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High Courts(2026) 10 P&H CK 6053

Parveen Kumar Sharma Vs Ramjas

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · 28 Oct 2026 · Deepak Gupta, J

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Judgment

27 paragraphs · 2,022 words

Deepak Gupta, J.

The defendant has filed the present regular second appeal under Section 100 CPC, assailing the judgment and decree dated 01.04.2023 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Panipat, whereby the appeal preferred by him against the judgment and decree dated 13.03.2020 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Samalkha, was partly allowed to the extent of reducing the rate of interest from 2% per month to 6% per annum, while maintaining the decree for recovery of ₹1,10,000/- in favour of the respondent-plaintiff.

2.

Briefly stated, the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery on the averments that the defendant, being known to him, borrowed ₹1,10,000/- on 02.02.2010 for his domestic requirements for a period of five years and executed a pronote and receipt in his favour. It was pleaded that despite expiry of the stipulated period and repeated demands, the defendant failed to repay the amount along with agreed interest. A legal notice dated 21.09.2016 was also served, but without any result, whereafter the suit was instituted on 12.12.2016.

3.

The defendant contested the suit, denying the loan transaction as well as execution of the pronote and receipt. He pleaded that the documents were forged and fabricated and that no amount had ever been borrowed by him. Objections regarding maintainability, limitation and absence of cause of action were also raised.

4.

Issues were framed. To substantiate his claim, the plaintiff examined Joginder Singh, attesting witness, as PW-1 and himself appeared as PW-2. The pronote and receipt were proved as Ex.P-1. The defendant appeared as DW-1 and examined Roshan Lal as DW-2 and Kashmira Singh, Criminal Ahlmad, as DW-3. Copy of FIR No.516 of 2016 was produced as Ex.D-1.

5.

Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial Court held that execution of the pronote and passing of consideration stood established through the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2. The plea of forgery and fabrication was rejected, and the suit was decreed vide judgment dated 13.03.2020. The First Appellate Court concurred with the findings regarding execution of the pronote and liability of the defendant, but reduced the rate of interest to 6% per annum.

6.1

Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Courts below have failed to appreciate that FIR No.516 dated 28.08.2016 had been registered on the complaint of Rajesh Sharma, wherein the appellant was cited as a prosecution witness. It is submitted that immediately thereafter, the plaintiff issued legal notice dated 21.09.2016 and subsequently instituted the recovery suit merely to pressurize the appellant and prevent him from deposing in the criminal proceedings. The suit is, therefore, alleged to be a counterblast to the registration of the FIR.

6.2

Learned counsel further submits that the pronote and receipt are forged and manipulated documents. By pointing out towards Ex.P1, particular emphasis has been laid upon the words "पाँचवर्ष" (five years), which allegedly appear in different ink and were subsequently inserted to extend the period of repayment and overcome the bar of limitation. It is argued that the alleged pronote is dated 02.02.2010, whereas the suit was instituted on 12.12.2016, and that without the disputed stipulation, the claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation.

6.3

Learned counsel submits that the Courts below have failed to appreciate these material circumstances and have erroneously decreed the suit.

7.

Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and examined the judgments of both Courts below, this Court finds that the controversy essentially concerns the genuineness of the loan transaction, the alleged alteration in the pronote and the consequent question of limitation.

9.

Insofar as the contention that the suit was instituted as a counterblast to the criminal proceedings is concerned, the learned Trial Court specifically considered the same. It noticed that the pronote bears the date 02.02.2010, whereas the FIR was registered in August 2016. Merely because the legal notice was issued and the suit was instituted subsequent to registration of the FIR, it cannot necessarily be inferred that the loan transaction was fictitious or that the pronote was fabricated. The sequence of events may furnish a circumstance for evaluating the credibility of the plaintiff's version, but cannot, by itself, establish forgery.

10.

It is also significant that the defendant had not specifically pleaded in his written statement that the pronote was fabricated to prevent him from appearing as a prosecution witness. The learned Trial Court noticed this deficiency and held that the defendant could not establish a material factual defence beyond his pleadings. Even otherwise, the defendant failed to produce cogent evidence connecting the alleged fabrication of the pronote with the criminal proceedings. The Courts below were, therefore, justified in declining to accept the plea merely on the basis of the chronology of events.

11.

The more substantial contention concerns the alleged interpolation of the words "पाँचवर्ष" in the pronote. A perusal of the document shows that the said words form part of the handwritten portion concerning the period of the loan. The learned Trial Court itself noticed that these words appeared to have been written in different ink. The significance of this circumstance cannot be altogether disregarded, particularly because the stipulated period of repayment has a direct bearing upon limitation.

12.

Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provides that a material alteration made in a negotiable instrument without the consent of the party sought to be bound may render the instrument void against such party, unless the alteration was made to carry out the common intention of the original parties. An unauthorized subsequent alteration extending the period of repayment would be material, as it affects the terms of liability and may alter the commencement of limitation. However, a distinction must be maintained between an alteration actually made after execution; and a variation in handwriting or ink, which formed part of the document when executed. The latter does not, merely on account of such variation, attract Section 87.

13.

Where a negotiable instrument bears an apparent and material alteration, the party seeking to enforce it may be required to satisfactorily explain the alteration. The burden cannot invariably be placed upon the defendant merely because he has not examined a handwriting expert. Equally, a difference in ink, without more, does not conclusively establish the time at which the writing was made. The question has to be determined upon the entire evidence, including the testimony of persons present at execution and the surrounding circumstances.

14.

In the present case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW-2 and Joginder Singh, the attesting witness, as PW-1. Both witnesses supported the transaction and the stipulation of repayment after five years. PW-1 specifically deposed that the defendant executed the pronote in his presence and received ₹1,10,000/- from the plaintiff. Their testimonies were tested through cross-examination. The learned Trial Court found that the material aspects of the transaction remained established. The First Appellate Court independently considered the allegation of interpolation and concurred with the conclusion that no unauthorized subsequent alteration had been proved.

15.

The difference in ink noticed by the Trial Court must therefore be considered along with the affirmative oral evidence concerning the terms of the transaction. The plaintiff's version regarding the five-year period was not founded exclusively upon the disputed writing but was also supported by the testimony of PW-1. The Courts below accepted that evidence. Although the absence of expert evidence cannot, by itself, defeat a plea of alteration, the defendant failed to establish through the available evidence that the disputed words were introduced after execution without his consent. The concurrent conclusion is thus founded upon an assessment of the document and the oral evidence, rather than upon the mere absence of a handwriting expert.

16.

The learned Trial Court also considered the defendant's own testimony and noticed that, notwithstanding his categorical denial in the written statement, he gave evasive answers during cross-examination concerning the execution of the pronote and its terms. The Court further examined the discrepancies pointed out in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 and found that they did not affect the essential facts of execution and payment of consideration. The First Appellate Court affirmed these findings. No material contradiction has been established, which would render the concurrent appreciation of evidence wholly unreasonable or perverse.

17.

Once execution of the promissory note is established, Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act raises a rebuttable presumption regarding consideration. In Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the presumption may be rebutted by direct or circumstantial evidence and by circumstances appearing from the plaintiff's own case. The standard applicable is that of preponderance of probabilities.

18.

Although the Trial Court used the expression "beyond reasonable doubt" while discussing the allegation of fraud, the ultimate findings regarding execution and consideration are supported by affirmative evidence and have been independently affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The use of that expression does not, in the circumstances, by itself warrant reversal of the decree.

19.

The objection regarding limitation requires examination in the light of the nature and terms of the instrument. Under Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit upon a promissory note payable at a fixed time after its date is governed by a period of three years commencing when the note falls due. In contrast, Article 35 applies to a promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, in which case limitation ordinarily commences from the date of the instrument.

20.

The question is therefore not merely whether the words "पाँचवर्ष" appear in the pronote, but whether, upon a proper construction of the instrument as a whole, they constitute an agreed postponement of the time for repayment. The Courts below have proceeded upon the plaintiff's pleaded case that the amount was advanced for five years and have accepted the evidence supporting that stipulation. On that construction, the amount became repayable upon expiry of the stipulated period in February 2015, and the suit instituted on 12.12.2016 would be within the prescribed period of three years. The legal notice dated 21.09.2016 does not independently extend limitation.

21.

It is pertinent that the learned Trial Court framed a specific issue regarding limitation, although the judgment records that the said issue was not pressed at the stage of arguments. The appellant's present challenge to limitation is inseparably connected with the alleged interpolation. Once the finding regarding the genuineness of the stipulated repayment period is sustained, the factual foundation of the plea that the suit was barred by limitation stands substantially displaced.

22.

The contention that the Courts below failed to consider the defence raised by the appellant is also not borne out from the judgments. The Trial Court expressly examined the alleged difference in ink, the circumstances surrounding registration of the FIR, the discrepancies in the oral evidence and the plea of fabrication. The First Appellate Court also addressed the allegation of interpolation and affirmed the finding regarding execution of the pronote. Thus, this is not a case, where the Courts below have altogether omitted to consider a material defence.

23.

The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. Interference is warranted, where such findings are perverse, based upon no evidence, or suffer from a material legal infirmity. Reference may be made to Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722, and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (dead) through LRs, (2001) 3 SCC 179.

24.

In the present case, the findings regarding execution of the pronote, passing of consideration and the alleged interpolation have been recorded upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The appellant essentially seeks reassessment of the same material. No perversity or disregard of material evidence has been demonstrated, which would justify interference in second appeal.

25.

Accordingly, no substantial question of law arises for determination in the present appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.