द्वारा कय की गई कुल 57.1549 हेक्टेयर भूमि के प्रकरण में भी सम्मिलित थे। इन दोनों प्रकरणों में जो व्यक्ति / कम्पनी common हैं (दोनों घोटालों में सम्मिलित है) उनके नाम इस प्रकार हैं:-

(1)

श्री मनोज कुमार पुत्र श्री तेजपाल सिंह (2) श्री गौरव पुत्र श्री तेजपाल सिंह (3) श्री अनिल कुमार पुत्र श्री जगपाल सिंह (4) श्री निर्दोष चौधरी पुत्र श्री सत्यवीर सिंह (5) श्री सत्येन्द्र पुत्र श्री तुरसनपाल (6) श्री स्वदेश गुप्ता पुत्र श्री आर०सी० गुप्ता (7) श्री ए०एन०जी० इन्फ्रास्ट्रक्चर एण्ड कन्सलटेंट प्राइवेट लिमिटेड (8) श्री विवेक कुमार जैन पुत्र श्री निरोतमदास जैन (मथुरा के प्रकरण में इनकी भूमि Himalaya Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. के नाम की कम्पनी के माध्यम से कय की गयी) (9) श्री धीरेन्द्र सिंह चौहान पुत्र श्री राजेन्द्र बहादुर चौहान (10) श्री मदन पाल सिंह पुत्र श्री कृपाल सिंह (11) श्री अजीत कुमार सिंह पुत्र श्री मदनपाल सिंह

उक्त से स्पष्ट है कि तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी श्री पी०सी० गुप्ता के नेतृत्व में प्राधिकरण के अन्य अधिकारियों/व्यक्तियों द्वारा एक गिरोह बनाकर जगह-जगह मूल काश्तकारों से काफी सस्ती दर पर भूमि कय की गई, जिसे प्राधिकरण द्वारा बिना किसी जरूरत को आपसी सहमति से काफी अधिक दर पर कय कर लिया गया। उपरोक्त से स्पष्ट होता है कि जनपद हाथरस का भूमि घोटाले का यह प्रकरण जनपद मथुरा के प्रकरण के समान है। इसी तरीके के अन्य प्रकरण भी हो सकते हैं, इससे इंकार नहीं किया जा सकता।

4.

उपरोक्त में से महाप्रबन्धक, नियोजन द्वारा अपनी आख्या में जो तालिका संलग्न की है, उसमें से कतिपय व्यक्तियों द्वारा भूमि पत्रावली में सैद्धान्तिक रूप से स्वीकृति प्रदान किये जाने के दिनांक 10.02.2014 के उपरान्त, कय की गई है तथा अधिकांश व्यक्तियों की भूमि का Mutation सैद्धान्तिक सहमति के बाद का है। यहाँ यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि पत्रावली में सैद्धान्तिक स्वीकृति कुछ खसरा नम्बरों की प्राप्त की गई तथा उससे अधिक खसरा नम्बरों की जगह-जगह भूमि कय की गई। यहाँ तक कि कुछ खसरा नम्बरों के सम्बन्ध में किसी सूचना इत्यादि को भी प्रकाशित नहीं कराया गया। महाप्रबन्धक, नियोजन की आख्या में यह भी उल्लेख है कि दो unknown से क्षेत्रीय समाचार पत्रों स्वराज टाइम्स व दाता सन्देश में दिनांक 25.02.2014 को सूचना का सार्वजनिक प्रकाशन कराया गया तथा आवेदन आमंत्रित किये गये। जिसके response में मुख्य रूप से 15 व्यक्तियों द्वारा ही आवेदन भूमि खरीदने के लिए किये गये, जो वहाँ के मूल निवासी न होकर दिल्ली, गाजियाबाद, बुलन्दशहर, आगरा आदि शहरों के थे। स्पष्ट है कि यह भूमि ग्राम मिथावली के मूल किसानों से कय नहीं की गई है एवं पूर्व नियोजित षड्यंत्र के तहत पूर्व से ही चिन्हित इन व्यक्तियों/ कम्पनियों को अवैधानिक लाभ पहुंचाने के लिए उनसे यह भूमि कय की गई।

5.

पत्रावली में टीप में यह उल्लेख है कि इन व्यक्तियों द्वारा जो सहमति पत्र दिया गया उसमें यह भी अंकित है कि सम्बन्धित भू-स्वामी उसी दशा में ही विकय पत्र निष्पादित करने को तैयार है कि उन्हें भुगतान होने वाली प्रतिकर धनराशि तीस-तीस लाख से कम के चेकों के माध्यम से पृथक-पृथक बैनामें करके चैक दिये जायें। जिस पर तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी द्वारा सहमति व्यक्त की गई। इसका मुख्य उद्देश्य है कि रु० 30.00 लाख से अधिक का लेन-देन (transaction) होने पर प्रकरण आयकर विभाग को संदर्भित किया जाना होता है, उससे बचने के लिए प्राधिकरण एवं इन व्यक्तियों द्वारा मिलकर ऐसा षड्यंत्र किया गया। इससे प्राधिकरण को छोटी-छोटी भूमि का पंजीकरण करने से पंजीकरण शुल्क के रूप में भी अधिक धनराशि भी व्यय करनी पड़ी। उल्लेखनीय है कि पत्रावली में उपरोक्त उल्लिखित भू-स्वामियों से इस प्रकार की सहमति के सम्बन्ध में कोई साक्ष्य उपलब्ध नहीं है। अतः यह सब षड्यंत्र प्राधिकरण के अधिकारियों द्वारा अपने आप concoct कर किया गया।

6.

भूलेख विभाग द्वारा परियोजना विभाग को न तो भौतिक कब्जा लेने के लिए कोई पत्र जारी किया गया और न ही कोई कब्जा लिया गया जिसके कारण प्रश्नगत भूमि अभी भी प्राधिकरण को कब्जे में नहीं है।

7.

यही नहीं इन सभी व्यक्तियों ने जो चेक इत्यादि जमा कराये उनमें से अधिकांश व्यक्तियों द्वारा MAHAMEDHA URBAN COOP BANK NOIDA एवं NOIDA COMMERCIAL COOP BANK LTD बैंक इत्यादि में जमा कराये गये, जैसा कि मथुरा के प्रकरण में भी हुआ था। ताकि इन लेन-देन (transactions) को किसी तरीके से छुपाया जा सके। सम्भवतः यह बैंक अब कार्यरत नहीं है।

8.

महा प्रबन्धक, नियोजन की आख्या में यह भी उल्लेख है कि पत्रावली में जो नोटशीट उपलब्ध है, उनमें नम्बरिंग पर ओवर राइटिंग की गई है तथा विभिन्न टीपों में विरोधाभास प्रतीत हो रहा है।

9.

