Sri Gopi Kishan Khandelwal Vs Smt Archana Tripathi
Allahabad High Court · 06 Nov 2026 · Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J
Judgment
Hon'Ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.
Heard Sri Prakhar Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Manish Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court, Kanpur Nagar in SCC Suit No. 12 of 2020 (Smt. Archana Tripathi v. Gopi Kishan Khandelwal), whereby the application Paper No. 113-Ga, filed by the petitioner-defendant under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'), seeking amendment of the written statement, has been rejected. The petitioner has also assailed the consequential order dated 07.10.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 19, Kanpur Nagar in SCC Revision No. 45 of 2026, whereby the revision preferred against the aforesaid order has been dismissed.
The controversy arising in the present petition centers around the refusal of the courts below to permit the petitioner to introduce an additional defence founded upon an alleged partition of the property in dispute between the respondent and Smt. Krishna Tripathi, and the consequential division of the tenanted accommodation. The question is whether such a plea could have been permitted to be incorporated in the written statement at the stage when the suit had already reached the stage of final arguments.
The respondent instituted SCC Suit No. 12 of 2020 on 10.01.2020 against the petitioner, seeking his eviction from the tenanted accommodation, recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. She claimed ownership and the status of landlady in respect of the disputed accommodation on the basis of a Will dated 10.11.2010 executed by Smt. Satyawati Tripathi.
The petitioner contested the suit by filing a written statement on 18.02.2021, disputing the respondent's claim of ownership and landlordship. He pleaded that Smt. Satyawati Tripathi had subsequently executed another registered Will dated 21.01.2012, thereby revoking the earlier Will dated 10.11.2010. It was further pleaded that the rent in respect of the tenanted accommodation was being collected by Sri Devendra Tripathi and not by the respondent.
During the pendency of the suit, the respondent brought on record, by filing Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga on 09.11.2021, certain documents relating to a compromise entered into between her and Sri Devendra Kumar Tripathi in Suit No. 1599 of 2019, including the compromise application and the judgment dated 19.10.2021. The terms of the compromise, inter alia, recognised the respondent's entitlement to collect rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the tenanted accommodation. After the aforesaid documents had been brought on record, the petitioner himself moved an application seeking amendment of his written statement under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. The said application was allowed by the trial court on 18.05.2024, and the consequential amendment was incorporated in the written statement.
When the suit had already reached the stage of final arguments, the petitioner moved an application dated 15.09.2025, registered as Paper No. 113-Ga, under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, seeking amendment of the written statement by incorporating proposed paragraphs 21-H, 21-I, 21-J and 21-K.
The basis of the proposed amendment was that the petitioner had acquired knowledge, in the last week of August 2025, that the property in dispute had already been partitioned between the respondent and Smt. Krishna Tripathi, even before institution of the suit. According to the petitioner, the partition had been effected pursuant to Resolution No. 121 dated 07.09.2019 passed by the Kanpur Nagar Nigam. It was further asserted that, consequent upon such partition, a separate house number, namely 92-A, had been allotted to the portion falling to the share of Smt. Krishna Tripathi, whereas the portion falling to the respondent's share continued to bear house number 92.
On the strength of the aforesaid assertions, the petitioner sought to introduce the further plea that the tenanted accommodation had also been divided between the respective co-owners, resulting in a splitting of the tenancy. It was, accordingly, contended that, in view of the alleged division of the tenanted accommodation, the suit instituted by the respondent, in the absence of Smt. Krishna Tripathi, was not maintainable in its existing form.
The respondent opposed the amendment application by filing objections Paper No. 115-Ga. It was contended, inter alia, that the facts sought to be introduced were neither newly discovered nor beyond the petitioner's knowledge and that the documents relating to the compromise in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 had already been brought on record during the pendency of the suit. It was further pointed out that the evidence of both parties had concluded, written arguments had been filed and the suit had reached the stage of final hearing. The petitioner, in turn, filed his counter-objection Paper No. 117-Ga, reiterating the grounds set out in the amendment application.
The learned Judge, Small Causes Court, upon consideration of the rival submissions and the material available on record, rejected the amendment application by order dated 20.11.2025. The principal considerations which weighed with the learned trial court were that the circumstances forming the basis of the proposed amendment existed even prior to institution of the suit, that the petitioner was aware of the relevant facts and that the proposed amendment was neither necessary for adjudication of the controversy nor justified at the advanced stage at which it had been sought.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred SCC Revision No. 45 of 2026. The learned Revisional Court, upon consideration of the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and examination of the record, dismissed the revision by order dated 07.10.2026, thereby affirming the order passed by the learned trial court. The petitioner has consequently approached this Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the courts below have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of the proposed amendment. It is contended that the plea relating to partition of the property and the consequential division of the tenanted accommodation has a direct bearing upon the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the maintainability of the eviction proceedings instituted by the respondent.
It is further submitted that the petitioner acquired knowledge of the alleged partition only in the last week of August 2025 and, therefore, the courts below have erred in proceeding on the premise that the facts sought to be incorporated were already within his knowledge. Learned counsel submits that the proposed amendment merely seeks to introduce an additional defence, without displacing or withdrawing any admission made in the written statement or setting up a defence inconsistent with the existing pleadings. It is also contended that permitting the amendment would not cause any prejudice to the respondent.
Learned counsel has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation1 and contends that the courts below have misinterpreted the principle laid down therein. It is submitted that the said decision concerned an amendment of the plaint whereby the plaintiff sought to introduce an additional relief, whereas the present case concerns an amendment of the written statement by which the defendant seeks to introduce an additional defence. According to learned counsel, the distinction between the two situations has not been properly appreciated by the courts below, resulting in an erroneous approach to the petitioner's application for amendment.
It is lastly submitted that the direction issued for expeditious or time-bound disposal of the suit could not, by itself, curtail the jurisdiction of the trial court to consider an application for amendment on its merits in accordance with law. The impugned orders are, therefore, assailed as suffering from material illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the petition and submits that the petitioner has not disclosed the complete facts and circumstances in which the subsequent amendment application came to be moved. It is contended that the petitioner never disputed the existence of the tenancy in respect of the accommodation in question in his written statement dated 18.02.2021. The respondent had instituted the SCC suit on the basis of her claim of ownership under the Will dated 10.11.2010 executed by Smt. Satyawati Tripathi, which claim was contested by the petitioner by disputing her ownership and landlordship.
Learned counsel further submits that, on 09.11.2021, the respondent brought on record Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga, comprising the compromise entered into between the respondent and Sri Devendra Kumar Tripathi in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 and the judgment dated 19.10.2021 passed therein. It is pointed out that Clause 4 of the compromise specifically recognised the respondent's entitlement to collect rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the tenanted accommodation. Learned counsel submits that, after the aforesaid documents had been brought on record, the petitioner himself sought amendment of the written statement under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, which was allowed by the trial court on 18.05.2024, and the consequential amendment was incorporated in the written statement.
It is contended that the subsequent application, Paper No. 113-Ga, moved on 15.09.2025, seeks to introduce a substantially similar controversy concerning the respondent's entitlement in respect of the disputed property, despite the relevant documents and circumstances having already been brought on record and being within the petitioner's knowledge. According to learned counsel, the plea that the petitioner acquired knowledge of the alleged partition only in the last week of August 2025 is an attempt to overcome the requirement of due diligence embodied in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. It is, therefore, submitted that the proposed amendment, having been sought after commencement of trial and when the suit had already reached the stage of final arguments, was rightly rejected by the trial court.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has not placed the complete procedural history of the proceedings in their proper perspective. It is pointed out that, when the suit had earlier reached the stage of final arguments, the petitioner had moved an application seeking recall and re-examination of D.W.-1, which was rejected by the trial court by order dated 04.02.2025. The said order was affirmed by the Revisional Court on 19.09.2025 in SCC Revision No. 81 of 2025 and was thereafter challenged before this Court in Matters Under Article 227 No. 650 of 2026. The aforesaid petition was allowed on the basis of a concession made on behalf of the respondent at the admission stage, permitting the petitioner to examine D.W.-1 on the next date fixed, subject to the stipulation that, in default of availing the opportunity so granted, the same would stand closed and the suit would be decided on the basis of the evidence already available on record.
According to learned counsel, the aforesaid sequence of proceedings demonstrates that the suit had already reached an advanced stage of adjudication and that the successive applications moved by the petitioner had the effect of prolonging its disposal. It is submitted that the present application for amendment was yet another attempt to reopen the controversy at the stage of final hearing, notwithstanding that the material now sought to be relied upon was available at an earlier stage of the proceedings.