उपरोक्त भूमि को कय करने में प्राधिकरण द्वारा कुल रु० 16,15,28,032.00 की धनराशि व्यय की गयी, जिसकी Net Present Value (9.50 प्रतिशत प्राधिकरण के ऋण की ब्याज की दर के अनुसार) रु० 23,92,41,724.00 होती है। स्पष्ट है कि प्राधिकरण के तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी, अन्य अधिकारी एवं इन व्यक्तियों द्वारा षड्यंत्र एवं फाड कर इस धनराशि को misappropriate किया गया तथा प्राधिकरण को 23,92,41,724.00 की हानि पहुंचायी गयी, जो एक बहुत बड़ा आपराधिक कृत्य है।

10.

महा प्रबन्धक, नियोजन द्वारा पत्रावली की जो नोटिंग उपलब्ध करायी गयी है उसमें निम्नांकित कर्मचारियों/अधिकारियों के हस्ताक्षर हैं:- (1) श्री पी०सी० गुप्ता, तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी (2) तत्कालीन उप मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी (3) श्री वी०पी० सिंह, तत्कालीन विशेष कार्याधिकार (4) श्री बृजेश कुमार, प्रबन्धक, नियोजन (5) श्री अतुल कुमार सिंह, प्रबन्धक, परियोजना (6) श्री अजीत परेश, तहसीलदार (7) श्री राजेश शुक्ल, तहसीलदार (8) श्री रणबीर सिंह, तहसीलदार (9) श्री सुरेश चन्द्र शर्मा, तहसीलदार (10) श्री पंकज कुमार, लेखपाल (11) श्री चमन सिंह, नायब तहसीलदार (12) वित्त विभाग के लेखाकार तथा सहायक लेखाकार, तत्कालीन प्रबन्धक वित्त एवं महा प्रबन्धक वित्त

11.

उपरोक्त के परिप्रेक्ष्य में यह निष्कर्ष निकालना कठिन प्रतीत नहीं होता है कि इस प्रकरण में तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी श्री पी०सी० गुप्ता द्वारा अन्य अधिकारियों तथा उपरोक्त सभी व्यक्तियों के साथ मिलकर वही modus operandi अपनाया गया जैसा कि मथुरा की जमीन घोटाले के मामले में अपनाया गया था अर्थात् बाहरी व्यक्ति (जो प्राधिकरण के अधिकारियों के रिश्तेदार/जानकार थे) द्वारा मूल किसानों से महायोजना के बाहर कृषि भू-उपयोग की भूमि का काफी सस्ती दर पर कय प्राधिकरण द्वारा 07 प्रतिशत आबादी के नाम पर इन बाहरी व्यक्तियों से आपसी सहमति से काफी अधिक दर पर उसी भूमि का कय। जिसमें प्राधिकरण के अधिकारियों द्वारा अभिलेखों में हेराफेरी तथा criminal misrepresentation किया गया। इसी प्लान के तहत इन व्यक्तियों द्वारा जो बाहर के निवासी थे, ग्राम मिथावली के स्थानीय किसानों से यह भूमि सस्ती दरों पर खरीद ली गयी, जिसे प्राधिकरण द्वारा आपसी सहमति के आधार पर इन्हीं व्यक्तियों से सर्किल रेट से दोगुनी दर पर रु० 1021.00 प्रति वर्गमीटर की दर पर खरीद लिया गया। इस षड्यंत्र की पुष्टि इस बात से भी होती है कि इनमें से अधिकांश लोग वही हैं जो मथुरा के प्रकरण में भी सम्मिलित थे। उल्लेखनीय है कि यह भूमि उस समय प्राधिकरण की महा योजना का हिस्सा नहीं थी तथा बाद में भी प्रस्तावित महा योजना फेज-2 में भी यह भूमि कृषि भू-उपयोग हेतु निर्धारित है। स्पष्ट है कि एक षड्यंत्र के तहत आपराधिक कृत्य कर प्राधिकरण को इतनी बड़ी हानि पहुंचायी गयी।

उपरोक्त के परिप्रेक्ष्य में मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी कृपया निम्नांकित कार्यवाही करें-

(1)

तत्कालीन मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी श्री पी०सी० गुप्ता व अन्य सम्बंधित अधिकारियों, जिसमें वित्त विभाग के अधिकारी भी सम्मिलित हैं और प्रश्नगत सभी व्यक्तियों / कम्पनियों MAHAMEDHA URBAN COOP BANK NOIDA तथा अन्य बैंकों के विरुद्ध भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम, 1988 की धारा-13 तथा भारतीय दण्ड संहिता की संगत धारा 420, 467, 468, 471, 120बी इत्यादि के अन्तर्गत तत्काल प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट दर्ज करायी जाये।

(2)

क्योंकि भूमि की न तो भूमि कय करते समय आवश्यकता थी, न ही अब आवश्यकता है और न ही भविष्य में इसकी कोई आवश्यकता बतायी गयी है, अतः स्पष्ट है कि पूर्व नियोजित षड्यंत्र के तहत प्रष्टाचार के माध्यम से यह भूमिय प्राधिकरण द्वारा सम्बन्धित अधिकारियों की मिलीभगत से खरीदी गयी, जिसमें malafide स्पष्ट परिलक्षित होती है। अतः यह bonafide खरीद नहीं है एवं इन विक्रय/ रजिस्ट्री पत्रों को विधिशून्य कराये जाने की आवश्यकता है। मुख्य कार्यपालक अधिकारी इसका विधिक परीक्षण कराकर इन रजिस्ट्री पत्रों को विधिशून्य कराने की कार्यवाही करें।

(3)

प्राधिकरण द्वारा 14.4896 हेक्टेयर भूमि कय की गयी एवं इस पर कुल ₹0 16,15,28,032.00 का प्राधिकरण द्वारा व्यय किया गया, जिसका Net Present Value ₹0 23,92,41,724.00 होती है। इस भूमि की कोई उपयोगिता प्राधिकरण के लिए नहीं है और न ही दूर भविष्य में कोई उपयोगिता होने की सम्भावना है। अतः ब्याज की धनराशि (जो अर्जित होती) ₹0 7,77,13,692.00 (₹0 23,92,41,724.00 - ₹015,50,56,382.00) की वसूली इन अधिकारियों से की जाये।

(4)

₹0 16,15,28,032.00 की वसूली उन 15 व्यक्तियों से की जाये, जिनकी भूमि प्राधिकरण द्वारा कय की गई

(5)

उपरोक्त जो अधिकारी सेवा में है, उन्हें निलम्बित करते हुए, उनके विरुद्ध विभागीय कार्यवाही करने हेतु सक्षम अधिकारी से अनुरोध किया जाये।

(6)

जिन कथित कम्पनियों से भूमि कय की गई वे sham कम्पनी प्रतीत होती हैं। अतः इस सम्बन्ध में Registrar, Company Affairs तथा Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Govt. of India को प्रकरण सन्दर्भित किया जाये, ताकि वे इस सम्बन्ध में जाँच कर कम्पनियों के विरुद्ध समुचित कार्यवाही कर सकें।

(7)

इन सभी भूमि के सम्बन्ध में जिनको धनराशि का भुगतान किया गया है, उसका विस्तृत विवरण cheque नम्बर सहित आयकर विभाग को भेजा जाये, ताकि आयकर विभाग इस सम्बन्ध में नियमानुसार कार्यवाही कर सकें।

85.