It is lastly submitted that the courts below have duly considered the nature of the proposed amendment, the stage of the proceedings, the material available on record and the statutory requirement of due diligence under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. The petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned orders suffer from any jurisdictional error, material irregularity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel, accordingly, prays for dismissal of the petition.
Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and examining the material available on record, the issue that falls for consideration is whether the rejection of the petitioner's application for amendment of the written statement suffers from any jurisdictional error or material irregularity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, having regard to the advanced stage of the proceedings at which the amendment was sought.
Before examining the rival submissions in the light of the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, which govern amendment of pleadings. The provision confers discretion upon the court to permit either party to alter or amend its pleadings, in such manner and on such terms as may be just, provided that the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
The proviso to Order VI Rule 17, however, imposes a statutory restriction on the exercise of such power after commencement of trial. It mandates that no application for amendment shall be allowed after commencement of trial unless the court comes to the conclusion that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial.
Thus, while the main provision confers discretion upon the court to permit amendments in appropriate cases, the exercise of such discretion, after commencement of trial, is subject to the mandatory requirement embodied in the proviso. The court is, therefore, required to examine not merely whether the proposed amendment is relevant or necessary for determining the real controversy, but also whether the applicant has satisfactorily established that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised at the stage contemplated by law.
In Vidyabai and Others v. Padmalatha and Another2, the Supreme Court explained the mandatory nature of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code and held that, after commencement of trial, the court can exercise its jurisdiction to permit amendment only upon recording its satisfaction that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial.
In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons and Others3, the Supreme Court enumerated the relevant considerations governing applications for amendment of pleadings. These include whether the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties; whether it introduces a fundamentally different or inconsistent case; whether it causes prejudice to the opposite party; and whether the application is bona fide.
It is also well recognised that an amendment of the written statement ordinarily stands on a somewhat different footing from an amendment of the plaint. In Baldev Singh and Others v. Manohar Singh and Another4, the Supreme Court recognised that a defendant may ordinarily be permitted to introduce an additional or even an alternative defence, subject to the limitations governing the exercise of such discretion. The relatively liberal approach adopted towards amendments of written statements, however, does not dispense with the statutory requirement of due diligence contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code.
The aforesaid legal position has also been reiterated by this Court in Mahboob Saifi v. Vimal Kumar Jain5. While considering a challenge to the rejection of an application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, this Court emphasised that the requirement of due diligence assumes particular significance where the amendment is sought after commencement of trial. It was observed that a mere assertion of subsequent knowledge, without disclosing the circumstances in which such knowledge was acquired or the steps taken thereafter, would not satisfy the statutory requirement. The Court further observed that an amendment sought at a highly belated stage, particularly after the matter has reached the stage of final arguments, warrants careful scrutiny, especially where the proposed pleas are disputed and their introduction would necessitate reopening of issues or the adduction of further evidence.
A similar view was taken by this Court in Vinod Chaurasia v. Shri Radha Kishan Ji Maharaj Virajman Mandir6. While considering an application for amendment of a written statement in an SCC suit, this Court observed that an amendment introducing an altogether new factual foundation, necessitating further evidence or permitting a party to resile from clear admissions already made in the written statement, cannot ordinarily be allowed. The Court reiterated that, after commencement of trial, the party seeking amendment must satisfy the requirement of due diligence under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. It was, however, clarified that rejection of an amendment application does not, by itself, preclude a party from raising a pure question of law founded upon the existing pleadings and evidence, provided its determination does not require investigation into fresh facts or cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions may be summarised thus: while an amendment of the written statement, including one introducing an additional or alternative defence, may ordinarily receive a liberal consideration, such latitude remains subject to the statutory restriction contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. Once trial has commenced, the relevance or potential significance of the proposed amendment, the absence of prejudice to the opposite party or the fact that it introduces an additional defence cannot, by themselves, justify its allowance. The applicant must independently satisfy the court that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before commencement of trial. Where the amendment is sought at the stage of final arguments, the court must scrutinise the explanation for the delay with particular care, especially when the proposed plea rests upon facts or circumstances which existed before institution of the suit.
In the light of the aforesaid legal position, the proposed amendment and the explanation furnished by the petitioner require examination.
In the present case, the proposed amendment is founded upon the alleged partition of the property pursuant to Resolution No. 121 dated 07.09.2019 passed by the Kanpur Nagar Nigam. The petitioner seeks to introduce the plea that, pursuant to the aforesaid partition, a separate house number, namely 92-A, was allotted to the portion falling to the share of Smt. Krishna Tripathi, whereas the portion falling to the respondent's share continued to bear house number 92. On this basis, the petitioner seeks to contend that the tenanted accommodation also stood divided between the alleged co-owners, resulting in splitting of the tenancy and affecting the maintainability of the suit in its existing form.
The resolution relied upon by the petitioner is dated 07.09.2019, and the alleged partition is stated to have taken place prior to institution of the SCC suit on 10.01.2020. The petitioner filed his written statement on 18.02.2021, yet no specific plea concerning the alleged partition, the separate municipal identification of the property or the consequential division of the tenanted accommodation was incorporated therein. The facts now sought to be introduced, therefore, pertain to an alleged state of affairs which, according to the petitioner himself, had come into existence before institution of the suit.
The explanation furnished by the petitioner is that he acquired knowledge of the aforesaid facts only in the last week of August 2025. However, a perusal of the amendment application does not disclose any satisfactory particulars explaining the circumstances in which the petitioner acquired such knowledge at that particular point of time. Nor does it indicate what steps had been taken by him earlier to ascertain the relevant facts or why the alleged partition and its consequences could not have been discovered before commencement of trial. A mere assertion of subsequent knowledge, without a satisfactory explanation as to why the matter could not have been raised earlier despite due diligence, would not, by itself, satisfy the statutory requirement.
Another circumstance brought to the notice of this Court by learned counsel for the respondent is that the documents relating to the compromise in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 had already been brought on record by the respondent through Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga on 09.11.2021. Clause 4 of the compromise recognised the respondent's entitlement to collect rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the tenanted accommodation. The record further indicates that an earlier amendment concerning the aforesaid compromise was allowed on 18.05.2024 and the consequential amendment was incorporated in the written statement.
The aforesaid circumstance assumes relevance for the limited purpose of examining the procedural history of the proceedings and the petitioner's awareness of the respondent's claim in respect of the tenanted accommodation. It is, however, necessary to distinguish the earlier proceedings relating to the compromise from the plea of partition now sought to be introduced. The fact that the petitioner had earlier sought and obtained amendment of his written statement after the compromise documents were brought on record would indicate his awareness of the respondent's claim in respect of the tenanted accommodation. It would not, by itself, establish that the petitioner had knowledge of the alleged municipal partition. Nevertheless, the petitioner was required to furnish a satisfactory explanation regarding the circumstances in which the additional facts now sought to be introduced came to his knowledge only in August 2025, particularly when the alleged partition itself pertained to a period prior to institution of the suit.
The proposed amendment was not sought at an initial stage of the proceedings. It was moved on 15.09.2025, after the evidence of both parties had concluded and the matter had reached the stage of final arguments. The respondent had already filed written arguments and the suit was awaiting adjudication. The petitioner, therefore, sought to introduce an additional factual foundation at a stage when the proceedings had substantially advanced. The nature of the proposed amendment would also require examination of the alleged partition, the municipal resolution, the separate identification of the property and the consequential effect, if any, upon the tenanted accommodation.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that the proposed amendment concerns the very question of the landlord-tenant relationship and the alleged splitting of the tenancy and is, therefore, relevant for the effective adjudication of the suit. The submission merits consideration; however, the relevance of the proposed defence cannot be examined in isolation from the statutory restriction imposed by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code.
Even assuming that the proposed defence may have some bearing upon the controversy between the parties, the relevance of a proposed amendment cannot, by itself, dispense with the requirement of due diligence. The petitioner was required to establish that, despite exercising due diligence, the facts sought to be introduced could not have been raised before commencement of trial. The absence of a satisfactory explanation in this regard assumes significance, particularly when the proposed amendment seeks to introduce a factual controversy concerning an event which allegedly took place before institution of the suit. In the absence of satisfaction of the statutory requirement, the amendment could not have been permitted merely on the ground that it might provide an additional defence to the petitioner.