In particular, the impugned report/order does not sufficiently demonstrate a reasoned examination of the relationship between the area of land said to be required for the proposed residential development and the land actually purchased. The record refers to a requirement of approximately 22.42924 hectares for the relevant residential component, whereas the land in question measures approximately 14.4896 hectares. The relevance of this comparison could not be determined merely by stating the respective figures. The authority was required to examine the planning documents, the purpose for which the land was proposed to be acquired, the location and arrangement of the parcels, and the reasons, if any, why the land purchased was considered unsuitable or unnecessary for the stated purpose. The report/order does not adequately demonstrate such an exercise of analysis.

86.

Similarly, the objections concerning the scattered or non-contiguous nature of the parcels, the alleged absence of possession, and the alleged lack of development required consideration in the context of the actual land records, the relevant planning documents and the decisions taken by YEIDA. These were matters capable of having a bearing on the assessment of the transactions. A conclusion that land was unsuitable, unnecessary or incapable of being put to its intended use could not fairly be reached merely by stating the allegation. The report/order ought to have disclosed how the relevant material was examined and how the conclusion followed from it. The deficiency identified by this Court is not that the authority was bound to accept the petitioner’s explanation, but that the decision does not sufficiently disclose the process by which the contrary conclusion was reached.

87.

The same concern arises in relation to the reliance placed upon the purchase price and the alleged difference between the price paid by the original cultivators and the price subsequently paid by YEIDA. The respondents’ allegations concern the possibility that intermediaries acquired the land at one rate and transferred it to YEIDA at a higher rate. Such a circumstance may warrant examination, but the difference in price, taken by itself, does not answer every question concerning the legality of the transaction or the responsibility of a particular public servant. The authority was required to consider the relevant purchase documents, the identity and role of the persons involved, the circumstances of the transactions, the applicable institutional decisions and the material connecting the petitioner with the alleged irregularities. The impugned report/order does not adequately disclose such a person-specific and document-based assessment.

88.

The material placed before this Court also refers to consent letters and the alleged splitting of payments into amounts below Rs.30 lakh. The respondents’ case is that such an arrangement was intended to avoid a particular process or scrutiny. This is a serious allegation which requires examination of the relevant documents and the circumstances in which the payments were made.

89.

However, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned report/order does not adequately explain how the relevant consent letters, payment records and other contemporaneous documents were evaluated, what inference was drawn from each material circumstance, and how that inference was connected to the petitioner. The Court is not holding that the explanation advanced by the petitioner is necessarily correct. It is holding only that the decision which set the criminal process in motion does not disclose a sufficiently clear and reasoned consideration of these matters.

90.

The petitioner has further relied upon the decisions of the Board of YEIDA, including the decisions referred to in the pleadings as having been taken in the 49th Board Meeting, and has contended that the impugned report/order effectively disregarded the collective decisions of the Authority. The respondents dispute the petitioner's interpretation of the record and maintain that the transactions required investigation. This Court does not consider it appropriate to decide the legal effect of each Board decision at this stage. Nevertheless, the existence of institutional decisions relevant to the subject transactions was a material circumstance which required examination. If the authority considered those decisions to be irrelevant, inapplicable or incapable of justifying the transactions, it was necessary to state why. If the authority considered that the transactions went beyond the scope of those decisions, it was necessary to identify the relevant distinction. The impugned report/order does not sufficiently demonstrate that this exercise was undertaken. The relevant paragraphs of the 46th and 49th meeting are as under:

46th Meeting

"मद संख्या : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे (R.O.W.) हेतु अधिग्रहीत भूमि के सापेक्ष 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि आवंटन के संबंध में। यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण बोर्ड की 39वीं बैठक दिनांक 25.02.2011 में निर्णय लिया गया था कि ऐसे पुरानी कृषकों जिनकी भूमि का अधिग्रहण यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा सुनियोजित औद्योगिक विकास हेतु किया गया है/ किया जायेगा, को उनकी अर्जित की जाने वाली भूमि के 07 प्रतिशत के बराबर विकसित क्षेत्रफल भावी आबादी विस्तार हेतु आवंटित किया जाये। उक्त के क्रम में यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे परियोजना हेतु अर्जित भूमि जिसमें लैण्ड फॉर डवलपमेंट टॉल प्लाजा, फैसिलिटीज की जमीन सम्मिलित है, के सापेक्ष 07 प्रतिशत के बराबर आबादी भूमि दी जा रही है

उत्तर प्रदेश शासन द्वारा निर्गत शासनादेश संख्या 1252/1-13-10-20 (29)/2004 दिनांक 17.08.2010 द्वारा घोषित पुनस्थापन एवं पुनर्वास नीति के प्रस्तर 3 (ज) में उल्लिखित है कि "लंबी दूरी में भूमि क्षेत्र का अर्जन यानि रेलवे लाइनों, राजमार्गों, ट्रांसमिशन लाइनों, पाइप लाइन बिछाने जैसी परियोजनाओं के मामले में, जिनमें भूमि का अर्जन कम चौड़ाई में कई किलोमीटर की दूरी तक किया जाता है, परियोजना प्रभावित परिवारों को 10,000/- रुपये प्रति परिवार की दर से अनुग्रह राशि मुहैया करायी जाएगी और उनके लिए कोई अन्य पुनस्थापन तथा पुनर्वास लाभ मुहैया नहीं कराये जाएंगे।

कालांतर में शासनादेश संख्या 1307/1-13-10-20 (29)/2004 दिनांक 03.09.2010 द्वारा प्रस्तर 3 में व्यवस्था की गई है कि "जिन परियोजनाओं में लैण्ड फॉर डवलपमेंट हेतु भूमि अधिग्रहीत की जा रही है उनमें प्रभावित मूल काशतकारों को अधिग्रहीत भूमि की 07 प्रतिशत भूमि आवासीय प्रयोजन हेतु अर्जन की लागत एवं विकास शुल्क लेकर दी जायेगी। उक्त आवंटित भूखण्ड का क्षेत्रफल न्यूनतम 120 वर्गमीटर तथा अधिकतम क्षेत्रफल संबंधित प्राधिकरण द्वारा निर्धारित किया जायेगा।