The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner with reference to A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. also requires consideration. The said decision arose in the context of an amendment of the plaint whereby the plaintiff sought to introduce an additional relief. The petitioner seeks to distinguish that situation from the present case, where the defendant seeks amendment of the written statement to introduce an additional defence. The distinction pointed out by learned counsel is relevant for appreciating the nature of the proposed amendment. However, the question whether the amendment seeks to introduce an additional defence, rather than an additional relief in the plaint, does not by itself conclude the issue arising in the present proceedings. The application was moved after commencement of trial and, therefore, its permissibility had necessarily to be examined in the light of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. Even where the proposed amendment seeks to introduce an additional defence in the written statement, the applicant is required to satisfy the statutory requirement that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before commencement of trial. The distinction relied upon by the petitioner does not dispense with that requirement. The decisive consideration in the present case, therefore, is not merely the nature of the proposed amendment, but the petitioner's failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation establishing due diligence.
The submission that the proposed amendment would not cause prejudice to the respondent is also insufficient to warrant interference. Absence of prejudice to the opposite party is certainly a relevant consideration while examining an amendment application; however, it is not a substitute for compliance with the mandatory requirement of the proviso. The statutory condition governing amendment after commencement of trial has to be independently satisfied.
The petitioner has also contended that the direction for time-bound disposal of the suit could not have deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. There can be no disagreement with the proposition that a direction for expeditious disposal does not, by itself, extinguish the jurisdiction of the trial court to consider an application for amendment in accordance with law. Nevertheless, such a direction cannot be construed as conferring an unconditional right upon a party to introduce additional pleadings at an advanced stage of the proceedings. The application was required to be examined in accordance with the statutory requirements, which, in the present case, have not been fulfilled.
Learned counsel for the respondent has also brought to the notice of this Court the proceedings concerning the recall and re-examination of D.W.-1. It is stated that the petitioner's application seeking recall and re-examination of the said witness was rejected by the trial court by order dated 04.02.2025. The said order was affirmed by the Revisional Court on 19.09.2025 in SCC Revision No. 81 of 2025. The petitioner thereafter challenged the orders before this Court in Matters Under Article 227 No. 650 of 2026, wherein the petition was allowed upon a concession made on behalf of the respondent at the admission stage, permitting the petitioner to examine D.W.-1 on the next date fixed, subject to the stipulation that, in default of availing the opportunity so granted, the same would stand closed and the suit would be decided on the basis of the evidence already available on record.
The aforesaid procedural history indicates that the suit had already reached an advanced stage and that the question of granting a further opportunity to lead evidence had also arisen in the course of the proceedings. This circumstance is relevant only for appreciating the stage of the suit and the procedural background in which the present amendment application came to be moved. It does not, by itself, determine the petitioner's entitlement to amendment, which has to be tested independently under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. The rejection of the amendment application is, therefore, required to be sustained on the ground that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the statutory requirement of due diligence.
The learned trial court, while rejecting the amendment application, took into consideration the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the proposed amendment, the circumstances in which the facts were sought to be introduced and the absence of any satisfactory justification for not incorporating them earlier. The learned Revisional Court also examined these aspects and affirmed the conclusion of the trial court. The reasons recorded by the courts below, when examined in the light of the statutory requirement under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, do not disclose any illegality warranting interference.
This Court is conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and is not intended to be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction for reappreciating the material or substituting one possible view for another merely because a different conclusion may also be conceivable. Interference is warranted where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or committed a patent error resulting in manifest injustice.
In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the courts below have exercised their jurisdiction in a manner warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court and affirmed by the learned Revisional Court is founded upon relevant considerations, particularly the advanced stage of the proceedings and the absence of a satisfactory explanation establishing due diligence. The petitioner has, therefore, failed to establish that, despite due diligence, he could not have raised the facts concerning the alleged partition before commencement of trial. The impugned orders do not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court.
For the reasons discussed above, the present petition is dismissed.
It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the question of permissibility of the proposed amendment and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the respective claims of the parties concerning ownership, partition or the landlord-tenant relationship. The learned trial court shall adjudicate the SCC suit independently, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence available on record, and in accordance with law.
Having regard to the fact that the suit was instituted in the year 2020 and has already reached an advanced stage, the learned trial court is directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously and endeavour to conclude the proceedings, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, without granting unnecessary adjournments to either party.
There shall be no order as to costs