पूर्व में यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण द्वारा जनपद गौतमबुद्धनगर, अलीगढ़ हाथरस, मथुरा, आगरा में यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे के R.O.W. निर्माण हेतु लंबाई में पट्टी के रूप में भूमि का अधिग्रहण करके भूमि कंसेशन एग्रीमेंट दिनांक 07.02.2003 के क्रम में कंसेशनायर को हस्तांतरित की गई है। यह भूमि लैण्ड फॉर डवलपमेंट का भाग भी नहीं है। R.O.W. में सम्मिलित अधिग्रहीत भूमि के कृषकों द्वारा लगातार यह मांग की जा रही है कि R.O.W. के लिए अधिग्रहीत भूमि के सापेक्ष उन्हें भी आबादी विस्तार हेतु 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि का लाभ दिया जाये।

उपरोक्त के संबंध में ज्ञातव्य है कि उक्त शासनादेश दिनांक 17.08.2010 व 03.09.2010 द्वारा उत्तर प्रदेश सरकार की पुनर्स्थापन एवं पुनर्वास नीति की घोषणा की गई है। पुनर्स्थापन एवं पुनर्वास नीति में वर्णित पुनर्वास लाभों के अलावा कोई अतिरिक्त लाभ यदि कोई अर्जन निकाय देना चाहें तो वह समुचित निर्णय लेकर ऐसा कर सकता है। जहाँ तक 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि आवंटन का प्रश्न है यह निर्णय नोएडा/ ग्रेटर नोएडा/ यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरणों में उक्त शासनादेशों के निर्गत होने से पूर्व से लागू है तथा प्राधिकरण बोर्ड द्वारा लिये गये निर्णय के अनुसार प्राधिकरण द्वारा अर्जित की जाने वाली भूमि पर एकरूप (Uniformly) में लागू है तथा यह उत्तर प्रदेश सरकार की पुनर्वास नीति में प्राविधानित पुनर्वास लाभ के अतिरिक्त है। प्राधिकरण द्वारा अपने सुनियोजित विकास हेतु अधिग्रहीत की जाने वाली भूमि के सापेक्ष उत्तर प्रदेश सरकार की पुनर्वास नीति में वर्णित लाभों के साथ-साथ 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि भी अतिरिक्त लाभ के रूप में दी जा रही है। यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे हेतु अधिग्रहीत की गई समस्त भूमि कन्सेशन एग्रीमेंट दिनांक 07.02.2003 के अनुपालन में कन्सेशनायर में जेपी इन्फ्राटिक प्रा० लि० को हस्तांतरित की गई है तथा भूमि के अर्जन पर आने वाली कुल लागत कन्सेशनायर द्वारा वहन किये जाने का प्राविधान कन्सेशन एग्रीमेंट में है। अतः यदि प्राधिकरण R.O.W. के लिए अधिग्रहीत भूमि के सापेक्ष प्रभावित कृषकों को 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि का लाभ देता है तो इस पर प्राधिकरण पर कोई वित्तीय भार नहीं पड़ेगा क्योंकि उक्त हेतु आवंटित भूमि की लागत कन्सेशनायर को वहन करनी होगी।

अतः यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे के R.O.W. निर्माण हेतु प्राधिकरण द्वारा अधिग्रहीत भूमि के पात्र कृषकों को भी 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि आवंटित किया जाना प्रस्तावित है। काफी ग्राम ऐसे हैं जिनमें केवल यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे हेतु केवल पट्टी के रूप में भूमि अधिग्रहीत हुयी है उसके अलावा अन्य सुनियोजित विकास हेतु इन ग्रामों में कोई भूमि अर्जन नहीं हुआ है। इस हेतु आवश्यक भूमि प्रश्नगत ग्राम के निकटतम ग्राम में उपलब्ध अर्जित भूमि में 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि दिया जाना प्रस्तावित है तथा आसपास के किसी ग्राम में अर्जित भूमि उपलब्ध न होने की दशा में आवश्यक क्षेत्रफल का अधिग्रहण करके 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि आवंटन किया जाना प्रस्तावित है।

उपरोक्तानुसार प्रस्ताव प्राधिकरण बोर्ड के समक्ष अनुमोदनार्थ प्रस्तुत है।

यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण की 46वीं बोर्ड बैठक दिनांक 11 जनवरी, 2013 का कार्यवृत्त।

मद संख्या (46/1) : प्राधिकरण की 45वीं बोर्ड बैठक के कार्यवृत्त की पुष्टि।

निर्णय : कार्यवृत्त की पुष्टि की गई।

मद संख्या (46/2) : प्राधिकरण की 45वीं बोर्ड बैठक में लिए गये निर्णयों की अनुपालन आख्या।

निर्णय : अनुपालन आख्या अवलोकित की गई।

मद संख्या (46/3) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण द्वारा वित्तीय वर्ष 2012-13 के माह सितम्बर, 2012 तक की वित्तीय प्रगति।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अवलोकित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/4) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण की बोर्ड बैठकों के संचालन हेतु बैठक विनियमावली बनाये जाने सम्बंधित।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया। मद संख्या (46/5) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण क्षेत्र के अन्तर्गत आवासीय टाउनशिप एवं बिस्वार्स / पुप हाउसिंग आवासीय भूखण्डों के आवंटियों के लिये शून्यकाल (zero period) अवधि घोषित किये जाने विषयक।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/6): प्राधिकरण की आवासीय सम्पत्तियों में एग्रीमेन्ट टू लीज किये जाने के उपरान्त अन्तरण किये जाने की अनुमति विषयक।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अवलोकित किया गया। मद संख्या (46/7) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे (R.O.W.) हेतु अधिग्रहित भूमि के सापेक्ष 07 प्रतिशत भूमि आवंटन के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मालद्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/8) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा अधिग्रहित भूमि के सापेक्ष दी जाने वाली 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि के विकास शुल्क, बाटर एवं सीवर बार्ज तथा भू-भाटक निर्धारण के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/9): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा अधिग्रहित भूमि के सापेक्ष 07 प्रतिशत आबादी भूमि आवंटन की पात्रता में संशोधन के संबंध में।

निर्णय : प्रस्ताव स्थगित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/10) : यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे प्राधिकरण की वाणिज्यिक योजनाओं में कृषकों को 17.5 प्रतिशत आरक्षण का प्राविधान किये जाने विषयक।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/11): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औ० वि० प्राधिकरण के अधिसूचित जनपद अलीगढ़ के ग्राम जिकरपुर के गाटा संख्या 125म क्षेत्रफल 0.6664 हे० में शहीद स्मारक/शहीद पार्क की स्थापना हेतु भूमि आरक्षित किये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/12) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण क्षेत्र की विद्युत आपूर्ति हेतु यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण के सैक्टर-9 में 765 के विद्युत उपकेन्द्र के निर्माण हेतु यू.पी. पी.टी.सी.एल. को आवंटित की जाने वाली भूमि का आवंटन दर निर्धारण कराये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय : प्रस्ताव इस निर्देश के साथ अनुमोदित किया गया कि यूपीपीटीसीएल उका भूमि का विक्रय नहीं करेगा तथा आवंटित भूमि की किसी अन्य प्रयोजन में प्रयुक्त नहीं करेगा।

मद संख्या (48/13) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण के क्षेत्र में अधिसूचित जनपद गौतमबुद्धनगर के 02 ग्रामों के कृषकों को बड़ी हुयी प्रतिकर दर की अंतर धनराशि के भुगतान के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/14) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण द्वारा कृषकों से आपसी सहमति के आधार पर कय होने वाली भूमि के सापेक्ष 30% सरकार द्वारा अंगीकृत पुनर्भाष्य एवं पुनर्वास नीति में प्रावधानित वार्षिकी (Annuity) व अन्य पुनर्वास सुविधायें प्रदान किये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/15) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे परियोजना के सलाहकार मैसर्स राइट्स लिमिटेड की सेवाओं एवं अनुबन्ध को समयवृद्धि प्रदान किये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (48/16) : समाज के सभी वर्गों हेतु वहन योग्य (Affordable) भवनों की योजना।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया

मद संख्या (46/17) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण द्वारा वाहन कय कर पुलिस विभाग को उपलब्ध कराये जाने विषयक।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया

मद संख्या (46/18) : यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे क्षेत्र (प्रथम चरण) की ड्राफ्ट महायोजना के सम्बंध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/19) : यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण के अंतर्गत जिला-अलीगढ़, मथुरा, महामायानगर एवं आगरा जिलों के क्षेत्रों को समायोजित करते हुये मास्टर प्लान-2031 (Phase-11) के सम्बन्ध में।

निर्णय : संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (46/20) : सैक्टर-22डी के पुनरीक्षित ले-आउट प्लान के सम्बन्ध में।

निर्णय : प्रस्ताव वापिस लिया गया।

मद संख्या (46/21) : यमुना एक्सप्रेस-वे प्राधिकरण क्षेत्र में मिश्रित, औद्योगिक, संस्थागत, आवासीय एवं रिकियेशनल ग्रीन भू-उपयोग की अर्जित भूमि पर योजना लाये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय : निर्णय प्रस्ताव वापिस लिया गया।

49th Meeting

मद संख्या (49/05): भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम-2013 के प्राविधानों के अनुसार प्रतिकर निर्धारण हेतु कार्यवाही किये जाने के संबंध में।

भारत सरकार की अधिसूचना दिनांक 26 सितम्बर 2013 द्वारा भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वासन और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम, 2013 प्रख्यापित किया गया है एवं भारत सरकार की अधिसूचना दिनांक 19 दिसम्बर 2013 द्वारा अधिनियम के प्रवृत्त होने का दिनांक 01.01.2014 नियत किया गया है। प्रमुख सचिव, राजस्व, उत्तर प्रदेश शासन, लखनऊ द्वारा जारी पत्र संख्या-40/एक-13-2014-7क (4) 14 दिनांक 17.01.2014 में उल्लिखित है कि उक्त अधिनियम भारत सरकार की अधिसूचना दिनांक 19.12.2013 द्वारा 01 जनवरी 2014 को अधिनियम के प्रभावी करने की तिथि नियत करने के दिनांक से प्रदेश में लागू हो गया है। उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 114 में उल्लिखित है कि भू-अर्जन अधिनियम-1894 एतद्वारा निरसित (Repeal) किया जाता है। उपरोक्त परिस्थितियों में प्राधिकरण के वर्तमान में गतिमान भू-अर्जन प्रस्तावों में भू-अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 के प्राविधानों में कोई अग्रिम कार्यवाही किया जाना विधिक रूप से सम्मत नहीं रह गया है बल्कि अग्रिम कार्यवाही नवीनतम प्रख्यापित अधिनियम के प्राविधानों के अन्तर्गत करना विधिक बाध्यता है। अधिनियम की प्रति संलग्न है (संलग्नक-1)।

वर्तमान में शासन की प्राथमिकता प्राप्त महत्वपूर्ण योजनाओं एवं प्राधिकरण की औद्योगिक संस्थागत आदि योजनाओं हेतु भूमि अधिग्रहण /क्रय की कार्यवाही गतिमान है। प्राधिकरण बोर्ड के निर्णयानुसार प्राधिकरण द्वारा अर्जित की जाने वाली भूमि की करार की प्रतिकर दरें एवं आपसी सहमति के आधार पर क्रय होने वाली भूमि की दरें एकसमान रहती है तथा करार /क्रय की एकमुश्त दरों में प्रतिकर सोलेशियम आदि समस्त देयतायें सम्मिलित रहती हैं। भू-अर्जन अधिनियम 1894 निरस्त हो जाने एवं नवीनतम प्रख्यापित भूमि अर्जन पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम 2013 प्रभावी हो जाने के फलस्वरूप उक्त नवीन अधिनियम की व्यवस्थानुसार प्रतिकर निर्धारण विधिक बाध्यता है।

भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम 2013 की धारा 26 में भूमि की बाजारू दर निर्धारित किये जाने के संबंध में निम्न मानक निर्धारित किये गये हैं-

(क) उस क्षेत्र में, जहाँ भूमि स्थित है, यथास्थिति विक्रय-विलेख या विक्रय के करार के रजिस्ट्रीकरण के लिए भारतीय स्टाम्प अधिनियम, 1899 (1899 का 2) में विनिर्दिष्ट बाजार मूल्य (सर्किल रेट) यदि कोई हो, या

(ख) निकटवर्ती ग्राम या निकटवर्ती पड़ोसी क्षेत्र में स्थित उसी प्रकार की भूमि के लिए औसत विक्रय कीमत, या

(ग) प्राइवेट कंपनियों के लिए या पब्लिक प्राइवेट भागीदारी परियोजनाओं के लिए भूमि के अर्जन के मामले में धारा 2 की उपधारा (2) के अधीन करार पाए गए प्रतिकर की सम्मत रकम, उक्त तीनों में जो अधिकतम हो

अधिनियम की धारा 30 में उक्त बाजारू दर के अनुसार आंकलित धनराशि के बराबर ही सोलेशियम राशि भी जोड़ते हुये प्रतिकर राशि निर्धारित किये जाने की व्यवस्था की गई है। अधिनियम के परिशिष्ट एक में यह व्यवस्था की गई है कि उक्त निर्धारित प्रतिकर धनराशि को अर्जित होने वाली भूमि की शहरी क्षेत्र से दूरी के अनुसार गुणांक (जो 01 से 02 के मध्य होगा तथा यह गुणांक सरकार द्वारा निर्धारित किया जायेगा) से गुणा करने पर प्राप्त धनराशि अन्तिम प्रतिकर के रूप में भुगतान की जायेगी। अतः सर्किल दर के कम से कम दो गुने तथा अधिकतम चार गुने के बराबर दर से प्रतिकर (सोलेशियम सहित) दिया जाना है। उपरोक्त विवरण से स्पष्ट है कि नये अधिनियम में सोलेशियम को सम्मिलित करते हुये सर्किल रेट के कम से कम दो गुने के बराबर प्रतिकर धनराशि का भुगतान तो किया ही जाना है।

उ०प्र० सरकार द्वारा उक्त गुणांक निर्धारित किये जाने तक करार क्रय की एकमुश्त प्रतिकर दर सर्किल रेट के दो गुने के बराबर निर्धारित किया जाना उचित होगा ताकि प्राधिकरण के कार्य अवरुद्ध न हो, उक्त के अलावा सरकार द्वारा उक्त गुणांक तथा प्रतिकर के अतिरिक्त दी जाने वाली अन्य पुनर्वास सुविधायें निर्धारित किये जाने तक की अवधि में निष्पादित होने वाले विक्रय पत्रों के सापेक्ष अन्तर धनराशि अथवा अतिरिक्त पुनर्वास सुविधायें अनुमन्य किये जाने पर तत्समय समुचित निर्णय लिया जावेगा।

अतः भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम 2013 के दृष्टिगत प्राधिकरण द्वारा अर्जित / क्रय होने वाली भूमि की करार की प्रतिकर दरें संबंधित ग्राम की सामान्य सर्किल दर के दो गुने के बराबर (सर्किल दर का दो गुना वर्तमान करार / प्रतिकर दर से कम होने की दशा में वर्तमान दर पर) निर्धारित किया जाना प्रस्तावित है।

तदनुसार प्राधिकरण बोर्ड के अनुमोदनार्थ एजेण्डा प्रस्तुत है।

यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण की 48वीं बोर्ड बैठक दिनांक 12 फरवरी, 2014 का कार्यवृत्त।

मद संख्या (49/1): प्राधिकरण की 48वीं बोर्ड बैठक के कार्यवृत्त की पुष्टि।

निर्णय: कार्यवृत्त की पुष्टि की गई।

मद संख्या (49/2): प्राधिकरण की 48वीं बोर्ड बैठक में लिए गये निर्णयों की अनुपालन आख्या।

निर्णय: अनुपालन आख्या अवलोकित की गई।

मद संख्या (49/3): वित्तीय वर्ष 2013-14 के आय व्ययक के सापेक्ष माह दिसम्बर 2013 तक के वास्तविक, 2013-14 का पुनरीक्षित एवं वर्ष 2014-15 का प्रस्तावित बजट।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/4): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे क्षेत्र में मिश्रित मूखण्डों की योजना की अर्हताएँ, नियम एवं शर्तें निर्धारण विषयक

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अवलोकित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/5): भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम-2013 के प्राविधानों के अनुसार प्रतिकर निर्धारण हेतु कार्यवाही किये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/6): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे परियोजना पर Commercial Advertising, Display or Hoarding आदि के लिये नीति निर्धारण के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/7): श्री लाजपत राय, प्रबन्धक (वित्त) को यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे प्राधिकरण में सेवानिवृत्ति के पश्चात consolidated salary पर पुनः एक वर्ष की अवधि हेतु अनुबन्धित करने से सम्बंधित।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/8): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे औद्योगिक विकास प्राधिकरण के अधिसूचित क्षेत्र जिला-गौतम बुद्ध नगर एवं बुलन्दशहर (प्रथम चरण) के जोनिंग रेगुलेशन में संशोधन के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/9): भवन विनियमावली में संशोधन के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/10): भूमि अर्जन, पुनर्वास और पुनर्व्यवस्थापन में उचित प्रतिकर और पारदर्शिता का अधिकार अधिनियम-2013 के प्राविधानों के अंतर्गत अर्जित/क्रय होने वाली भूमि के सापेक्ष 20 प्रतिशत विकसित भूमि के विकल्प के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/11): यमुना एक्सप्रेसवे क्षेत्र में मेट्रो रेल योजना विषयक।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/12): ई-निविदा प्रक्रिया के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा कार्यरत स्वीकृति प्रदान की गई।

मद संख्या (49/13): आई०टी०आई०टी०ई०एस० उपयोग के भूखण्डों में भवन निर्माण पूर्ण कर अधिभोग प्रमाण पत्र प्राप्त करने की अनुमन्य समयावधि बढ़ाये जाने के संबंध में।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अनुमोदित किया गया।

मद संख्या (49/14): बी.एच.एस.-02/2013 योजना के आवंटन सम्बन्धी प्रगति आख्या।

निर्णय: संचालक मण्डल द्वारा प्रस्ताव अवलोकित किया गया।”

91.

The deficiency is particularly material because the report/order does not merely express a preliminary administrative concern or call for further examination. It became the basis for registration of a criminal case involving allegations of cheating, forgery, use of allegedly forged documents, criminal conspiracy and offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

92.

In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the authority to distinguish between an irregularity requiring administrative examination, a transaction calling for further investigation, and material which could reasonably support an allegation of criminal conduct against a particular person. The existence of a disputed transaction or an adverse administrative inference does not, without more, establish the criminal liability of every person associated with it. The authority was required to record the basis on which it considered the material sufficient to warrant the action directed by it.

93.

The Court is conscious that the standard applicable to the registration of an FIR is not the same as the standard required for conviction, and that an investigating agency may investigate allegations which have not yet been established. The present decision does not impose a requirement that an administrative authority conclusively establish an offence before information can be given to the police.

94.

The defect lies elsewhere, which is that the report/order, as the immediate foundation for the impugned action, does not sufficiently disclose a fair and reasoned consideration of the relevant material and the petitioner’s asserted position before the adverse conclusions were drawn. The requirement of application of mind does not mean that every allegation must be proved at the outset. It means that the authority must actually consider the relevant material and must not treat allegations or inferences as established conclusions without a discernible basis.

95.

The Court has also examined the question of opportunity. The petitioner’s specific grievance is that the report/order dated 15.03.2019 was made without a show-cause notice, without supply of the relevant material and without sufficient time or opportunity to explain the documents on which the adverse conclusions were based. On the record presently placed before this Court, neither the impugned report/order itself nor the pleadings and material relied upon by the respondents identify a show-cause notice issued to the petitioner before the report/order was made, specify the date on which such notice was served, or demonstrate that the material relied upon against him was supplied to him for an effective response. Nor has any contemporaneous record been identified before this Court which demonstrates that the petitioner was heard on the specific adverse conclusions subsequently recorded in the report/order dated 15.03.2019.

96.

The Court does not overlook that the impugned report/order was followed by a criminal investigation and that statements and other material were subsequently collected. The counter-affidavit also describes the course of investigation, the involvement of other persons and the steps taken by the investigating agency. Those matters, however, concern the investigation and subsequent proceedings.

97.

They do not establish that the petitioner was given an opportunity to meet the adverse material before the impugned administrative report/order was prepared. A hearing or an opportunity available at a later stage of criminal investigation cannot, without more, be treated as proof that the earlier decision-making process was fair. Equally, the absence of a reference to a hearing in the order is not, by itself, conclusive proof that no hearing took place. The relevant consideration is that, despite the petitioner’s specific challenge, the record placed before this Court does not demonstrate that the claimed opportunity was afforded.

98.

The distinction is important. The Court is not holding that an administrative authority must conduct a criminal trial or determine the guilt of a public servant before referring suspected criminal conduct to the police. Nor is the Court holding that a person must invariably be given advance notice before every FIR can be registered.

99.

The present finding is confined to the report/order dated 15.03.2019, which, on the record before this Court, contains adverse conclusions founded upon an examination of administrative and transactional material but does not demonstrate that the petitioner’s position was sought or considered before those conclusions were reached. In the particular circumstances of this case, where the petitioner disputes the treatment of institutional decisions and contemporaneous documents and where the report/order itself became the immediate basis for criminal proceedings, a fresh, fair and reasoned consideration is warranted.

100.

The requirement of fairness in administrative decision-making is not a mere formality. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the principles of natural justice are intended to secure justice and prevent miscarriage of justice, and that administrative action cannot be insulated from those principles merely because it is characterised as administrative. The Court emphasised that the content of natural justice depends upon the circumstances of the case and the nature of the decision being taken. The principle is relevant here because the report/order dated 15.03.2019 had consequences extending beyond an internal administrative assessment and became the basis for setting criminal proceedings in motion. The authority was therefore required to act fairly, consider the relevant material and ensure that the process leading to its conclusions was not arbitrary. The relevant paragraphs of A.K. Kraipak are as under:-

“17.

This takes us to the question whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings similar to that with which we are concerned in these cases. According to the learned Attorney General those principles have no bearing in determining the validity of the impugned selections. In support of his contention he read to us several decisions. It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. The question how far the principles of natural justice govern administrative enquiries came up for consideration before the Queens Bench Division In re : H. K. (An Infant). Therein the validity of the action taken by an Immigration Officer came up for consideration. In the course of his judgment Lord Parker, C.J. observed thus:-

“But at the same time, I myself think that even if an immigration officer is not in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, he must at any rate give the immigrant an opportunity of satisfying him of the matters in the subsection, and for that purpose let the immigrant know what his immediate impression is so that the immigrant can disabuse him. That is not, as I see it, a question of acting or being required to act judicially, but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must, as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing one's mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative frame work under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. I appreciate that in saying that it may be said that one is going further than is permitted on the decided cases because heretofore at any rate the decisions of the courts do seem to have drawn a strict line in these matters according to whether there is or is not a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially."

18.

In the same case Blain, J. observed thus:

"I would only say that an immigration officer having assumed the jurisdiction granted by those provisions is in a position where it is his duty to exercise that assumed jurisdiction whether it be administrative, executive or quasi-judicial, fairly, by which I mean applying his mind dispassionately to a fair analysis of the particular problem and the information available to him in analysing it. If in any hypothetical case, and in any real case, this court was satisfied that an immigration officer was not so doing, then in my view mandamus would lie.”

19.

In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei Shah, J. speaking for the Court, dealing with an enquiry made as regards the correct age of a government servant, observed thus:

"We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State ….”

20.

The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon there- after a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasijudicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decison in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala, the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.”

101.

The requirement that a decision disclose the reasons for its conclusions is equally well settled. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that reasons are an essential component of a fair decision-making process, particularly where an order prejudicially affects the rights or interests of a person. Reasons serve not only to communicate the conclusion but also to demonstrate that relevant matters have been considered, irrelevant considerations excluded and discretion exercised on a rational basis. The Court set aside the order under challenge and remitted the matter for a reasoned decision without expressing any opinion on the merits. The principle applies to the present matter in the limited sense that the impugned report/order must disclose a rational connection between the relevant material and the conclusions drawn. The relevant paragraphs of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. are as under:-

“12.

The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi- judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak V. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 150.

14.

The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report)

15.

This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.

41.

In England there was no common law duty of recording of reasons. In Stefan vs. General Medical Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, "the established position of the common law is that there is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to record reasons".

It has been acknowledged in the Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at p. 23 that "No single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".

44.

But, however, the present trend of the law has been towards an increasing recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corpn., (2002) 1 WLR 2397). It has been acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development towards openness in Government and judicial administration.

46.

The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee in SCC p. 602, para11 : AIR para 11 at p. 1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the Court cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review".

In S.N. Mukherjee, (1990) 4 SCC 594, this court relied on the decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and Exchange Commission Vs. Chenery Corpn. (1942) 87 Law Ed 626 and John T. Dunlop vs. Walter Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its opinion discussed above.

47.

Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a)

In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b)

A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c)

Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d)

Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e)

Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f)

Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(g)

Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.

(h)

The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i)

Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j)

Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

(k)

If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l)

Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.

(m)

It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).

(n)

Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

(o). In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process".

102.

Further, in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner12 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the validity of an order must be judged by the reasons stated in the order itself and that its deficiencies cannot be cured by subsequently supplying fresh reasons through an affidavit or otherwise. The rule is important in the present case. The respondents have placed before this Court their explanation of the allegations, the course of investigation and the material subsequently collected. That material may be relevant to the investigation and to any lawful decision taken in the future. However, it cannot retrospectively supply reasoning which is not disclosed by the impugned report/order itself. The legality of the report/order dated 15.03.2019 must be assessed on the basis of the decision as made, read with the contemporaneous record shown to have been considered at that time.

103.

The Court is also mindful that a defect in the reasoning of an administrative order does not necessarily mean that the conclusion reached by the authority is factually wrong. The authority may, after considering the entire record and hearing the petitioner, reach the same conclusion, a different conclusion, or conclude that further action is not warranted. The choice between those outcomes belongs to the competent authority in the first instance. Judicial review is concerned with the legality and fairness of the decision-making process, and it is not an occasion for this Court to undertake the factual adjudication afresh where the appropriate course is to remit the matter for a lawful decision.

104.

The impugned report/order dated 15.03.2019 is therefore liable to be set aside, without this Court expressing a concluded view on the underlying allegations/offences.

105.

The Court has considered the respondents’ reliance upon the subsequent investigation and the charge-sheets referred to in the pleadings. The record refers to a charge-sheet dated 02.07.2024, in which the petitioner was not named, and to subsequent supplementary charge-sheets filed in the course of the investigation. The respondents’ counter-affidavit also refers to a later charge-sheet, identified as Charge-sheet No. 07 dated 27.01.2026, against the petitioner. These developments demonstrate that the criminal investigation has progressed over time.

106.

They do not, however, answer the distinct question whether the report/order dated 15.03.2019 was made after a fair and reasoned consideration of the relevant material. Equally, the fact that the petitioner was not named in an earlier charge-sheet does not, by itself, establish that the later proceedings are invalid. The Court therefore declines to determine the evidentiary effect or legal sufficiency of any of these charge-sheets in the present proceedings.

107.

For the reasons recorded in paragraphs hereinabove, the report/order dated 15.03.2019 is liable to be quashed and set aside. The defects identified in that decision concern the adequacy of the consideration of relevant institutional decisions and contemporaneous material, the absence of a sufficiently discernible connection between the material referred to and the conclusions recorded, and the lack of material demonstrating that the petitioner was afforded an effective opportunity to respond to the adverse material before the conclusions were reached. These findings relate to the legality and fairness of the administrative decision-making process. They do not constitute a determination that the underlying allegations are false or that the petitioner is entitled to exoneration.

108.

Accordingly, the report dated 15.03.2019 is quashed and set aside. It shall, however, remain open to YEIDA to initiate a fresh enquiry, if any new facts come to light.

XII. Conclusion and Directions

109.

In view of the foregoing analysis, the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 also cannot be sustained, as the material presently placed before this Court indicates that the competent authority granted sanction without having before it, and independently considering, the relevant material bearing upon the petitioner’s individual role and the circumstances of the transactions in question.

109.1.

The order’s recital that the material was carefully examined and that the authority applied its mind is relevant, but is not conclusive where the completeness of the material placed before the authority has been specifically challenged.

109.2.

The decisive consideration is whether the contemporaneous sanction record demonstrates an informed and independent exercise of statutory discretion, including consideration of material relevant to the petitioner’s explanation.

109.3.

Accordingly, the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 is quashed and set aside. However, it is open to the competent authority for fresh, fair and reasoned consideration in accordance with law and the observations made hereinabove.

109.4.

The authority shall neither be directed to grant sanction nor be precluded from refusing it and the decision must rest upon an independent assessment of the relevant material and the applicable statutory requirements.

110.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the report/order dated 15.03.2019 cannot be sustained in its present form.

110.1.

The deficiency lies in the absence of a sufficiently discernible and reasoned consideration of the relevant contemporaneous material, including the decisions of the 46th and 49th meetings of the YEIDA Board, the planning and transaction records, and the circumstances bearing upon the petitioner’s individual role.

110.2.

The record placed before this Court also does not demonstrate that the petitioner was afforded an effective opportunity to respond to the adverse material before the conclusions recorded in the impugned report/order were reached.

110.3.

Accordingly, the report/order dated 15.03.2019 is quashed and set aside. It shall, however, remain open to YEIDA to initiate a fresh enquiry, if any new facts come to light.

110.4.

Before passing a fresh order, the competent authority shall supply to the petitioner the material proposed to be relied upon against him, to the extent legally permissible and necessary to afford an effective opportunity to respond. The petitioner shall be granted reasonable time to submit his explanation, supporting documents and objections, and shall be afforded an effective opportunity of personal hearing

110.5.

This conclusion shall not be construed as a finding that the underlying allegations are false, nor shall the authority be precluded from reaching an appropriate conclusion upon an independent assessment of the relevant material.

111.

The findings hereinabove do not determine the truth of the allegations or confer immunity upon the petitioner from any prosecution that may otherwise be lawfully instituted.

112.

The Court has considered whether the appropriate consequential relief should be confined to protection against coercive action or whether further proceedings in the criminal case against the petitioner should also be stayed. The Court has set aside both the report/order dated 15.03.2019 and the sanction order dated 21.08.2025 for deficiencies in their respective decision-making processes.

112.1.

The first is the administrative decision which preceded the registration of FIR No. 209 of 2019, while the second concerns the statutory decision to permit prosecution for the specified offences. The legal effect of the setting aside of these decisions must, however, be assessed with care. The quashing of the report/order does not, by itself, nullify the FIR or the material independently collected during investigation, at this stage. Similarly, the setting aside of the sanction order does not automatically determine the maintainability of every charge or every proceeding, irrespective of the statutory requirement applicable to it.

112.2.

Nevertheless, it is only in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that a limited stay of further criminal proceedings against the petitioner is necessary to preserve the efficacy of the relief granted.

112.3.

The sanction order has been set aside and the competent authority with liberty to reconsider, if the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were permitted to advance to substantive trial during the period in which the sanction question is being reconsidered. The stay is not being granted on the premise that the petitioner stands exonerated or that the prosecution evidence is insufficient. It is a limited consequential measure directed to the circumstances of this case and to the need for a lawful decision on sanction before the criminal proceedings advance further in respect of offences for which such sanction is a statutory prerequisite.

112.4.

Accordingly, further proceedings in the criminal case arising out of FIR No. 209 of 2019 including further trial proceedings, shall remain stayed for a period of twelve weeks from the date on which a copy of this judgment is produced before the competent authorities.

112.5.

During this period, the competent authority shall undertake the reconsideration directed in the above paragraphs, as applicable. The stay shall not be construed as an acquittal, discharge on merits, or quashing of the FIR or charge-sheets. It shall not prevent lawful preservation of evidence or other steps which do not amount to proceeding with the trial against the petitioner.

112.6.

If the fresh decisions are not completed within the stipulated period, it shall be open to the parties to seek appropriate orders.

112.7.

The stay does not affect the investigation or proceedings relating to FIR No. 421 of 2018 concerning the Mathura land transactions, which are separate proceedings and are subject to the orders passed by the competent courts in that matter. No observation in this judgment shall be construed as modifying any such order.

113.

Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

114.

The Government Advocate is directed to send the copy of this order to the concerned authorities for necessary compliance with direction contained here-in-above.

Footnotes

  1. 1.(2014) 14 SCC 295
  2. 2.2022 INSC 1082
  3. 3.(2013) 11 SCC 673
  4. 4.(2021) 14 SCC 626
  5. 5.2023 SCC OnLine SC 90
  6. 6.(2020) 2 SCC 338
  7. 7.AIR 1993 SC 2155
  8. 8.(2014) 14 SCC 295
  9. 9.(2013) 8 SCC 119
  10. 10.(1969) 2 SCC 262
  11. 11.(2010) 9 SCC 496
  12. 12.(1978) 1 SCC 405